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A brief (max. 10 sentences long) professional CV in English.

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## NEWS BRIEF

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DEAR READER,

THE KHALILI COLLECTION ON WORLD TOUR

The Khalili Collection of Islamic Art is the largest privately owned collection of Islamic art in the world. Its founder, Prof. Nasser D. Khalili, the Iranian born British property developer and art collector may be the proud owner of more than 20,000 objects of Islamic art that were created between the 7th and early 20th centuries.

A fine selection of several hundred objects of the Khalili Collection, including rare Qur’ans and illustrated manuscripts, exquisite glass, ceramics and jewellery, magnificent textiles, carpets and paintings, was exhibited at major museums and cultural institutions worldwide. More recently, in 2007 an exhibition was organized at the Art Gallery of New South Wales, Sydney, which was followed by a larger one in 2008 at the Emirates Palace, Abu Dhabi and at the Institut du Monde Arabe, Paris in 2009-2010.

Finally it arrived to Amsterdam at the Nieuwe Kerk, where 471 masterpieces were shown between 11 December 2010 and 17 April 2011 in an exhibition entitled ‘Passion for Perfection’. All those who were fortunate to visit it were impressed by the splendour of the objects installed in this 600 years old church, making use of lots of mirrors. Not for nothing underlined Prof. Khalili in his televised message the particular symbolism of this exhibition: an exquisite collection of Islamic art, owned by a Jew, and exhibited in a Christian Church.

Next to the size and quality of the collection, the vision of its founder is also of particular relevance. His sense of mission is comprised in four pillars: conservation, research, publication, and exhibition. Several elements of this concept are visible also to the general public: splendid exhibitions worldwide, beautiful exhibition catalogs generally available, and the crown jewel: a unique effort to publish a comprehensive series of 27 volumes of the Collection. This project is partially completed, it is still under way, and when completed, it will constitute an unparalleled survey of the arts of the Islamic world.

We can be very thankful to Prof. Khalili for his vision and unlimited devotion for art in general and Islamic art in particular. Let us hope that more and more people will follow him in the quest for conserving, researching, publishing, and exhibiting the major artistic achievements of mankind.

Flórián Farkas
Editor-in-Chief

The Hague, June 30, 2011
HISTORY
BÉRCZI, Szaniszló

Ancient Arts of the Caucasus Region

Example issue from the Coloring Booklet Series of Eurasian Arts

The Hungarians presently living in the Carpathian Basin are connected with many cultural threads to the peoples of the Caucasus region. These threads of connections form a complex network due to migrations and countless cultural contacts among the peoples of the Eurasian steppe. However, the strongest tie for Hungarians is with the Caucasus: after Prince Árpád moved with his people to the Carpathian Basin, their relatives, the savartoi asphaloi remained in the vicinity of the Caucasus. The chronicles remember Savardian (Sabirian) Hungarians, too.

Fig. 1. The front cover of the booklet exhibits the outer wall relief sculptures of the famous church of Akhtamar, Turkey (Earlier it was erected as Armenian Catholic Church.)

Those, who are interested in the arts, ethnography (i.e. cultural anthropology) and archaeology, may discover similarities between the cultural artefacts of the Caucasus peoples and Hungarians, because both in architecture, smiths work and goldsmith arts, ornamental arts, and any other field of the everyday life

1 The complete series can be accessed in electronic format at: http://www.federatio.org/tkte.html. The graphical illustrations of this paper are the author’s drawings and paintings.
one can find parallel objects, ideas, lifestyle between the products of the Carpathian Basin heritage and Caucasus Mountains heritage.

The history of the peoples of the Caucasus and of the Carpathian Basin is extraordinarily varied, and Hungarians always kept contacts alive with the peoples of the Caucasus. The Russian tsar had a Georgian-Hungarian cavalry (Hussar) corps. The Armenians escaped several times from their Caucasian homeland and have chosen Hungary as their new homeland. The four towns of the Armenians are well-known in Transylvania: Szamosújvár, Erzsébetváros, Gyergyószentmiklós and Csíkszávár.

Fig. 2. Detailed drawings of the famous Maikop silver cup. It is an early map of the Caucasus Mountains and the two main rivers springing from it: the Tigris and Euphrates.

Thanks to the results of archaeological research more and more is revealed of the contacts in elder days. The ancient Hungarian chronicles frequently guide us to the regions of the Caucasus (e.g. Lebedia). Nimrod organized his people in this region; several ranks, titles of the old tribe system reveals a proximity with the ancient Assyrians (see Viktor Padányi).

Russian archaeology carried out excavations in the foreground of the Caucasus and found Scythian kurgans in several places, e.g. at Kelermes and Maikop. On the other side of the Mountain system western archaeologists found ruins and burials of Urartu and Assyrian origin. The best known of them is the Ziwiye royal burial. The archaeologists found the Mesopotamian heritage on both sides of the Caucasus Mountains.
Fig. 3. Compilation from a detail from the Ziwiye burial and an ancient stone carving from Urartu.
The king powders the palmettos.

What makes the art of Caucasus extremely valuable is the fact that it exhibits a rich stratification of the several cultures since times memorial. We can follow among others the blossoming of ancient Christian arts since the birth of Christ through the first autocephaly churches. In this period the old Scythian artistic elements occur together with the Christian artistic elements. One beautiful example is the common occurrence of these traditions in the sculptural decorations of the Akhtamar Church.

Fig. 4. Compilation from a detail of the Akhtamar Church’s outer wall relief.
The Akhtamar Church has similar significance for the Armenians that the Ják Church for Hungarians. (Ják Church is an ancient Romanesque style church in Western-Hungary, where old artistic architecture and sculpture was preserved during the stormy centuries of the last 800 years). The Akhtamar Church remained more or less intact on an island in the Lake Van. Probably it remained preserved because the scenes on the carvings of the outside walls were taken from both the Old and the New Testament, and also from the ancient Scythian and Mesopotamian art. On the one hand the Old Testament is also part of the Islamic tradition, and on the other hand the Turks (Seljuk and Osman) appreciated the old steppe traditions as worthy for preservation, too.

Fig. 5. Goldsmith works frequently exhibit traditional animal fight scenes in the old Caucasian arts.

In our coloring booklet we extended the meaning of the Caucasus Region with old Armenia in the South, and with the Kuban Region and Volga River Region in the North. In the northern regions the Scythian organized empires for longer periods, in the southern regions the Urartians, Assyrians and Armenians. The Caucasus Region played an exceptional role from a civilization perspective: e.g. it was the birthplace of metallurgical technologies. The know-how of bronze metallurgy then of the iron made or broke empires during the centuries. In the Hittite Empire, the south-eastern neighbour of the region, steel making was for a long time a state secret.

The best known ancient peoples of the Caucasus Region are: the Scythians, the Urartians, the Assyrians, the Armenians, the Alans, the Chazarians, the Onogurians, the Huns and Hungarians, the Georgians (Gruzians) and Abkhazians, the Cherkhesiens, the Osetians and the Azerians. One of my friends visited Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan and travelling in the metro he discovered a wall painting adorning a station: Hunor and Magyar (the mythic ancestors of the Huns and Hungarians) hunting the Miracle Stag. He asked his colleagues? How it is here? You must know it better – was the answer. Hungarians are warmly welcomed in the Caucasus and in Central-Asia.
Fig. 6. Stone carvings also frequently exhibit traditional animal fight scenes; however, signs of the presence of Christianity is also involved in this old Caucasian art products.

The Eurasian animal style drawings occupy important place in the Caucasus Art coloring booklet. Visitors of the State Hermitage Museum of Saint Petersburg may get a deep impression of this art from. The Scythian finds were those which connected the ancient Hungarian (Árpád age) arts to the Eurasian steppe arts. On the basis of this art archaeologists recognized the connections between the Andronovo and Afanasievo cultures, and the ancient Mesopotamian arts.

Fig. 7. Rich Romanesque sculpture, paintings and architecture can be found in the Christian states of Georgia and Armenia. Doorway decoration in the Geghard Monastery, Armenia.
Migrating Mesopotamians moved through the Caucasus and Central-Asia and exported their culture to the steppe region. These people were able to build towns, had a writing system, the know-how to build irrigation systems, used developed metallurgy to make instruments and tools, could construct cars, and were skilled riders; they disseminated in Eurasia their art, culture and their agglutinating language – as researched and documented by László Götz in his famous encyclopaedia: The Sun Rises in the East. The common heritage found in the Hun-Scythian royal burials can only be understood in this way, opines Dr. Götz – be their location the South-Russian Steppe, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, the Krims, the Caucasus, the Altai-Mountains, Kudyrga, Pazyryk, or Nuin Ula.

Fig. 8. Filigree and enamel artefacts were characteristic. Shown here is the canteen of King Attila, the Hun (from the scattered treasury of Western Eurasia, left and right) or the Kelermes plate (center).

Fig. 9. Romanesque art in Georgia, Msehta.
The Solar Calendar system of 12 months is symbolised on this outer wall carving.
The rich cultural heritage of the Caucasus Region formed an organic part of the people of Prince Árpád. The early Árpád Age architecture, the churches, especially the circular churches, the goldsmith and enamel art are the best known evidences of these connections. The travels of the Dominican fraters to the Caucasus Region led by Frater Julian in the 13th century recalled these links. Connections from later period were also discovered by László Bendefy, in the Vatican Library. He found bulls of popes from the 13th-14th century on the appointment of bishops in the Caucasian Kuma-Hungarian Kingdom. (King Jeretyán asked the pope for a bishop appointment in his country). We hope that as the earlier booklets, the Ancient Arts of the Caucasus Region booklet will invoke your enthusiasm and inspiration when you read and paint, regardless of being an adult, student, or child.

Fig. 10. Romanesque art in Georgia, and Armenia: as if folk tales were told, animals are fighting, priests are worshiping on these tympanums from church gates…

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OBRUSÁNSZKY, Borbála

Special Objects of the Hunnic Administration

During the past one and a half century scholars developed many theories about the state of the Huns and their administration system. Among researchers there is no unanimity on the operation of the Hunnic state, moreover, some scholars debate even the existence of the state itself.

In order to clarify the history of the Huns and their administration system, we should not rely on the researchers’ opinions only because in many cases they reflect some modern way of thinking regarding the state. We would choose the right research method, if we took into account the historical sources of the related period and we involved those sources of the steppe peoples, which preserved the heritage of the Huns (i.e. the Turkic, Mongolian, Hungarian and some ancient states in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus).

From the related sources it is clear that the Huns and their descendants had a very well-organised administration system. It was based on two pillars, i.e. self-governance or tribal and central or royal system, which operated together. It was the result of a very effective development, and it can be observed during medieval times, e.g. in the Hungarian Kingdom or the Mongolian Empire. According to the Chinese chronicles, the administrative system of the Huns was as simple as the control of only one person. With that system they controlled a huge empire. Shi Ji 110 tells us the following: “Their lands, however, are divided into regions under the control of various leaders. They have no writing, and even promises and agreements are only verbal.”

I was curious how the steppe people could effectively organise the administration of the territory under their control. Whether they used only verbal communication in order to manage their country, or they had conventional signs, which were known to everyone, even by the farthest rural communities of the empire that have accepted them. I found some examples from the ancient Hungarian provincial administrative devices, which were unknown in the European countries, so I looked for their Inner Asian parallels, which date back to the Hunnic period. Let us take a look at some characteristic devices!

Seal and gerege

In ancient times, when literacy was not spread over the steppe kingdoms, in the countryside the judge summoned witnesses by an ancient object accepted by everybody. The nomads, who lived scattered in the vast steppe regions, needed an effective information passing system in order to let the news reach the most distant territories.

The seal was one of the oldest authentication devices in the steppe society, also among the Huns. Probably, it originated from tamga (seal for animals) or other special clan signs. Among the findings of

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1 The Chinese Shi Ji, Hou Han shu, Jin shu, History of Caucasian Albanians, the Byzantine Procopius, etc.
the Huns clan symbols were carved on objects and they appeared on coins of Central-Asia and of the Northern Indian Hunnic Empires. Seals had important role in the administration of the Huns, it represented shanyu’s will, and it was the symbol of sovereignty.

Inside the Hunnic administration there was a high ranking officer. He was the seal-holder (pichigechi). In addition to the shanyu, some kings or wangs and some cities had their own seals. The latter had a special meaning: cities inside the Hun Empire enjoyed special, i.e. collective rights, as later the Western European ones.

The other special device used by steppe administration was the belge or gerege (better known as paizi). It can be considered as the first “passport” and it had a very important role in the communication and diplomacy among tribes. The tribal leaders or later the emperors had numerous envoys that went on special missions. They used a circular wooden or metal object, which was certified by the leader of emperor himself. With the help of that device the holder of it was able to prove his identity and legality.

This device has a Eurasian nomadic origin, the mention of this object can be found from Northern-China via the Caucasus to the Hungarian Kingdom, where the billog was used. The first appearance of that object had occurred in the Hun Empire. In those times the nomads used a very developed communication system. The historian G. Sukhbaatar proved that the use of the paizi had been continuous from the Huns to the Mongolian Empire. In these two empires the kings or khagans strictly regulated their usage. As literacy spread among the peoples of the steppe, they began to use written documents instead of the billog or paizi. We can observe that process in the Hungarian Kingdom and the Mongolian Empire, too.

**Written sticks**

In the process of administration one of the most important events was the collection of duties. In the Hun Empire, as in other traditional steppe pastoral societies – as the Chinese chronicles inform us – autumn was the time when this happened. The Shi Ji 110 records the following: “In autumn, when horses are fat, another great meeting is held at the Dai Ling when a reckoning is held of the number of persons and animals.”

Among the steppe people there was a special device used for this type administration. Unfortunately, only little data remained about it. However, a special device or written stick was used in the ancient

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2 The best known coin findings are from the Kidarits and Hepthalits.

3 The best example: When the new Chinese Emperor, Wang Mang wanted to collect the seals of the Southern Hun shanyu, some rejected that order. They were right, because the Emperor changed some expressions on the new seal: instead of Xiong-nu shanyu, the new version read: Xin-Xiongnu shanyu – or under the dominance of the Xin dynasty. The other change was the name of the seal: instead of xi, or the seal for shanyu or emperor, Wang Mang wanted to use a form that was used only as seal for a minister or official.

4 The Inner-Mongolian scholar Uchiraltu reconstructed this title. According to Katalin Csornai, the title is bichigechi. It is similar to what Uchiraltu discovered, and to the Russian word pechat. The Hungarian word for seal is “pecsét”, which is the same as the above mentioned expression.

5 khagan, shanyu or king

6 The special Hungarian expression for that is “rovásbot” or runic stick.
Hungarian rural administration. It was an ancient method for collecting duties, but its usage was widespread in commercial transactions. Such special sticks have been found along the cities of the Silk Road, where thanks to the dry weather these objects have been preserved. The Hungarian shepherds preserved this kind of method until the end of the 19th century; we can see several samples of it in some local museums. On the stick the tax collector carved the number of the animals, and he continuously recorded the changes of the herd in question. Both sides of the stick were used for tax administration. When the stick became full, the local head of the administration preserved it for quite a long time.

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ARCHAEOLOGY
БАЯР, Довдой

Дорнод монголын хүн чулуудыг бүтээсэн цаг үе,
хиий дурсгээлэйн асуудал

Монгол орны дорнод нутагт тархсан эртний түүх соёлын олон төрөл төрөл нутаг дотор орнооцдог уран хийцтэй хүн чулууны онцгой байр суурь ээлдэг. Эдгээр өөрөөг анх илэрхийлж олж судалсан амьдралын судалгаа дунд тэгээд эрүүлгийн холбоогоны цаг, учир холбоогоны аж ахуйн зооогоо боломжтой санааг нь 1980-аад орд ШУЯ-нын түүхийн хүрээлэнгээс төмөлөн илэээн судалданье хэсгийн ажлын дүрмийг буюу Цагаан булсны өдөр нэгэн төрөл дурсгалаар баяжуулан өгсөн болно.

Дурсгалын судлагдсан байдлаа. Дорнод Монголын хүн чулуудыг анх судалж нийтэд мэдээлэсэн эрдэмтэн бол Зөвлөлтийн судлаач В.А.Казакевич бичгээ 1927 онд Дарьганын өвөг дүрсийг хэрэглүүлэн судалгааны ажлын хажуудаа тухайн нутагт буй эртний дурсгалт зүйлсийг мөн нэгэн адил хамруулан судалсаны дотор 17 хүн чулуу илэрхийлэн олоод тодорхойлно бичиж зургийн хамт нийтгүүлжээ (1).

Цаашлал. Энэ дурсгалын судалгааны загвар хийцээ хүн чулуу гагцхүү өдөгчдийн манай улсын нутаг дэрээсээр нэгэн орногийн зүйл нэгэн орноо нутаг дугаалд хөрөг дүрсийг хөрөг дүрсийг бүрэн бахархажээ. Мөн ОХУ-нын Буриадын нутгийн нутаг нутгийн чүлэн нутгийн хүрээнд баяжуулан өгсөн бөгөөд нутгийн эрчим үеийн дурсгалын тархалтыг хөрсөө өргөтөн тэлсээр байна.

Хийц дурсгээлэйн онцлог. Хүн дурсгээл өдгөө орноо наар нь бүтээсэн цаг үеийн дүрмийн дунд нэгэн эрчим элэээн төгсгөн нь хүрээ зөвлөөгүй эхээр эгч үзэж ээлдэг. Энэ нь нэг талаар, эртний хүмүүс нь эрчим элэээн төгсгөн орноо наар нь хүрээлэнгээ дөрөг дурсгээнд орноо нутаг нутгийн хүрээнд баяжуулан өгсөн бөгөөд нутгийн эрчим үеийн дурсгалын тархалтыг хөрсөө өргөтөн тэлсээр байна.
туурихах бүтээлээ ажиллаа бэлэн болох богцд олон зууны түрүүд хүн хөшөө орлол хийхэд баримтлалыг арилн іслээ бэлэн болсно. Тиймээс ч Евразийн тал хөрөнд нутгийн амьдрааг овог аймгийн дунд юм үйл болохын төлөөдө өмнөх эдгээр дурсгалыг яагаад хадгалагдан үлдэж ээ. ХУ-ын эрдэмтэд Я.А.Шер удътгэр дурсгалыг 7 төрөл үйлд хуван амилсан байдаг.

1. Өмнөд Оросын тал нутаг дахь үхрийн үйлхэн хүн чулуу
2. Өмнөд Оросын тал нутаг дахь томрийн үйлхэн хүн чулуу
3. Монгол, Сибирь буй томрийн үйлхэн буяу хөшөө
4. Монгол, Сибирь, Түркестан дахь Түрэгийн хүн чулуу Өмнөд Оросын тал нутаг дахь Половцын буяу Команы хүн чулуу(14).

Сүүлэт үйлхэн судалгааны баримтууд Дорнод Монголын хүн чулуу өөр болон анагаан урлаж байх бөгөөд олон зууны туршид хүн хөсөө хийхэд баримтлах нарийн дэг жааг бүрээд тогтсон байна. Тиймээс ч Евразийн тал хөрөнд нутгийн амьдралыг амьдрааг овог аймгийн дунд юм үйл болохын төлөөдө өмнөх эдгээр дурсгалыг яагаад хадгалагдан үлдэж ээ. ХУ-ын эрдэмтэд Я.А.Шер удътгэр дурсгалыг 7 төрөл үйлд хуван амилсан байдаг.

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Хөшөөний хийц төрөл төдийгүй эдгээр хөшөодийн дэргэд зориудаар цогцлон байгуулаган чулуун байгуулагхүүд нь мөн ялагаатай, тухайлбал түрэгийн хүн чулуу нь дөрвөлжин хэнбарээр хайрцаглан суулагсан хөшөө, хээний чулуун хавтанг хашлалаа, хөшөөний омноос зүүн омно цувуулж зоосон "балбал" хэмээнээ ээ чулуу, том хэмжээнэй дурсгалуудад зөрчний түрэгийн рүүн бичээст пайлуур хөшөө ээргүй зүйлс заавал байдал. Дорнод Монголын чулуун хөргийн ойролцоо эдгээр шаар арь арь нь та жийсэн бол өөрөө эрхгүй дургүйч чулуу овоохон дүүргүй байгуулагч эмнеб болох гээл нь байрлалдах байна. Харин ургацуулалтын хувьд эдгээрийн арь арь нь буулуу биолог ба хайрлаж байх, тахил тайлгын чөгөөг хайруулах бол бүх нь нөлөөлдсөн билээ.

Цаг хугацааны талаар. Хүн чулуун хөшөөний он цагийг тогтооход тэдгээр дурсгалын тодорхой зээл хувцас, эдгэээр хээрэлэлтийн хэлбэр дурс, гээг усээ засч янзах арга магт зөрчний он цаг нь тодорхой зээл ээргүй байдал хардуулагдсан хүнд баригдааг. Хүн чулуун хөшөө нь түүхий он цагийг тодорхой мэдэгдэж байгаа аргаар эндэл зөвчөөрөөс тогтоосон байгааг ургацааны хувьд тодорхой мэдээлэл болсон бөгөөд хөргүүдийг чулуу оволж бөгөөд 153 болсон байна. Дорнод Монголын хүн чулуудын онцолоо нүүрнээс баригдаагаар ургацааны хувьд бүрэн алдагдаалт болсон. Хүн чулууны дурсгал нь хүн чулуун тодорхой зээл ээргүй байдал, түүхий он цагийн хувцааны гээл болсон бөгөөд эдгээр тодорхой зээлээс нийтээс нийгэмээр хүлээн зөвшөөрөх үеийн хөшөөнд байгааг тодорхой мэдээлэл болсон бөгөөд хөргүүдийг чулуу оволж бөгөөд 157 болсон байна. Уг хөшөө нь хөргүүдийг чулуу оволж бөгөөд 157 болсон байна.
мужийн нутаг, хуучнаар бол Хавт Хасарын үгсэндээ эээмшил нутаг, Хархираагийн хот хэмээн эртний балгасын ойролцоо мэдээлэл XIII зуны уеийн булшнаас биеэээред олсон билээ (23). Үүчилэн ын хэлбэрээр эдэнд XIII-XIV зуны монголчуудыг дурсэлсэн персиий миниатюр хэмээн номд ниймээлээ эзэр. нангиад урчлудын бүтээсэн монгол хүмүүсийн хөрөг зургүүдад олонтаа дурсэлджээ.

Дорнод Монголын хөрөгдэд бүтэн биеэр нь холтой нь дурсэлдэг учир гутлын хэлбэр дурс их тодорхой эмэээн. Эртний монголчдүү одоогооных шиг ээтэн хоншоортой бус билгээ, харин ялгуу шөвгөрдүү мухран хоншоортой гутал эмсдөг байсан нь тухайн уеийн уран зургийн дурсгалд байна гүн дурсэлдэггээ гадна тээсүүл булшнаас ч биеэээред олддог. Эртний монгол гутлын ын хэлбэр дурс оноогийн бүрэн, эдчээрлэхийг эзэр монгол ясны гуталд тэр хөөрөрөө хадгалдан улдээжээ.

Судлан бүхий хөрөгүүдийн цаг үе, усаас хамаарлыг тодруулж хамгийн онцгой өнөөгийн дүрслэвэр нь тэдгээрийн гэзгээг үс ям. Дундад зууны монголчууд дурсгал эзэр нь харэн засч явдлагыг талаар урчилж байсан Блано Карпини, Вильгельм Рубрук (24), Сюй Тин, Пэн Да Я (25), Жан Хун (26) тэр бүрдээр ардчаа дүрслэгджеэ. Энэ нь тодорхой тэмдэглэлээ дүрсэлжээ. Эртний монгол гутлын ийм хэлбэр дүрс өнөөгийн булшнаас биетээрээ олдсон билээ. Эртний монгол гутлын ын хэлбэр дүрс өнөөгийн буриад, өвөрлөгчдөд булшнаас биетээрээ олддог. Энэ нь тэдгээрийн хөөрөрөө хадгалдан улдээжээ.

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Эдгээр дурсгалын он цагийг тодорхойлж бас нэг баримт бол Сүхбаатар аймгийн Онгон сумын нутаг Шивээтийн Гурван овоо хэмээн газарт буй нэгэн хөргийн дэргэдээ чулуун байгуулагжийг мэлтэн сугаахад нэгэн булш илэрсэн дотроос XI, XII зууну үеийн зоос олдсон явдал юм. Энэ нь хөрөг чулуу бүхий энэхүү байгуулагжийг ямар ч атуулын XII зууны хүнийг хойших үед цогцлон байгуулах болохыг үрдсэн. Үүнээс үзэхэд Дорнод Монголын хүн чулууд нь XIII-XIV зууны үеийн алтан ургийн их хааны усныг орж ирэхийг дагналж байна. Эдгээр дурсгалын он цагийг тодорхойлж бас нэг баримт бол Сүхбаатар аймгийн Онгон сумын нутаг Шивээтийн Гурван овоо хэмээн газарт буй нэгэн хөргийн дэргэдээ чулуун байгуулагжийг мэлтэн сугаахад нэгэн булш илэрсэн дотроос XI, XII зууну үеийн зоос олдсон явдал юм. Энэ нь хөрөг чулуу бүхий энэхүү байгуулагжийг ямар ч атуулын XII зууны хүнийг хойших үед цогцлон байгуулах болохыг үрдсэн. Үүнээс үзэхэд Дорнод Монголын хүн чулууд нь XIII-XIV зууны үеийн алтан ургийн их хааны усныг орж ирэхийг дагналж байна. Эдгээр дурсгалын он цагийг тодорхойлж бас нэг баримт бол Сүхбаатар аймгийн Онгон сумын нутаг Шивээтийн Гурван овоо хэмээн газарт буй нэгэн хөргийн дэргэдээ чулуун байгуулагжийг мэлтэн сугаахад нэгэн булш илэрсэн дотроос XI, XII зууну үеийн зоос олдсон явдал юм. Энэ нь хөрөг чулуу бүхий энэхүү байгуулагжийг ямар ч атуулын XII зууны хүнийг хойших үед цогцлон байгуулах болохыг үрдсэн. Үүнээс үзэхэд Дорнод Монголын хүн чулууд нь XIII-XIV зууны үеийн алтан ургийн их хааны усныг орж ирэхийг дагналж байна. Эдгээр дурсгалын он цагийг тодорхойлж бас нэг баримт бол Сүхбаатар аймгийн Онгон сумын нутаг Шивээтийн Гурван овоо хэмээн газарт буй нэгэн хөргийн дэргэдээ чулуун байгуулагжийг мэлтэн сугаахад нэгэн булш илэрсэн дотроос XI, XII зууну үеийн зоос олдсон явдал юм. Энэ нь хөрөг чулуу бүхий энэхүү байгуулагжийг ямар ч атуулын XII зууны хүнийг хойших үед цогцлон байгуулах болохыг үрдсэн. Үүнээс үзэхэд Дорнод Монголын хүн чулууд нь XIII-XIV зууны үеийн алтан ургийн их хааны усныг орж ирэхийг дагналж байна. Эдгээр дурсгалын он цагийг тодорхойлж бас нэг баримт бол Сүхбаатар аймгийн Онгон сумын нутаг Шивээтийн Гурван овоо хэмээн газарт буй нэгэн хөргийн дэргэдээ чулуун байгуулагжийг мэлтэн сугаахад нэгэн булш илэрсэн дотроос XI, XII зууну үеийн зоос олдсон явдал юм. Энэ нь хөрөг чулуу бүхий энэхүү байгуулагжийг ямар ч атуулын XII зууны хүнийг хойших үед цогцлон байгуулах болохыг үрдсэн. Үүнээс үзэхэд Дорнод Монголын хүн чулууд нь XIII-XIV зууны үеийн алтан ургийн их хааны усныг орж ирэхийг дагналж байна. Эдгээр дурсгалын он цагийг тодорхойлж бас нэг баримт бол Сүхбаатар аймгийн Онгон сумын нутаг Шивээтийн Гурван овоо хэмээн газарт буй нэгэн хөргийн дэргэдээ чулуун байгуулагжийг мэлтэн сугаахад нэгэн булш илэрсэн дотроос XI, XII зуunу үеийн зоос олдson явдал юм. Энэ нь хөрөг чулуу бүхий энэхүү байгуулагжийг ямар ч атуuлын XII зуunы хүнийг хойших үед цогцлон байгуuлах болохыг үрдсэн. Үүнээс үзэхэд Дорнод Монголын хүн чулууд нь XIII-XIV зуunы үеийн алтан ургийн их хааны уsныг орж ирэхийг дагналж байна. Эдгээр дурсгалын он цагийг тодорхойлж бас нэг баримт бол Сүхбаатар аймгийн Онгон сумын нутаг Шивээтийн Гурван овоо хэмээн газарт буй нэгэн хөргийн дэргэдээ чулуун байгуулагжийг мэлтэн сугаахад нэгэн булш илэрсэн дотроos XI, XII зууну үеийн зоos олдson явдал юм. Энэ нь хөрөг чулуу бүхий энэхүү байгуулагжийг ямар ч атуuлын XII зуunы хүнийг хойших үед цогцлон байгуuлах болохыг үрдсэн.


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BAYAR, Dovdoi: Questions on the Preparation Time and Method of the Idols of Eastern Mongolia

Throughout the vast Mongolian steppe we can find lots of idols, which represent the ancient cult of ancestors of the Scythian-Hunnish clans. In front of the statues local people performed rites of sacrifice for their forefathers since prehistory.

The investigation of these statues began in the 1920s, when Russian scholars identified some and tried to classify them. They set up a classification system for the idols of the Eurasian steppe consisting of seven classes: idols of the Bronze Age of the Southern Russian steppes, idols of the Iron Age around the Yenisey River, idols of the Iron Age of the Southern Russian steppes, deer stones in Mongolia and Siberia of the Iron Age, Tashtikin idols from Southern Siberia, idols of the Turks (Mongolia, Siberia, Turkestan) and idols of the Cuman of the Southern Russian steppes.

Scholars of the Mongolian Academy of Sciences began to investigate the idols in Eastern-Mongolia in the 1980s under the leadership of Dovdoi Bayar and found 69 special statues, which differ from those classified under the seven classes mentioned above. They belong to the Mongolian period (13th-14th century).

The paper presents their importance and describes the special features of these late idols. The author compared Mongolian statues with other ones and found some similarities, mainly with the Cuman ones.
LINGUISTICS
CSORNAI, Katalin

The Literary Remains of the Hun Language in the Ancient Chinese Chronicles.

Part One: The Dignitaries

Introduction

The fact that the history of the Huns goes back to the Far-East and that the different names in the Chinese chronicles like jiehun, gekun, xianyun, hunyu, xiongrong, xiongnu, etc., refer to the Asian Huns and their related tribes is becoming more and more evident.¹ So the history of the Asian Huns is the part and parcel of the history of the European Huns and the deeds and traditions of the former ones can easily be traced and found in the ancient Chinese chronicles.² In addition, regarding that the Hungarians are the descendants of the Huns, it is of no surprise that the Asian Hun words, proper names and titles in the said chronicles show significant similarities to their relevant Hungarian ones. The same applies, of course, to the Turkish and the Mongolian languages, as the history of these three peoples whose ancestors made up the common civilization of the Asian steppe peoples has deeply intermingled.³

The words and names in question appear in the following chronicles:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title of work</th>
<th>Author and author’s age</th>
<th>Time of completion</th>
<th>Age dealt with</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shiji 110</td>
<td>Sima Tan (180-110 BC)</td>
<td>104-86 BC</td>
<td>Yellow Emperor – 95 BC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sima Qian (145-86 BC)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanshu 94</td>
<td>Ban Gu (38-92 AD)</td>
<td>200 BC - 24 AD</td>
<td>206 BC - 24 AD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hou Hanshu</td>
<td>Fan Ye (398-445 AD)</td>
<td>3-5 century AD</td>
<td>25-220 AD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68 and 89</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jinshu</td>
<td>Fang Xuanling (578-648)</td>
<td>644 AD</td>
<td>265-419 AD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

³ The Inner-Mongolian lingvist, Prof Uchiraltu, for example, also researches the Chinese chronicles, and has found quite a few Xiongnu words that is used in the Mongolian language today. See UCSI RALTU: A hun nyelv szavai. (The Words of the Hun Language.) Napkút Kiadó, Budapest, 2008.
A Brief Outline of the Dignitaries

The Asian Huns formed their military and state organization very early. When the first known ruler, Touman danhu ascended the throne in about 215 BC, the scheme must have been in use for a long time, since fairly quickly did he or rather his son, Bator (Maodun) organize his state having considerably increased with the tribes conquered. Below the supreme ruler, the danhu, there were 24 dignitaries. These 24 dignitaries or titles are not always listed in the same position or by the same name in the different chronicles. To have an overview, Pritsak collected the variants of the title names as they were recorded in the chronicles, namely in the Shiji, the Hou Hanshu and the Jinshu. We write them here as he did, (the numbers in brackets show the order in the hierarchy, e.g. the left wise king being the 1st, the right wise king the 2nd, the left yuli king the 3rd, etc.):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHIJI</th>
<th>HOU HANSHU</th>
<th>JINSHU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Da Chen</strong> (the Great Ones)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>si jiao (the 4 horns)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. left &amp; right wise king (1–2)</td>
<td>1. left and right wise king (1–2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. left &amp; right yuli king (3–4)</td>
<td>2. left and right yuli king (3–4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>liu jiao (the 6 horns)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. left &amp; right great general (5–6)</td>
<td>3. left &amp; right rizhu king (5–6)</td>
<td>3. left &amp; right rizhu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. left &amp; right great captain (7–8)</td>
<td>4. left &amp; right wenyudi (7–8)</td>
<td>4. left &amp; right qieju</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. left &amp; right great danghu (9–10)</td>
<td>5. left &amp; right zhanjiang (9–10)</td>
<td>5. left &amp; right danghu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Xiao Chen</strong> (the Small Ones)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other clans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. left &amp; right gudu hou (11–12)</td>
<td>6. left &amp; right gudu hou (11–12)</td>
<td>6. left &amp; right gudu hou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. no name given</td>
<td>7. left &amp; right shizhu gudu hou (13–14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There were also:

- rizhu qieju (15–16)
- danghu (17–18)
- no name given (19–24)
As we can see, there were two of every title: one left and one right. According to the Chinese chronicles the left-wing dignitaries governed the eastern parts and the right-wing dignitaries ruled over the western parts of the empire while the danhu had his court in the middle. The left dignitaries were said to be superior to the right ones. The officials of the four and the six horns (or according to other translations: corners) were members of the danhu’s clan. The ones bearing the next title, the gudu hou, were of other clans, all the more because the danhu and the members of his clan always took their wives from the gudu’s clan.

The Title Names

TARKANY, TARIAN: 單于 (GS 147.a., 97.a.: tân/tân-gįwo/jįu) – Pinyin: danhu.
大車 (GS 317.a. 74.a.: d’âr/d’ā-kįo/kįwo) – Pinyin: daju

These two characters are generally transcribed as shanyu. In the Hanshu Yinyi it is written: “The danhu is the appearance of the infinite vastness, which means that it is his danhu-nature that triggers this heaven-like appearance”. Pulleyblank identifies the word danhu with the tarqan, tarxan. He says that according to Pelliot the Tujue probably adopted the word tarqan from their ruanruan predecessors. Pulleyblank himself states, however, that the ultimate source was undoubtedy the Xiongnu language. The use of the Chinese -n for foreign -r was regular in the Han period, and the Chinese *d- had not been palatalized in the second century BC when the transcription first appeared. Pulleyblank adds that the title name tarqan, without its final -n, can be seen on the coins of the Hephtalite ruler of Nezak Tarxan, and in Greek script we find either TAPKA or TAPAKA. The Xiongnu had already known and been using this title before they met the Turks. So in the Qin and the Han period the tarqan – or as it is pronounced today, the danhu – meant the supreme title of the Huns. Much later, in the course of time, among the Turks and the Mongols it gradually declined coming to mean no more than the holder of certain privileges. We should add that in the form of tarkany as title and in the form of Tarian as tribal name it

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5 At this point it is crucially important to note the difference between the Chinese and the Xiongnu orientation. As we can read in the Shiji, “the danhu’s throne stands left from the main dignitaries and faces the north”. So they orientated to the north, and the fact that his throne was on the left of the main dignitaries means that the ranking officials were on the danhu’s right (and so the minor dignitaries on his left). The Chinese emperor’s throne, however, traditionally faced south, which means that whenever the Chinese chroniclers say that the left dignitaries ruled over the eastern parts of the country, by the north orientation – which is also in use in Europe and the western world today – it is to be understood that the right dignitaries governed the eastern parts and also they were superior in rank while the left-wing officials governed the western parts and were subordinate to the right-wing officials. See O. PRTSAK: “Orientierung und Farbsymbolik”. In: Asia Major I. Saeculum V. Munich, 1954, 379.
was in use among the Hungarians of the Conquest period and it has been preserved in a great number of Hungarian geographical names.\(^8\)

As for the characters in the second place: 大車, the name has not yet been analysed. Regarding the rules in Early Middle Chinese in transcribing foreign names, it must have been another form of the tarkany, where the Early Middle Chinese of 大 gives the phonetics of tar, as in Early Middle Chinese aspirated *d- is applied for *t- and nevertheless, as we have mentioned above, in the Qin and Han period the *d- had not been palatalized. We can see that the phonetics of the second character in both names is nearly the same, the difference being just the voiced and unvoiced consonant (giwo - kìwo).

**SZECSENY** 自次 (GS 812.l, 555.: sįěng/sįäng or şįęng/şįäng-tś'īar/ts'ī) – Pinyin: zici

or: wise king (賢王 - This is not a transcription, it is the Chinese translation of the Xiongnu term)

or: toghri屠耆 (GS: d’o/d’uo-g’iεr/g’ji GS 45.i’. and 552.l.) – Pinyin: tuqi

The Early Middle Chinese phonetics of the zici (sįěng-tś’īar) correctly renders the Hungarian szecseny. As sečen it also exists in Mongolian with the same meaning of wise.\(^9\)

According to common law, the person being in the highest rank below the danhu, i.e. the left (or in European terms: the right) wise king inherited the danhu’s throne, so it was always the crown prince who bore that title. In case of political or military urgency, however, any member of the four horns could succeed the throne. He was called wise, which must have been tuqi (and, as we have seen above, also zici) in the original language. De Groot says that tuqi corresponds to Turkic toghri, which means wise, virtuous.\(^10\) In 123 BC when Zhao Xin surrendered to the Huns, the danhu, showing his appreciation, appointed him to zici king. According to the Zhengyi this title meant the highest rank below the danhu. If this is so, then the zici king must definitely be identical with the wise king and so with the tuqi king, the mere difference being due to the different translations, i.e. what the Chinese rendered with the term ‘wise’ was toghri in Turkic and szecseny in Hunnic.

**GYULA**谷蠡 (GS 1202.a. 1241.o. kük or giuk/iwok–luâ or liei.) – Pinyin: yuli

Among the ancient phonetics it is the giuk-luâ that covers gyula best. Yuli was the second rank below the danhu. As in the case of every Xiongnu official, so were there two of the yulis: a left and a right one. They governed the eastern and the western part of the empire.\(^11\) Among the Hungarian dignitaries of the

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\(^11\) As for orientation, see note 4.
Conquest period *gyula* was the second rank in the hierarchy of the high ranking officials just like the *yuli* of the Asian Huns.

**YIRTINČÜ / YERTENČÖ**日逐 (GS 404.a..1022.a.: níět/nźíět-d’îôk/d’iuk) – Pinyin: rizhu

伊秩訾 (GS 604.a. 402.f. 358.k.: ịer/i-d’iět/d’iět-tsịăr/tsię) – Pinyin: yizhizi

意謁者 (GS 957.a 313.x. 45.a.: ịg/i-jàt/jat-tjà/tśjà) – Pinyin: yiyezhi

The above *yirtinčü* or *yertenčö* is a Turkic word, the transcription of which has been recorded in three different ways by the Chinese chroniclers. It means: the Earth, the world. The name must have referred to the power of its bearer as having the general command over the armies and in this respect it properly renders the expression the Chinese chroniclers applied: the great general (they were the first ones of the six horns). Below we make an attempt to outline the nature of his position with the help of some relating records.

‘The states of the Western Regions (Xiyu) are inhabited by ploughmen who have walled cities, cultivated fields and domesticated animals. Their customs are different from that of the Xiongnu and the Wusun. As they were all subject to the Xiongnu, the *rizhu* king responsible for the Western part of the Xiongnu Empire established the position of the chief commandant of the slaves, who was in charge of the affairs of the Western Regions (Xiyu).’

*Hanshu* 96, Part 1, Xiyu Zhuan, page1-2

‘Then Bi, the *aojian rizhu* king of the Xiongnu proclaimed himself as Huhanye *danhu* and came to knock at the border-gate expressing his wish to defend (the border) against the northern barbarians.’

*Hou Hanshu* 19, Geng Yanfu di Guo Zhuan, Page 15

‘The Southern *danhu* sent the *aojian rizhu* king with an army of over three thousand soldiers to encounter the Han troops.’

*Hou Hanshu* 19, Geng Yan Fu Geng Kui Zhuan, page 19

‘The Konfucian teachings have reached and fascinated the Xiongnu. The Xiongnu have sent here the *yizhizi* king, the *daju qieju* to study them.’

*Hou Hanshu* 32, Fan Zhu Zhuan, page 8-9

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13大車 *daju*: d’âr/d’â-kio/kjwo GS 317.a. 74.a. See under entry TARKANY; 且渠 *qieju*: ts’ià/ts’ia-g’io/g’iwo. 46.a. és 95.g. See under entry ORKHON / HORKAN.
The position of *rizhu* was filled by the members of the Huyan clan. This title was translated by the Chinese as ‘great general’ (da jiang 大將), which suggests that its bearer had the greatest military force at his disposal. This is just logical, considering that his rank was the highest one among the officials of the six horns. Of course, there were two of them, the left and the right one. They assisted the *danhu* in governing the empire so they were not allowed to be away from the court thus they did not have any domain. This is clearly justified by the above extract from the *Hanshu Xiyu Zhuan* where we have learnt that the *rizhu* king established the position of the chief commandant of the slaves in order that there would be someone to manage the Western Regions as he himself had to help the *danhu* with the administration of the empire. He was responsible for the affairs of the conquered states and as such, he judged in criminal or controversial cases. Furthermore, on the basis of the above records of the *Hou Hanshu Fan Zhu Zhuan*, he also seemed to have taken an active part in cultural and educational fields.

It is remarkable that we often see the name *aojian* preceding the title name *rizhu*. This will lead us on to our next Hun name:

**ORKHON / HORKAN** 奥鞬 (GS 1045.a. és 249.a.: ôg/âu-kjian/kjan) – Pinyin: aojian.

且渠 (GS 46.a. és 95.g.: ts’jà/ts’ja-g’jo/g’jwo) – Pinyin: qieju

呼衍 (GS 55.h. 197.a.χo/χuo-gian/jän) – Pinyin: huyan

Pritsak believes that *aojian* is not a title name but it should be a personal name while others, i.a. De Groot, are convinced that it refers to a title name. As an argument Pritsak brings forward the fact that it sometimes appears as part of the name of some persons who obviously could not belong to the *danhu*’s clan and once it was even born by a man who later became a *danhu*. On the basis of the ancient phonetics De Groot identifies it with the name Orkhon. We can say that it was not uncommon that the chief of a powerful clan named the river on the territory of the subjugated people after his own clan. We should add, however, that here we have encountered the phenomenon so frequent in the case of Chinese texts, namely, one and the same name has been transcribed into Chinese in several different ways and we can easily walk into the trap of supposing two different persons or titles where it is only two different ways of transcription that we have faced. Examining the Early Middle Chinese of the *aojian* (ôg/âu-kjian/kjan) and comparing it with the Early Middle Chinese of *huyan* (χo/χuo-gian/jän) the identity of the two names seems just obvious, the mere difference lying in the disappearance of the initial *h-*, which is a frequent occurrence. So the *aojian rizhu* in the above extracts from *Hou Hanshu* is the Horkan *yirtinčü*, i.e. the great general and judge of the Horkan clan. As for Pritsak’s problem about the name *aojian* born by a person or persons belonging to the *danhu*’s clan, the solution could be the following: in the course of time the *aojian* or *horkan* has become to mean not only the clan whose members had the exclusive right to fill the office but also the person who acted as a *horkan* by position while it was no longer a restraint for him.

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14 See under entry ORKHON / HORKAN.
to be a member of the clan Horkan. This also explains why the distinguishing designation *horkan* / *aojian* had to be applied together with the title *rizhu* (in this case Horkan / Aojian meaning the clan name and *rizhu* meaning the title), which necessity had not arisen before, when clan and office used to be linked together.

Németh writes that below *gyula* and *kende*, *horka* was the third rank in the hierarchy of the dignitaries among the Hungarians of the Conquest period (which, we should add, was the similar case of *rizhu* or *aojian* among the Asian Huns, who also filled the third rank in the hierarchy) and, says Nemeth, it must have been both a title name and a personal name. He was mainly responsible for co-ordinating and managing the state (just like the *rizhu* or *aojian rizhu* with the Asian Hun Empire). In Turkish language the word ‘horka’ means to accuse. In Hungarian ‘horkan’ means to snort, to rebuke. As we have seen above, *horkan* (a Hunnic term) was the same as *yirtinčü* (a Turkic term) and his duties also involved that of a judge’s – a very interesting coincidence.

In the extract of *Hou Hanshu* 32 above we have read that the Asian Huns have sent the *yizhizi* king, the *daju qieju* to the Han Empire to study the Confucian teachings. Regarding the Early Middle Chinese, the *qieju* (ts’å-g’io) here also denotes *horka* or *orkho(n)*. When reading a *g’i* followed by a vowel, it will be the transcription of *rk* in the Qin and the Han period China. Furthermore, the particular aspirated initial *ts’i* affricate followed by aspiration must have disappeared later. The *daju* preceding *qieju* is another transcription of *tarkany*, as we have explained above. The quotation in question (*Hou Hanshu* 32) can be interpreted as follows: The Confucian teachings have reached and fascinated the Xiongnu and they have sent here the *yirtinčü* king, (who is) the *tarkany’s* horka to study them.

ÖNGDÜRTI 温寓鞮 (GS 426.c. 124.a. 866.h.: wень/yu – Pinyin: wenyudi

Examining the Han period chronicles and especially the *Hou Hanshu*, an interesting formula catches one’s eye with the title name *wenyudi*: more than frequently is it preceded by the attributive 右 you, i.e. right(-wing). For example:

‘The northern danhu sent his brother, the right wenyudi king, to pay tribute.’

*Hou Hanshu* 4, Hedi Ji, pages 4-5

‘The right wenyudi of the Southern Xiongnu rebelled making savage raids.’

*Hou Hanshu* 4, Hedi Ji, page 4

‘Because he had earlier plotted with Anguo, the right wenyudi king, Wujuzhuan was wanted by the danhu to stand trial.’

*Hou Hanshu* 89, Xiongnu Zhuan

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This is not by chance. The Early Middle Chinese pronunciation of *wenyudi* fairly well corresponds to the Old Turkic *öngdürti*, which means *east, eastern*. A few hundred years earlier in his great work, *Shiji*, Sima Qian had recorded this title in Chinese translation: great captain – he had not wanted to apply the transcription of the foreign word, and the same had been done in the *Hanshu*. In the *Hou Hanshu*, however, Fan Ye, the author did not apply this term any more but tried to substitute it with the phonetic transcription of the foreign word. In its original language, however, this word (*öngdürti*) only meant *eastern* and it did not render the title itself. It was just the first part of the title name. Fan Ye either abbreviated the title by will or mistakenly denoted the first four dignitaries of the six horns with this word when listing the Xiongnu titles and thus did it go on to appear in the chronicle from then onward. Interestingly enough it is always preceded by the attributive ‘right’ but never ‘left’.19

**CSONGOR / ŠONGXOR / ŠINGXUR**

For the time being it is the striking likeness of the Early Middle Chinese of *danghu* (*tâng-g’o/yuo*), the Hungarian proper name Csongor (pronounce: tshonggor) and the Mongolian words šongχor and šingχur that leads us to make the tentative assertion on the identity of the above four forms. The *t* - in the Early Middle Chinese transformed into *tsh* - in Hungarian and *sh* - in Mongolian (the *tsh* - shows an older form than *sh* -). The Mongolian šongχor and šingχur means falcon. The tradition that nomadic peoples symbolized their origin with different kinds of animals and that it was also shown in their clan names is generally known. It is not impossible that here we deal with such a clan giving the last two dignitaries, i.e. left and right *danghu*, of the six horns.

**KUDA / KADA(R)**

Our sources say that they were dignitaries of a different clan. So they did not belong to the Xiongnu by origin but yet it is for this reason that the clan of the Kuda possessed a particular role within the Xiongnu confederacy – it was exclusively the daughters of this clan that the *danhu* and his brothers took in marriage. The Xiongnu word has survived in Mongolian as *kuda*, with the very same meaning: the heads of two families related through marriage of their children. In Hungarian we say this relationship as *koma*. It is noteworthy that we can also find the name *kuda* in the Afrigidan Chorezm. As Tosltov says: ‘The unit of the ranches gathered into a complex of fortress was called *ked*, the community of patriarchal clans, with the *kedkuda* as head.’20

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18 The *tarkany* is identical with the *danhu or shanyu*, as it has been explained above.

19 Here we refer Pritsak’s essay on orientation from which we learn that the orientation of the Xiongnu and that of the Chinese are different. See note 5. Yet, the *Hou Hansu Nan Xiongnu Zhuan* applies the Xiongnu orientation, so the right direction corresponds to the east, Pritsak says. “So lesen wir im Nan Hiung-nu chuan (Hou Han-shu, Kap. 89, 1 v.), daß der Shan-yü Yü (18-46 n. Chr.) seinen Vetter Pi (den späteren Shan-yü Hu-han-yeh II., 48-56) zum ‘rechten (yu) Ao-chien Jih-chu König’ mit der Verwaltung der Stämme an der Südgrenze bis zu den Wu-huan betraute. Da die Wu-huan die süd-östlichen Nachbarn der Hiung-nu waren, muß es sich hier um den Osten des Hiung-nu-Reiches gehandelt haben.” See Pritsak, Op.Cit, 379.

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The Creative Hungarian Language and Its Special Teaching Method

Part 7. : Changes in the Methods of Teaching Reading and Writing

In part 6 of this series we have introduced the history of the Hungarian language teaching. In this part we are going to present briefly the history of teaching reading and writing.

Method of “Pronouncing the names of letters”

The initial Latin, German and early Hungarian language teaching methods used the technique of “Pronouncing the names of letters”. The children had to pronounce the names of the letters, and then they had to try to synthesize them in reading according to syllables. The reading of the word dara went like this: dé – a, da; er – a, ra; dara

This technique is very ponderous. The utterance of the names of the letters is artificial and unnecessary. It is a big hindrance that greatly diminishes the speed and efficiency of learning to read. The method was nevertheless used for a long time; even the most famous writers of the 19th century like János Arany, Mór Jókai and Zsigmond Móricz had to learn to read accordingly. This method does not take into account that the names of the letters (bé, cé, dé, ef, gé, há, etc.) are arbitrary, stands far away from the natural pronunciation, inserts unnecessary phonemes into the learning process, the students have to do unnecessary by-passes.

The famous preacher of Kolozsvár, István Szőnyi Nagy, wrote in 1690:

“While it is written: PA RA DI TSOM BAN, why they have to syllabise: PÉ A, PA; ER A, RA; PARA; DÉ I, DI; PARADI; TSÉ O EM, TSOM; PARADITSOM; BÉ A EN, BAN; PARADITSOMBAN? Great futility and maze! Why do they have to twirl a word with thirty one syllables when it is made up of five syllables?”

The steps of the letter name pronunciation method are thus:

1. Teaching the alphabet, with the names of the consonants (bé, cé, dé, etc.)
2. Reading the letters jointly.
3. Reading the syllables jointly.

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1 Authors’ homepage is: http://www.tisztamagyarnyelv.hu/
2 Adamikné Jászó Anna: Az olvasás múltja és jelene (Past and Present of Reading), Trezor Kiadó, 2006, Budapest.
Letter based method

This method is also known as the sounding-analyzing-synthesizing method.

Parts: sounding, analysis, synthesis.

It starts with sounding pre-exercises, taking out letters from words, the students pronounce them, and then they build words. Theoretically the reading and writing are taught in parallel, but in practice the children usually learn reading the letter first and after that writing it.

It consists of the following steps:


Pál Gönczy was the first who applied it (1862, 1868). Its name at that time was writing-reading method. After 1950 its essence remained, only its name has changed.

Most of the methods followed its philosophy and will follow it in the future, too, because it fits the bottom-up building nature of the Hungarian language.

There is only one problem with it, namely what the researchers of the non agglutinating languages – especially English and French, languages that do not have unambiguous letter–phoneme couplings – insist, that at the beginning of the learning, children have to struggle with meaningless language signs and elements until they reach meaningful words. This reasoning might be true for non agglutinating languages, but not for Hungarian. However, early language teaching methodology in Hungary followed the Western models, it did not point out the incorrectness of this reasoning and the practice did not follow the nature of Hungarian language.

Word-form (sentence-form) based method

The word-form (sentence-form) based – global – methods put the emphasis on the word or on the sentence. Some researchers consider these the smallest meaningful elements of speech. The word-form based methods are the most common.

Its most extreme versions do not teach letters, phonemes at all. The students need to discover themselves the letters, phonemes. This is rare. Less extreme versions teach letters at some level, but only later, after learning the whole-words.

3 Adamikné Jászó Anna: Az olvasás múltja és jelene (Past and Present of Reading), Trezor Kiadó, 2006, Budapest.
At the beginning children learn the written form and meaning of words. They have to identify several hundreds of words and link them to the drawings. They have to identify them in short sentences, too.

Once they understand it and skillfully do it – in case of less extreme methods – children extract the letters from the words.

There are methods that are based on the whole text (e.g. the method of Jacotot, 1818.), there are others that make the task easier and are based on sentences (e.g. Graffunderm 1943.), but most of them are based on the words. (Karl Vogel was the first one who applied it in his book in 1843.)

In Hungary such a first book was the book of Dezső Farkas, published in 1862; his method was based on words. The book of József Márki was based on sentences; it was published in 1870.

The benefit of the global method versus the analyzing-synthesizing method is that even in the first phase the meaning is connected to the writing-characters.  

The disadvantage is that it does not fit into the bottom-up building nature of the Hungarian language.

This method did not spread significantly in Hungary.

In the West it had more followers than in Hungary, given that the Hungarian language – due to its structure – requires the bottom-up building system, and accepts less the reverse methods. There were trials in order to introduce it, in 1978 even a family of textbooks was written, but it did not achieve widespread acceptance. Its influence peaked in the period between 1978 and 1990. The percentage of the clear global method was around 10 %, the mixed method reached 22.5 %, and the letter-based method commanded the remaining 67.5 %.

Other connected methods

Phonomimicry

In the 20th century the symbolical methods broadened. Smart supporting tasks were invented; the most efficient was the method of phonomimicry, invented by Róza Tomcsányiné Czukrász. Its essence is that the pronunciation of the phoneme was accompanied with an auxiliary movement gesture; the phonemes are coupled with movements, gestures.

This method uses more senses and is playful.

Unfortunately the use of this supporting method was abolished by the changes introduced in 1950.

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Meaning and speech exercises

The cultivation of the speech for a man is a technical task, but for a nation it is the indispensable tool of development.\(^6\)

It was a very important foundational subject; it was in the curriculum between 1869 and 1963.

The curriculum of 1869 defined the tasks:

"The purpose of this subject is to prepare the children, who just started to go to school, for teaching and being habituated for logical speech. . . ."\(^7\)

"The concepts reasoned by questions should be inserted into the speech-flow and presented in orderly fashion."

This subject prepared the children to examine things, develop thinking, and create sentences in order to communicate experiences.

Anna Adamikné Jászó summarizes the task of the subject:

". . . it contains language and logical preparation, it deals with the basic operations of thinking (argument), such as analysis – synthesis, concept of species – genus, division and classification, whole – part relationship, segmentation, comparison, similarities and differences, attributions."

Unfortunately it was abolished in 1963; environmental studies took its place, the time frame of Hungarian language was diminished. Language arts became impoverished; the solid base of teaching conceptualization-composition and thinking had disappeared.

The current situation

Nowadays almost all the teaching systems go back to the letter-based method. There are some methods which insert some short, few weeks long, "global based" pre-exercises before the reading-writing, but there is no method that matches the two requirements – the gradual building up from the smallest elements and the base of meaning – simultaneously.

The subject of meaning and speech exercises, the systematical development of general conceptual thinking is not part of language teaching.

Our methodology changes all this. The presentation of it will be the task of the next parts of this series.

\(^7\) Adamikné Jászó Anna: Az olvasás múltja és jelene (Past and Present of Reading), Trezor Kiadó, 2006, Budapest.
\(^8\) Ibid.
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(To be continued)
SPIRITUALITY
SYED, Damsaz Ali

Mir Mirak Andrabi: A Real Mentor of Kashmiris

Abstract

Such was his adherence to the path of piety, self-denial and inclination towards Sufism that he distributed the whole Jagir of his father. As a real mentor of people he showed the path how to cure and purify the heart, although the forms of devotion are innumerable and all of them are true, the particular disease of the heart of a devotee can be cured only through a particular devotion. He compared his task with worldly Physicians and said that the medicines might be innumerable, but only a particular medicine is prescribed for a particular disease in accordance with the nature of disease, which is known only to the Physicians. The same is the case with the Sufi path.

1. Introduction

Mir Mirak1, son of Syed Shamsu’d-din2, was the ardent follower of Qadriya3 Sufi Silsila and disciple of Shah Nimatullah4 Qadri Hisari. Mir Mirak, born in an affluent family of Andrabī5 Syeds settled at Malarattā6 in Srinagar Kashmir. He lost his parents in his early childhood. He was kind and simple and renounced worldly life and devoted himself to spreading the message of Tuwhid. Impressed by his piety and devotion and spiritual progress, Nimatullah Shah Qadri appointed him as Khalīfa. Thus his magnetic personality, learning and piety were instrumental in influencing the people of Kashmir. For a long period

1 Hussain Qadri M, Fatuhati Qadri, Mss, pp. 207-208, Research Library University of Kashmir.
3 The order was originally founded by the celebrated saint of Baghdad named Sheikh Abdul Qadir Jilani (470-561 A.H. / 1078-1165 A.D.) He was a prolific writer, and his works became the main source of Qadriya doctrines and practices. He strongly advocated that three things are a must for a believer. He should keep the commandments of Allah. He should abstain from the forbidden things and he should be pleased with the decrees of providence.
Rizvi Athar Abbas, A history of Sufism in India, New Delhi, 1992, p. 174.
4 Miskin Mohiud-din, Tarikh Kabir, Srinagar, 1905, pp. 31-33.
Mohammad-din Foaq, Tarikh Budshahi, Srinagar, 1928, pp. 403-404.
5 Gamgeen, S., Genealogical Table of Andrabī Syeds, Srinagar, 1985, pp., 1-2.
6 Malaratta lays Southwest of Srinagar and lies at a distance of 8 kms from the Capital.
his religious activities remained confined in and around the peripheries of Khanqahi Andrabia, constructed by Sultan Qutub’d-din7, (775-791 A.H. / 1372-89 A.D.)

2. Foundation of Muslim rule

The establishment of the rule of Muslim kings called Sultans8 in Kashmir neither affected its independence nor at first brought about any material change in the political, social and cultural life of the people. Sultan Shah Mir9 (740-743 A.H. / 1339-42 A.D.) and his immediate successors were content to carry on with the old institutions and organizations. However, from the time of Sultan Qutubu’d-din (775-791 A.H. / 1372-89 A.D.) onwards, when a large number of Syeds and Sufis started pouring into Kashmir from different parts of Persia and Central Asia, the condition began to undergo a change under their influence. Prime name among them was Mir Syed Ali Hamdani who visited the valley during the rule of Sultan Qutubu’d-din. The ancestors of Syed Mirak also came to the Kashmir valley from Andrab Afghanistan in the wake of missionary activities of Mir Syed Ali Hamdani.

3. Ancestors of Mir Mirak

Syed Muslim, a great Sufi, migrated from Arab and settled down in Andrab10 (Afghanistan). The descendants of Syed Muslim spread over to various parts of sub-continent in order to propagate Islamic teachings. The absolute love of God made them to sacrifice their native land for the purpose of propagation of Islam. According to various geographical versions it can be seen that Andrab was situated on the crossroads of Khurasan and India. Abdul Habibi the author of Tarikhi Afghanistan Baad-Auz Islam writes about its origin and occupation of its people. He says that "according to Hieun-Sang’s version, it was best known by the name of Anth polo, too”. Agriculture was the main occupation of its

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7 Hindal best known by the name of Qutubu’d-din ascended to the throne of Kashmir in the year 775-791 A.H. or 1373-89 A.D. after the death of his father named Sultan Alau’d-din. He died in the year 1389 A.D. and is buried in the graveyard built by himself at Saraf Kadal Srinagar.
Sufi, G.M.D., Islamic Culture in Kashmir, Srinagar, 1979, p. 65.


9 Shah Mirza bin Tahir Shah bin Faur Shah known by the name of Shamsu’d-din Shah Mir, was a descendent of the ruler of Swat. He arrived in Kashmir during the reign of Suhadeva (1301-1320 A.D.) along with his family. Suhadeva granted him the Jagir in the village of Devarkunail in district Baramulla. He ruled for a period of three years and five months, and died in the year 1342. He is buried at Anderkot (Sumbal Sonawari)

10 Andrab is the name of a large stream in Afghanistan and of the valley it empties into, the stream which originates in the Hindu Kush, near Khawak Pass and flows to the west for about 75 miles before merging into the Surkhab. Together, the two streams form a long, narrow Valley. The upper part of that Valley is also called Andrab, the lower part alternately as Khinjan or Doshi. Both parts of the valley had been united governmentally under a single leader, or hakim, who resided at Banu.
inhabitants. Andrab remained the main center of gold\textsuperscript{13} and silver. The people were freedom loving, kind and compassionate.

Syed Ahmad Andrabi, (d. A.H. 804 / A.D. 1401), and his son Syed Mohammad Andrabi, (d. A.H. 850 / A.D. 1447), came to Kashmir under the duress of Mir Syed Ali Hamdani (R.A) in the 14\textsuperscript{th} century during the reign of Sultan Qutub'u'd-Din (775-792 A.H. / 1373-89 A.D.). It was on the spiritual instructions of Mir Syed Ali Hamdani (R.A) that Syed Ahmad Andrabi and his son stayed in Kashmir and played a major role in the propagation of Islam and that accordingly metamorphosed the destiny of people. Besides they guided and impressed upon the people to follow the path of Shariah. Syed Ahmad Andrabi was a great Arabic and Persian scholar. With missionary zeal and zest they imparted spiritual and religious teachings to the people of Kashmir. Because of their tireless efforts, they did succeed in bringing about a significant and perceptible change in the mindset and life of people in Kashmir. They also influenced the Sultan Qutub'u'd-din (775-792 A.H. / 1373-89 A.D.) with their appealing behavior. Acknowledging their role and contribution, the Sultan built a Khanqah for them at Malaratta Srinagar, popularly known by the name of Khanqahi Andrabia\textsuperscript{12}, and also granted the Jagir of Chudran, Weerhar and Auchan in the district Pulwama for the maintenance of Khanqah and the followers. The said Khanqah became the center of Andrabi Syeds, which still prevails. Their descendants settled down not only in valley but also at various parts of the world. It was their inner desire to make people understand the absolute realities of god. They were not after worldly desires, and it was their selfless love for humanity which equally benefited people here and outside. They succeeded in sowing seeds of fraternity among human beings and under their asylum they could understand the essence of humanity. These Sufis were simple and kindhearted and were as impartial as sun, as generous as river and as tolerant as earth. These Sufis had clearly understood the philosophy of existentialism and were making people aware at large of this philosophy through their sober and empathetic attitude. After their departure from this world their descendants got settled at various parts of the valley. Among all the descendants the noteworthy and prominent was Syed Mir Mirak (d. 990 A.H. / 1582 A.D.) Andrabi, son of Syed Shamsu'd-din Andrabi (d. 932 A.H. / A.D. 1525). He was putting up in the Khanqahi Andrabia.

4. Mir Mirak as a Physician

The prime name who worked restlessly for the betterment of people was Syed Mir Mirak\textsuperscript{13} Andrabi. He acted as the true mentor of Kashmiri society, and used to move from place to place with his followers whose number was roughly up to four hundred. They were instrumental in the construction of Mosques, Khanqahs, Bridges, and Sarais (for travelers) etc., at different places of the valley. Syed Mir Mirak\textsuperscript{14} Andrabi felt that for the acquisition of different types of religious knowledge the teacher should be selected with care. As a good teacher\textsuperscript{15} he continued to teach the disciples according to their capacity and

\textsuperscript{11} Habibi Abdul, 
\textsuperscript{12} Foaq Mohammad D., 
\textsuperscript{13} Miskin Mohiu'd-din, 
\textit{Tarikhi Kabir}, Srinagar, 1905, pp. 52-53.
Peerzada Khaliq Tahiri, 
\textsuperscript{14} Ahmad Syed, 
\textit{Tohfa Syed}, Mss, pp. 3-4, Research Library University of Kashmir.
\textsuperscript{15} Miskin Mohiu’d-din, 
\textit{Tarikhi Kabir}, Srinagar, 1905, pp. 40, 52.
prescribed the right path for the spiritual attainments. He compared his task with worldly physicians and said that the medicines might be innumerable, but only a particular medicine is prescribed for a particular disease in accordance with the nature of disease, which is known only to the physicians. The same is the case with the Sufi path, although the forms of devotion are innumerable and all of them are true, the particular disease of the heart of a devotee can be cured only through a particular devotion. He emphasized that the remedies of the sickness of heart are known only to the Prophets, Sufis, religious scholars and the physicians of the faith.

5. Purification of the inner through Zikr

Like all spiritual teachers Mir Mirak Andrabi, laid great stress on Salat or Namaz. He pleads that it should precede all other acts of devotion. But the key to prayer is purification, which is of three kinds, firstly the clothes and body, secondly of the nafs, (lower soul), and thirdly of the heart. He who does not purify his body and clothes is najs, unclean, according to the ahli-shariah. The other two kinds of purification can be achieved only by the followers on the spiritual path. He held purification as a prerequisite to prayer, and guided the people and taught them the principles to be followed while praying. The real meaning of prayer, he said can be understood only by arbab-i-qulub, while going to pray one should banish all desires from their minds and purify their hearts with thoughts of God. If they do it then they face the real Qibla, that is God. Mir Mirak said that prayer connects the creature with the creator, and it is a medium through which man can approach God. The real meaning of prayer he says is munajat, invocation, which is impossible without concentration. He also asserts that fasting is compulsory for every Muslim, whether rich or poor; however, the poor are relieved from the obligation of Zakat and Hajj, two of the five principles of Islam. He also performed the Zikr, the literal meaning is "recolletion' or "remembrance'’. This is used by the Sufis especially for remembrance or praise of God. Zikr is the conscious recollection of God, to the exclusion of all that is other than God. Mir Mirak performed the Zikri Jahr, "loud Zikr”. When the Zikr obtains complete command over the heart of the Zakir, one who recites the Zikr, the vestiges of the imaginary existence of the Zakir, begin to search through the rays of the sun of wujud "being'. The dust of the adversity of existence "of the Zakir" and Zikri are destroyed. The beauty of the mazkur "object of meditation, God” manifests itself in the person of Zakir and confirms the divine promise.

16 Miskhati Baba Dawud, Asrar-ul-Abrar, Mss, pp. 190-191, Research library University of Kashmir.
18 Ibrahim M Molvi, Tazkira Khushnaweesian, Srinagar, 1977, p. 36.
19 This form of Zikr is performed loudly either by a lone Sufi or in company with others. It is opposed to Zikri khafia, which is performed mentally only.
20 Fatoohi Dr.Louay, Hand in hand on the way to Allah with Tariqa Alliyah Qadriya, 102, New Delhi, 1999.
6. Mastery over breath control

Because of his spiritual merits he gained mastery over breath control by performing the Zikr habs-i-nafs, meditation. The meditation is more effective for attaining higher merits. In this practice the beginner should retire to a lonely place, and sit in the posture used by the Prophet Mohammad\(^{21}\). The novice is supposed to place the elbows on the knees and should tightly close the lobes of his ears, allowing no air to pass. The eyes should be then closed with the help of two index fingers, in such a way that the upper eyelid was fixed steadily, on the lower eyelid without the fingers, pressing the eye balls. On the upper and lower lips he should place the ring finger and small fingers thus closing the mouth. The right middle finger should be then placed on the right side of the nose and the left middle finger on the left side. He should then tightly close the right nostril with the right middle finger, so that the breath may not pass through it. The left nostril should be opened and he should breathe slowly, reciting simultaneously la’llah, drawing the breath up to the brain, he should often tightly close the left nostril also, with the left middle finger, and keep the breath confined within the body. He should retain the breath as long as he does not feel suffocated; the period of restraining the breath should be increased gradually. The exhaling of the breath should be performed by first removing the middle finger from the left nostril and, this process should take place slowly, as expelling the breath quickly injurious to lungs. In the course of exhaling, [Il-Allah]. But Allah should be repeated. By performing this Zikr, Mir Mirak was in a position to hear mysterious sounds, and the whole universe was filled with it.

Due to his extraordinary spiritual attainments several miracles are associated with him. He not only converted the people who approached him but also removed several social evils from the society especially the habit of drinking which was completely eradicated from some places of Srinagar and far off areas. He opposed all sorts of oppression and injustice and propagated the feeling of equality among the common masses. He visited the far-flung areas of the valley along with his large number of followers, and consequently a new culture\(^{22}\) emerged there. He influenced the culture of the valley both materially and spiritually. On the material side he encouraged the people to adopt new arts and crafts to boost their economic setup. He introduced the art of embroidery work with the golden thread (Zardoozi), embroidery work on the Shawls, and manufacturing of Kashmiri hat “Topi”.

7. True approach as Success

Such was his\(^{23}\) adherence to the path of piety, self-denial and inclination towards Sufism\(^{24}\) that he decided to distribute the whole Jagir\(^{25}\) of his father and only kept a part of it for his family maintenance.

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\(^{21}\) Rizvi Hassan A, *Battles by the Prophet*, New Delhi, 1992, pp. 33-34.

\(^{22}\) Culture is that complex system, which includes knowledge, beliefs, art, morals, law, customs and any other capabilities and habits acquired by a man as a member of society. The individual receives culture as a part of social heritage and in turn may reshape the culture and introduce changes, which then become part of the heritage of succeeding generations. Culture may be divided into material and non-material culture. Material culture consists of manufactured objects such as tools, furniture, automobiles, buildings, roads, bridges and etc. Non-material culture consists of the words people use, the ideas, customs, and beliefs they hold, and the habits they follow.


\(^{24}\) Nuri Abdul Wahab, *Fatuhati Kubravi*, Mss, p. 79, Research Library University of Kashmir.
The fana and humility were the hallmarks of his personality. Fana for him really means bringing the being (wuju'd) to ecstasy (wajd). To pass from the temporal to the eternal demands self-discipline, hardship and suffering. The fana consists of various degrees, the annihilation of actions (fana-al-afal), the annihilation of attributes (fana-al-sifat) and the annihilation of the essence (fana-al-zat). To be transported from the realm of physical sensation to the spiritual realm is to achieve the annihilation of actions. The annihilation of attributes is the grade of relative occultation, the stage of potentiality and love. By attaining the annihilation\(^\text{26}\) of the essence one is set free from the existence and from the pitfalls of relative consciousness. Mir Mirak says the truth of truths, the reality of realities\(^\text{27}\), in search of which mankind goes knocking in vain upon a thousand doors, has for centuries been discovered by men in depth of their own God given greatness. This can be achieved by way of annihilation and extinction, through non-being and non-existence, by forsaking the lines laid down by reason and tradition. The worldly gains were always concealed by him\(^\text{28}\), into the realm of real discovery. He came to know all there is to know just as God himself knows, with the knowledge of certainty. This is the essential knowledge that comes with annihilation and permanent non-being (fana-wa-baqala). When he entered into suffix practices, he totally got absorbed and finally left in that. Mir Mirak uplifted the faith and promotion and gave currency to the true faith of Islam, consequently his contribution to the revival of Islam and its faith proved very fruitful throughout the valley in general and particularly in the areas of Srinagar city, because much emphasis is laid by him on the practice of Shariah and norms of Tasawwuf and good virtues and deeds of piety which are considered essential for Salvation in this world and hereafter. The current population has paid glowing tributes to Mir Mirak for the services rendered to Islam as a great Sufi Mujadad (reviver). Teachings of Mir Mirak which had its impact in doing away with the hazards of Bidat (innovation) and making the ways and modes of Ahl-i-Sunnat all the more popular.

His relation with other Sufis was very amicable; his approach was laconic and suffice in nature. Mir Mirak was always in a constant try to benefit from the knowledge of others. Most of the venerated Sufis of different orders were greatly inclined towards Qadriya Silsila through his teachings. The mention may be made of Suhrawardi Sufi master Sheikh Hamza Makhdum (d. 984 A.H. / 23 March 1576 A.D.) and his disciple Dawud Khaki (d. 994 A.H. / 1586 A.D.). Sheikh lived at a crucial period of Kashmir’s history. He was having the conflicts with Chaks who were mainly Shias. He himself was a strong supporter of the Sunni sect. He waged incessant ideological battles against the Shias. He even succeeded in converting them to the Sunni faith. The conflicts aroused the sentiments of Sultan Ghazi Chak (968-971 A.H. / 1561-63 A.D.). He ordered the Sheikh to leave the city towards the Beeru Budgam, and never try to return again till the end of Chak rule. He came back after the end of Ghazi Chak’s rule. From the Malfuzat it appears that the overall mission of the Sheikh was to build up the contemporary Muslim society in Kashmir in accordance with principles of Islamic Shariah. For this purpose several mosques were built supported by the construction of Khanqahs in rural areas. After his departure, he lies buried on the slopes of Kohi-

\(^{25}\) Foaq Mohammad-din, Tarikh BadShahi, Srinagar 1928, pp. 403-404.

\(^{26}\) Khaki Dawud, Rishi Nama, Mss, p. 85, Research Library University of Kashmir.


\(^{27}\) Dhar A, N, Mysticism across Cultures, New Delhi, 2002, pp. 70-71.

\(^{28}\) Hayat Zakkariyya M, Virtues of Dhikr, Delhi, 1982, p. 35.
Maran hill, in Srinagar, where in his lifetime he used to spend long hours in meditation. It was only after the mediation of Mir Mirak that the disputes were resolved. His main aim was to make people understand the concept of oneness, and to keep them aware of Quranic philosophy. All Sufis are one and they are the basic followers of Prophet Mohammad. Only the Sufis have understood the magnanimity of the Prophet, and it was the object of all Sufi orders, to let people know about the Prophet and his message. The Prophet himself announced that all Sufis who will come here up to the day of resurrection (Judgment) are my representatives. They are the true successors of my deep insight spiritual hierarchy known to Allah only, which human beings cannot understand. As such all Sufis Walis, Dervishes are dear to Prophet Mohammad. To propagate and to make people aware about the absolute reality some of his descendants dispersed to various parts of the subcontinent.

The Shrine is visited by large number of people every day. They mostly come on Thursdays, and they light earthen ware oil lamps as homage to Sufi. Presently the annual Urs of Syed is celebrated on the 5th of Safar every year. The huge income received by his Shrine is not utilized properly by the living descendants of Andrabi family settled at Malaratta, the center of Andrabi Syeds in the valley of Kashmir; the only problem is that they are not accountable to any authority. They are spending the money lavishly for their personal benefits, not for the betterment of people. If the revenues were spent for opening institutions, the situation would have been definitely different. So there is a dire need for the reformation of Kashmiri society, so that the offerings or donations may be used for development, for which the charity boxes were meant for. This was the only reason that so many years before the guideline was shown by the great Mir Mirak Qadriya Sufi who used to donate the offerings among the needy people, but unfortunately we all have not followed and understood his teachings and the right path shown to us.

8. Migration of descendants

Some of the descendants29 of Syed Mir Mirak Andrabi left the Kashmir Valley and settled down at various parts of the subcontinent. Syed Mir Mohiu’d-din Andrabi best known by the name of Syed Ghulam Rasool settled down at Wazirabad, (Amritsar) and was buried there. Syed Saifu’d-din Andrabi and Syed Mohd Shafi Andrabi Ratanpuri, left the Valley and settled down at Damukhee (Lahore) to carry on their ancestral profession, and were buried there. Syed Ishaq settled down at Rang Mahal Lahore, (Pakistan), Syed Qasim at Kabul (Afghanistan), Syed Abdul Gani, Syed Abdul Gafar Sialkot (Pakistan), Syed Gias’d-din Lahore (Pakistan), Syed Mahmood at Sialkot (Pakistan), Mohammad Syed, Abdul Aziz Gurdaspura (Punjab), Syed Mohammad Ishaq Rawalpindi, (Pakistan), Syed Abdul Qadir Lahore, (Pakistan), Syed Shahzad at Cocha Aarif Dar (Amritsar), Syed Kabir at (Shimla), Syed Mirak (Amritsar), Abdul Gafar at Sialkot (Pakistan), Abdul Gafar at Jawar Shah Lahore (Pakistan), Hussain Shah at Sialkot (Pakistan), Syed Mohammad Syed Azad Kashmir (Pakistan), Syed Ghulam Yasin, Syed Nabeel Ahmad, (Arab Riyadh) at present they are in Islamabad Pakistan and Syed Hassan at Ranchi Patna (Bihar).

They not only pulled down the language barriers, but also made the Islamic tradition more comprehensible to common people. Reality is the universal will, the true knowledge, eternal light and supreme beauty, whose nature is self-mortification, reflected in the mirror of the universe. The world in

comparison with reality is a mere illusion. The multiplicity indicates a mode of unity; the phenomenal world is an outward manifestation of the one real. The real essence is above human knowledge. From the point of view of its attributes, it is a substance with two accidents: one is creator and another is creature. One is visible and another is invisible. In its essence it is attribute less, nameless; they propagated this message to all corners of world. They consider love to be the essence of all religions and the cause of creation and its continuation. One has to obey Allah and those who obey the command, are the real Muslims. For becoming a Sufis one must receive training under the supervision of a guide. The selection and following is the most important duty of a Sufi. A bad or imperfect guide may lead him to evil. He must use his intellectual ability and human endeavor to find out the true guide and once obtained he must obey his direction. Therefore the Sufi must discipline his mind first by living according to absolute spiritual vision, which he can attain by being obedient to his guide Sufi.

Conclusion

As a religious leader Mir Mirak\(^\text{30}\) Andrabi played a pivotal role in propagating the Philosophy of Qadriya\(^\text{31}\) Silsila and changing the socio-religious and cultural sphere of Kashmiri society. He dedicated his whole life for betterment\(^\text{32}\) of common people irrespective of religion. His righteous approach had a wide range of impact\(^\text{33}\) on the minds of people; consequently a new culture emerged in which people could feel themselves free and safe. His reforms touched all the aspects of the society. As in other fields, so were the changes in the socio-economic field. The history\(^\text{34}\) of the Valley entered a new phase with the philanthropic efforts of Mir Mirak, and profoundly affected the existing pattern of the Valley. He left this world on 5 Safar, 990 A.H. / 1582 A.D. He is laid to rest at Malaratta Srinagar.

\(^{30}\) Kamal Mir, Inshai Mir Kamal, Mss, p. 50, Research Library University of Kashmir.

\(^{31}\) Sabur Ahmad Ibni, Khawariqus Salikeen, Mss.pp. 102-03, Research Library Kashmir University


\(^{33}\) Maseehullah Shah, Shariat-o-Tasawwuf, Delhi, 2005, pp. 105-107.

\(^{34}\) Khan Saleem, History of Medieval Kashmir, Srinagar, 2006, pp. 31-32.
ALIYEV, Huseyn

Armed Conflict in the North Caucasus:
A Theoretical Analysis of Conflict Dynamics and Dimensions

“Ironically, Chechnya, which has experienced war for more than a decade, has become relatively more peaceful than the neighboring republics...”
(Al-shishani 2009)

Introduction

Since the late 1980s North Caucasus has been a scene for several protracted ethnic conflicts. According to the Human Rights Watch in 2009 (HRW 2010), the separatist insurgency in the North Caucasus intensified and a 2010 Crisis Watch report (ICG 2010) identifies the region as an ongoing conflict area.

The first armed conflict that shook North Caucasus after the dissolution of the USSR began in 1994 with Moscow’s attempt to bring under its control a breakaway Chechen republic. However, the conflict currently taking place in the North Caucasus is distinctly different from the Chechen War. The goals and the means to achieve these goals as well as the players have transformed dramatically.

Therefore, this paper will focus on the events which took place in the last six-seven years, i.e., after the end of active combat phase in Russia’s last Chechen campaign (1999-present) in 2003-04. However, the ongoing conflict can also be considered as a protracted crisis; it took its origins in the Chechen wars of 1990s and it is an offshoot of the Chechen conflict which has spilled over, in the described period, and gave a birth to an ongoing armed conflict in the North Caucasus. It will be assumed here that the current conflict is no longer limited to Chechen borders and it is no longer focused on Chechnya as its epicenter. The recent conflict in the North Caucasus is a region-wide rather than country-specific phenomenon. Accordingly, the North Caucasus conflict analyzed in this paper is a separatist insurgency struggling to establish a sovereign Islamic state on the territory of the Russian North Caucasus, i.e., in Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria and North Ossetia.

This paper provides an analysis of an ongoing armed conflict with an application of peace and conflict theories. Furthermore, this paper offers an overview of humanitarian efforts and activities conducted in the North Caucasus and the position of the international humanitarian community with the regards to the conflict.
1. History and Context

1.1. Historical Background

Located in a vital intersection between the Caspian and Black Seas, the Caucasus has long been considered a bridge between Europe and Asia. In 1785 the Russian Empire started its conquest of Caucasus, which culminated in the 1835-59 Caucasian War waged between Russia and a confederation of several Caucasian nationalities united by Imam Shamil. In spite of winning the war, Russia was able to subdue the North Caucasus only by the end of 19th century. After the October 1917 Revolution, the nations of North Caucasus created a short-lived Mountainous Republic overtaken by the Red Army in 1922. In 1934 the Soviet leadership divided the North Caucasus into administrative regions in accordance with ethnic divisions and created a number of autonomous republics within the Soviet Union. Suspected by Stalin in collaborating with the Nazi Germany during World War II several Caucasian nations, namely Chechens, Ingush, Balkars and Karachays have been deported from the North Caucasus onto the steppes and deserts of Kazakhstan and Siberia (Dunlop 1998). The deported ethnic groups were allowed to return to their homeland only after the death of Stalin (German 2003).

The eclipse of the USSR and failure of Gorbachev’s perestroika have been marked by the growth of nationalist sentiment in many parts of the Soviet Union and in particular in the Caucasus. In comparison to South Caucasian republics (Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia) which had a status of independent Soviet Socialist Republics within the USSR, the autonomous republics of North Caucasus have been a part of the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic, and therefore, had few chances to obtain independence from Moscow. The growth of nationalist movements had been particularly active in Chechnya, where the former Soviet Air Force general, Djohar Dudayev proclaimed Chechnya independent from the USSR in 1991, i.e., shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, after the dissolution of the USSR in 1992, the newly created Russian Federation with Boris Yeltsin as its first president was not ready to relinquish Chechnya, which could set an example to many other independence-seeking autonomous republics in the North Caucasus and elsewhere in the Russian Federation (Hughes 2001). A hastily assembled invasion army has been sent to bring Chechnya under federal control in December 1994.

Lack of military discipline and underestimation of enemy forces have dragged Federal troops into a lengthy and bloody siege of the Chechen capital, Grozny (Lutz 1997). After suffering heavy casualties and failing to take control over Grozny, the Russian air force and artillery subjected the city to carpet bombing and shelling, which left more than 15,000 people dead, mostly civilians, and more than 30% of the city leveled to the ground (Hansen 1998). By the late March 1995, Federal troops were in a loose control over the capital and other major cities in Chechnya. However, active guerilla warfare continued in the mountains and sporadically engulfed cities and villages. In June 1995 the Chechen war spilled over the republic’s borders for the first time; a group of Chechen militants headed by Shamil Basayev seized a hospital with several hundred hostages in Budenovsk (Stavropol Kray) in the south of Russia.

In April 1996, Gen. Dudayev had been killed in a Russian air strike and his successor Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev was more willing to make an agreement with the Federal government in Moscow. Yeltsin was similarly eager to secure peace in Chechnya: a vital precondition for his victory at the upcoming presidential elections. The Khasavyurdu Peace Accords, which have been signed in the summer of 1996, officially put an end to the First Chechen War (1994-96) (Hansen 1998).
The Khasavyurd accords left Chechnya *de facto* independent, although legally it still remained a subject of the Russian Federation (German 2003). The peace accords provided a *negative peace*, with Chechnya being ravaged by war and controlled by a clique of rival warlords who barely accepted the authority of a democratically elected president, Aslan Maskhadov (in 1997). Desperately struggling for funds, the Chechen warlords often relied on funding from Arab Gulf States. Together with funding significant numbers of *jihad*-fighters began to enter Chechnya (Kroupenev 2009).

By 1999, the unsettled Chechen conflict started to seed its fruits in the North Caucasus: several villages in the mountainous Dagestan, inhabited by *Avars*\(^1\) announced a creation of a radical Muslim state, independent from Dagestan’s government and the federal government in Moscow. The Chechen warlord, Shamil Basayev, supported by several hundred Arab *jihadists* staged a cross-border incursion into Dagestan with an aim to assist *Avar* insurgents (Blandy 2002). Basayev’s raid marked the beginning of the Second Chechen war (1999-present), officially called by the Putin’s government a ‘counter-terrorism’ operation.

By 2003 Federal troops managed to successfully suppress organized Chechen resistance in cities and villages of Chechnya and installed a pro-Moscow government, headed by a former rebel cleric Ahmad Kadyrov. In contrast to his predecessor, Putin heavily relied on ‘carrots and sticks’ strategy in Chechnya, offering government positions to renegade warlords and granting lavish amnesties to demobilizing rebels (German 2003). As a result, by end of 2002 insurgents have been pushed deep into mountains and deprived of any chance to significantly affect the political or economic life in the country. They have lost their capacity to openly engage in combat with federal troops and had to rely entirely on guerilla warfare.

It is at that time that the Chechen conflict began to spill over into the rest of North Caucasus, and it is from that moment that we can no longer separate it from an armed conflict currently raging in the region. This study deals with the region-wide separatist insurgency which began to emerge and rapidly develop in the North Caucasus with the end of active combat phase in Chechnya in 2002-03.

1.2 Context

1.2.1 Geographical and Human Context

North Caucasus is a part of The North Caucasian Federal District, which is one of the eight federal districts of the Russian Federation and it covers approximately 170,700 square km with a population of 8,933,889 people (Rosstat 2002). Administratively, North Caucasus is made up of Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Cherkessia, North Ossetia, Stavropol Kray and Chechnya (Figure 1). The region provides strategic exits to the Caspian Sea in the east and the Black Sea in the west. It includes the largest part of the Grand Caucasus mountain range. The region is rich in natural resources: oil deposits are abundant in Dagestan and Chechnya, the Caspian coast is an important fish production area. Most of the territory is highlands with arable area; a few deserts are in Dagestan and steppes in Stavropol Kray (Hansen 1998).

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\(^1\) *Avars* - most numerous ethnic group in Dagestan.
In terms of demographics, around 70% of the North Caucasus' population belongs to local ethnic groups, 33.3% of the population is ethnic Russian (Rosstat 2002). The official language is Russian, although each autonomous republic has its own native language. Most of the local languages spoken in the North Caucasus belong to the Caucasian family of languages (only the Ossetic language relates to the Indo-European group of languages). The main religions practiced in the region are Sunni Islam (Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria) and Orthodox Christianity (North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Stavropol Kray).

1.2.2. Early Warnings

‘Early warnings’ strategy provides an analysis of preconditions for conflict’s appearance and development. Preconditions can be defined by “both incentives for rebellion and capacity/opportunity” (Miall 2000:113). The North Caucasus had both of these criteria. There can be a number of reasons for conflict spillover in the North Caucasus. Hereby, these reasons are divided into social, physical vulnerabilities and political preconditions creating a conflict environment and leading to conflict escalation.
1.2.3. Social Vulnerabilities

The years of war in neighboring Chechnya brought economic and social degradation to most of autonomous republics in the North Caucasus. Social vulnerability and lack of adequate employment can be considered as one of the major root causes for the spread of separatist insurgency in autonomous republics of North Caucasus. Additionally, separatist ideology, weapons and radical Islam constantly penetrated Chechnya’s neighbors and often motivated masses of unemployed young people to join Chechen rebels (McGregor 2006). Ideological propaganda continuously used by rebels to attract new recruits is often spread via internet and directed to exploit social weaknesses.2

1.2.4. Physical Vulnerabilities

Widespread human rights abuses3 conducted by law enforcement forces and authorities, ‘witch hunting’ for possible separatists and frequent disappearing of people suspected of involvement in anti-government opposition have served for many as reasons to join insurgents. Feeling of insecurity and constant fear of repressions from police and army can also be considered as a cause for young people to join rebels.

1.2.5. Political Preconditions

The end of large-scale combat in Chechnya coincided with the establishment of the pro-Russian government of Ahmad Kadyrov’s (and after his death in 2004 his son Ramzan’s) in the republic. Relying on defected rebels and Russian special services, Kadyrov unleashed a successful crackdown on rebel movement in Chechnya that forced hundreds of fighters out of the republic. Searching for safe heavens and supply bases, rebels were regularly crossing the borders into Ingushetia and Dagestan. Lastly, following the above mentioned crackdown on rebels in Chechnya non-Chechen rebels of north Caucasian identity began returning to their home countries and establishing separatist groups there.

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2 “Before leaving to join the militants in the forests or mountains and before taking up arms, young people learn a lot on the Internet, where the militants are portrayed as liberators and the romanticism surrounding this image is strengthened ideologically by the desire to free the homeland from the “kafirs,” which means infidels and is the most widely used term on the resistance movement’s propaganda websites. They leave for mountains when they become absolutely convinced by the adherents of radical points of view on the situation in the region. For them the question of religion becomes the primary issue, while the rest (achievement of independence, revenge) assumes secondary importance. At present many on-line youth forums on the Internet function precisely in the vein (see, for example, www.amina.com/kamina, www.kavkazchat.com/forumindex.php). ”Vatchagayev, Mairbek, “North Caucasus Insurgency Attracting Mainly Young and Committed Members,” North Caucasus Analysis, Volume: 10 Issue: 2, January 15, 2009.

2. Origins of Conflict

2.1 Conflict Phase (2003-2006)

The end of large-scale fighting in Chechnya was in fact, the beginning of the conflict’s spillover in the North Caucasus. Adoption of the Chechen constitution by the Russian backed government of Ahmad Kadyrov in 2003 and Kadyrov’s election as a president of the Chechen republic officially put an end to Chechnya’s independence and outlawed the separatist government of Maskhadov. By the end of 2003, the Chechen insurgent movement was in a gridlock, with its actual power being concentrated in the hands of the most influential warlord in country, Shamil Basayev. A handful of other warlords were in charge of militant groups in different parts of the country. However, the official leader of the insurgent government, Maskhadov had little real power and even less ability to control the situation on the ground.

The outflow of fighters from Chechnya, which began by the end of large-scale military operations in 2002-03, gave a powerful boost to the development of military jamaats in different parts of the region. There is no question that most of the jamaats have been founded by the veterans of Chechen resistance and largely adopted similar ideology and modus operandi. The first indicator of conflict spillover was a rapid increase of attacks on government officials, security forces and military installations throughout Dagestan, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachayevo-Cherkesia. An increased rate of violent incidents followed an almost similar level of intensity in most of republics in the North Caucasus, including Chechnya (Figure 2).

4 Shamil Basayev, a failed law school student and computer salesman in Soviet times, joined the Chechen independence movement in 1991. The same year Basayev participated in a hijacking of a Russian plane. In 1992, Basayev joined a battalion of Chechen volunteers participating in the Abkhaz-Georgian war to support Abkhazian separatists. With the defeat of the Georgian army in 1993, Basayev, already commander of a Caucasian volunteer brigade (unit of nationalists from different parts of Caucasus), led a unit of Chechen volunteers in the Nagorno-Karabakh war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. With the start of the Chechen war in 1994, Basayev was one of the leading figures in the resistance movement. In 1995, he raided a town in the south of Russia, taking 1,600 people hostage in a local hospital. After the end of the first Chechen war, Basayev occupied a post of vice-prime Minister in Maskhadov’s government. In 1999, he led an army of Islamic militants on an incursion into Dagestan, which provoked the second Chechen war. In the following years, Basayev was the most influential and powerful warlord in Chechnya and a mastermind of the Caucasus Front, a region-wide separatist movement. Basayev, is also known as a mastermind of the 2003 Moscow Theater hostage crisis and the 2004 Belsan school hostage taking (RUSSIA PROFILE.ORG).

5 “The organizational structure of separatist societies [in the North Caucasus], jamaats, does not coincide with the structure of traditional Muslim societies in the region, which are also called jamaats. The traditional jamaats are organized along territorial principles, incorporating the population of a village or city district, grouped around the mosque. The separatist jamaats are extra-territorial and dispersed. One jamaat can encompass many small groups, united in one or several networks.” Yarlykapov Akhmet A. 2007. “Separatism and Islamic Extremism in the Ethnic Republics of the North Caucasus”, Russian Analytical Digest, No.22, 5 June 2007.
The data compiled by the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) indicates that as early as January 2004, Chechnya ceased to be the only hotspot in the North Caucasus, and it was no longer the most violent place in the region. The conflict has steadily progressed and militant cells actively operated not only in their home republics but also united for large-scale attacks:

- **June 21-22, 2004**, around 500 Ingush and Chechen militants attacked government and security installations in the capital of Ingushetia, Nazran, leaving 100 policemen, officials and soldiers dead and hundreds wounded (CACI 2004).
- **September 1, 2004**, a multi-ethnic band of militants (with a majority of Ingush nationality) took 1,100 people hostage in a school in the North Ossetian town of Beslan (UNICEF 2006). The following siege of the school ended with a failed rescue operation and subsequent death of 334 hostages, including 186 children (BBC 2005).
- **October 13-14, 2005**, large-scale militant attack on government and military installations in the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria, Nalchik, left 140 people dead. Most of attackers were of Balkar nationality (RFE 2006).

Essentially, all of the large-scale joint operations conducted by separatists in the North Caucasus from 2003 to 2006 have been directly masterminded, financed and commanded by Basayev. As the most
powerful and renown Chechen warlord, Basayev envisioned himself as a figure capable to unite anti-Russian resistance in the North Caucasus and therefore, considered all means to fight Russia as legitimate, including terrorism.

On May 2005, Basayev announced the creation of a united Caucasian Front, aimed to unify insurgent groups throughout the North Caucasus. He purposefully denied the post of Ichkeria’s president, consequently offered to him after the death of Maskhadov and Sadulayev,\(^6\) expecting to play a role of a regional leader, rather than focusing on Chechen insurgency only.

It was anticipated that Basayev’s death on July 2006, which happened as a result of an accidental explosion in Ingushetia, will strike a serious blow to the cohesiveness of insurgency.

### 2.2 Second Phase (2006-present)

In spite of losing a leader capable to unite militant cells for large-scale operations, the separatist underground movement did not lose its strength with the death of Basayev. The rate and intensity of rebel attacks in 2006 remained averagely similar to the previous year (Figure 2). However, the situation in the North Caucasus was meant to change.

The only warlord capable to replace Basayev as a leader of the Caucasian Front was a veteran of two Chechen campaigns and Basayev’s right hand, Doku Umarov. Umarov has taken over the post of Ichkeria’s president and immediately abolished the Republic of Ichkeria by creating a Caucasus Emirate in October 2007 (Davydov 2009). The Caucasus Emirate has eliminated the concept of independent Chechnya, replacing it instead with that of a united pan-Caucasian state, including all of the Russian North Caucasus. Umarov proclaimed himself as its Emir (supreme leader). The Caucasian Front has become a military branch of the Caucasus Emirate, now incorporating military jamaats of Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachayev-Cherkessia and North Ossetia.

Although opposed by some of Ichkeria’s leaders in exile (Chechenpress 2007), the Caucasus Emirate has opened a region-wide front of anti-Russian insurgency. The creation of a new insurgent entity in the North Caucasus has been marked by an increased level of militant attacks in all parts of the region (Figure 3).

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\(^6\) Republic of Ichkeria is an official name of the unrecognized separatist government of Chechnya. The first elected president of Ichkeria was Djohar Dudayev. After his death in the Russian air strike at the end of the First Chechen war in 1996 he was temporarily succeeded by Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev. In the aftermath of peace accords between Ichkeria and Russia and the subsequent presidential elections in Chechnya, Aslan Maskhadov was elected as a president of Ichkeria and occupied that post until he was killed by Russian special forces in 2005 in the course of 'counter-terrorism' operation (1999-present), officially known as the Second Chechen war. On Maskhadov’s death, the insurgent cleric Abdul Halim Sadulayev has been appointed to the post of Ichkeria’s president by the rebel Council. Sadulayev has been killed in action in 2006 (Unrepresented Nations and Peoples, Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, at http://www.unpo.org/content/view/7865/100/, retrieved on 05.03.2010).
Figure 3

Violent Incidents in the North Caucasus by Republic, 2008-2009

Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2009

The wave of violence included armed confrontations between rebels and security forces, rebel attacks
on government and military installations, abductions, assassinations of police, military and civilians,
bombings, including suicide bombings, etc. Escalation of violence almost doubled in 2008 and tripled in
2009. In fact, the surge of violence reached an unprecedented level in 2009, with 1100 incidents in
comparison to 795 in 2008. The number of people killed in the conflict almost doubled in 2009 with 900
fatalities in comparison to 586 deadly incidents in 2008 (Figure 3) (CSIS 2009). According to the Center for
Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), the number of suicide bombings quadruped in 2009 in
comparison to the previous year (most of them occurred in Chechnya).

Ironically, President Medvedev’s administration announced an end to ‘counter-terrorism’ operation in
Chechnya on April 2009 (BBC 2009). The announcement had more of a symbolism (needed to boost
Kadyrov’s government) rather than reality.

3. Parties to the Conflict

I would like to define the main participants of the conflict in the North Caucasus by dividing them into
primary and secondary parties. Primary parties are the main protagonists, whereas the secondary parties are
sides participating in the conflict by either offering assistance to primary parties or contributing to the
violence.
3.1 Primary Parties

The main primary parties to the conflict are the separatist organizations in the North Caucasus (so-called jamaats), Chechen insurgents and the federal government of the Russian Federation. The 2008-2009 escalation of violence in the region can be directly attributed to the increase of jamaats’ strength and activity, intensifying their incompatibility with the government.

3.1.1. Separatist Jamaats

There are currently five active separatist jamaats in the region:

1. Jamaat Shariat – is an insurgent group operating in Dagestan. It was created in the early years of the second Chechen campaign in 2001 (McGregor 2006);

2. Ingush jamaat – founded in 2000 it kept a low profile until the conflict began to spill over in 2003-04. Members of the Ingush jamaat participated in the 2004 Nazran raid and the Beslan school siege (Ibid);

3. Ossetian jamaat – is the smallest jamaat operating in mainly Orthodox Christian North Ossetia. It is closely associated with Chechen militants (Vatchagayev, September 2007);

4. Yarmuk jamaat – operates in Kabardino-Balkaria. It is responsible for the 2005 Nalchik raid (BBC 2005);


Insurgent jamaats normally consist from several dozen to several hundred active members, operating both in urban settings and in forested and mountainous areas. Most of jamaats’ senior members and leadership are usually veterans of Chechen campaigns, although the majority of rank and file members are recruited among unemployed youth. The insurgency is known to have no clan, class, and age or nationality bias. Militants accept fighters from all over the region and other parts of Russia, as well as a number of foreign volunteers (McGregor 2006). In terms of the social status of its members, the insurgency includes people from all walks of life. Although often accused of being Islamic fundamentalists, militants are likely to have both moderate and radical members, practicing both the radical Salafi trend of Islam and more moderate Sunni branches traditionally practiced in the region (Kroupenev 2009).

7 “For instance, among those killed during the operation to dislodge militants holed up in a residential apartment building in Dagestan on August 26, 2006, there was Zubail Khiyasov, a former Dagestani culture minister and director of the Kumyck National Theater of Dagestan, who was close to 70 years old.” Vatchagayev, Mairbek, “North Caucasus Insurgency Attracting Mainly Young and Committed Members”, North Caucasus Analysis, Volume: 10 Issue: 2, January 15, 2009.
3.1.2. Chechen Insurgents

Chechen separatists under Basayev have been serving as an ideological, financial and training hub for separatist jamaats in the North Caucasus. From the start of the first Chechen campaign in 1994, Chechnya became a source of instability and contributed significantly to the creation of separatist groups in other Caucasian republics of the Russian Federation. The creation of the Caucasus Front by Basayev and after his death the establishment of the Caucasus Emirate by Umarov was the major attempt to spread the conflict beyond Chechen borders (Yarlukapov 2007). Following the escalation of violence and conflict spillover in the past several years, Chechen insurgents became merely a part of a separatist underground movement in the region. According to recent estimates there are approximately 500 to 1000 active insurgents operating in Chechnya (ГРАНИ.РУ 2009) with thousands of supporters and sympathizers in cities and villages (Vatchagayev, April 2009).

3.1.3. Government of the Russian Federation

The federal government of the Russian Federation (RF) is a primary party in the North Caucasus conflict with its position towards the issue remaining virtually unchanged both under the Putin and Medvedev administrations. The government of the RF does not officially recognize the conflict in the region as distinct or separate from the Chechen problem (which is normally considered as an issue of terrorism) and generally classifies most of violent incidents as connected to organized crime and terrorism (Mendelson & Gerber 2006). The federal government has boosted its military contingents in the North Caucasus in recent years and retained Interior troops and Special Forces units in Chechnya, in spite of the official announcement on termination of ‘counter-terrorism’ operation in Chechnya on April 2009. As mentioned earlier, the Kremlin repeatedly denied the existence of separatist insurgency, classifying jamaats as ‘illegal armed gang formations’ (Bishevskii 2004), a definition officially accepted by all local autonomous governments in North Caucasus.

32. Secondary Parties

The local governments in the region can be identified as secondary parties to the conflict. As representatives of both federal and local administration on the ground they have to implement state policies and usually stand in crossfire between rebels and federal government.

3.2.1. Local Governments

Local administrations of autonomous republics in the North Caucasus are, in most cases, the ones who are blamed by the federal government for the increase of violence as well as the ones expected to handle security problems. Participation of local governments in the conflict varies from case to case; it can be a complete denial of the crisis as it is in case of the government of North Ossetia, or vigorous efforts to step up security as is the case with the government of Ingushetia.
3.2.2. Kadyrov’s Government in Chechnya

The pro-Russian government of Ramzan Kadyrov in Chechnya can be considered as a secondary party distinct from other local governments of autonomous republics in the region. A former Chechen rebel, Kadyrov managed to build a strong militia force (mostly made up of demobilized or renegade insurgents) to tackle separatists in Chechnya. With the strong support from federal government Kadyrov conducts active ‘counter-terrorism’ campaign in Chechnya, forcing Chechen insurgents to seek safe havens in neighboring north Caucasian republics.

4. Emergency Dimensions

The humanitarian implications of the current conflict in the North Caucasus have multiplied the humanitarian issues left from the decade of war in Chechnya. According to UNHCR, there are 80,000 IDPs in the North Caucasus. And the volatile situation in the region prevents the return of IDPs from the armed conflict in Chechnya (UNHCR 2010). The ongoing conflict has both social and physical impacts on the region.

4.1 Physical Impacts

Increase of violence in the region caused serious disruptions to economic activities, in particular in Ingushetia and Dagestan. The deterioration of security eliminated any prospects of using the region for tourism and posed serious threats to transportation. Dire economic situation is exacerbated by high levels of unemployment. In fact, North Caucasus has the highest unemployment level in the Russian Federation (Figure 4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Employment %</th>
<th>Unemployment %</th>
<th>Position of the region in Russia (out of 86)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adygeya</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>Employment: 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dagestan</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>Employment: 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingushetia</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>Employment: 83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabardino-Balkaria</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>Employment: 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karachay-Cherkessia</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>Employment: 79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Ossetia</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>Employment: 63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chechnya</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>Employment: 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krasnodar krai</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>Employment: 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stavropol krai</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>Employment: 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rostov oblast</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>Employment: 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Federal District</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>Employment: 53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4

Unemployment in North Caucasus, 2008

4.2 Social Impacts

The conflict has also contributed to the increase in tensions between the indigenous population and ethnic Russians in most of the autonomous republics in the region. That has resulted in the outflow of ethnic Russians from the region; a process which has begun in the early 2000s (in case of Chechnya and Ingushetia from the early 1990s) and continues at the present. The 2009 Amnesty International report on Russian Federation indicates extensive violations of human rights in the region. Arbitrary detentions, abductions, torture, reprisals against the relatives of suspected insurgents and attacks on humanitarian workers are among the dozens of human rights violations points. Human Rights Watch reports about 119 rulings proceeded in 2009 in the European Court on Human Rights in which Russia has been accused of serious human rights violations in Chechnya.

5. Incompatibility

Incomptabilities are considered as sources of conflicts; they are likely to represent a certain resource or disagreement over an issue which can lead to contradiction and, consequently, to confrontation. The main incompatibility in the North Caucasus conflict is a territorial dispute, i.e., confrontation between separatists seeking to create an independent Islamic state in the North Caucasus and the government of the Russian Federation seeking to preserve its territorial integrity and maintain control over strategically important and resource-rich territories.

Two issues over which the conflict takes place will be scrutinized hereby. Subjectively defined incompatibility or the conflict’s parties own definition of the reasons and causes of the conflict. And Non-party defined, i.e., a third party opinion on the conflict.

Subjectively defined: the situation in the North Caucasus is officially defined by the president of the Russian Federation, Dmitry Medvedev, as a ‘struggle with terrorism.’ After the cancellation of ‘counter-terrorism’ operation in Chechnya in April 2009 (started in August 1999), the president emphasized ‘the clear improvement of situation in North Caucasus’ republics and concluded that ‘Russia’s fight with terrorism is successful.’ As previously mentioned, the Russian government does not accept the existence of insurgent jamaats in the region, instead identifying them as ‘illegal gang formations.’ Accordingly, the main goal of the federal government is a restoration of ‘law and order’ in the North Caucasus which shall remain a part of the Russian Federation.

The separatist leadership on the other hand, is striving to create an independent Islamic state in the North Caucasus, a Caucasus Emirate that is expected to include all autonomous republics in the Russian North Caucasus. Russian control of the region and pro-Russian local administrations are the main

8 Dmitry Medvedev, in a live broadcast on three national TV channels on December 24, 2009.
9 Ibid.
10 Leader of the Caucasus Emirate, Doku Umarov “We fight for the right to live according to the Shari’a, the laws of Allah, the Great and Almighty, for people not to follow the laws which Putin and Surkov have written. These are our slogans.” Radio Free Europe (RFE), at http://www.rferl.org/content/Commentary_Can_Medvedevs_New_Vision/1939203.html (retrieved on 01.03.2010).
obstacles to the creation of the Caucasus Emirate. Therefore, the primary incompatibility can be defined as territorial based and the secondary incompatibility as ideological.

Non-party defined: the North Caucasus conflict is mostly regarded by the international community and humanitarian organizations as an outcome of heavy-handed Russian policies in the region, disrespect for human rights by local authorities and inability to improve economic situation and alleviate unemployment (Human Rights Watch 2009, UNCHR 2009, etc.). Resolving the above mentioned reasons, can eradicate the ground causes for insurgency and dry up its human resources pool, i.e., by reducing high levels of unemployment among young people pushing them into the ranks of separatists (Vatchagayev, January 2009). Allowing for more autonomy, cultural and ethnic self-representation as well as reducing Moscow’s firm grasp over political and social life in the North Caucasus can eliminate incompatibilities.

6. Symptoms

Applying two dimensions, attitude and behavior, mentioned by Galtung (1996) in his conflict analysis triangle, might be useful in defining the main symptoms leading to contradiction and development of a conflict.

The attitudes of the two conflicting sides have developed over a longer period, preceding the beginning of the current conflict by almost a decade. The development of a pan-Caucasian nationalism and ethnic self-identification movement started in the region with the decomposition of Soviet power in the late 1980s (McGregor 2006). The image of Russia as a colonial power struggling to keep its control over the Caucasus increased with the start of the Chechen conflict and persisted in the following decade boosted up by inability of the federal government to improve the economic situation. Low levels of support for federal and local governments (Vatchagaev, March 2009) are characteristic in the North Caucasus. The Russian attitude towards insurgency movement is built upon a stereotype of terrorists or Islamic fundamentalists. This image is actively developed by the mass media and the government.

The behavior of warring parties can be characterized as highly violent; both are eager to rely on any means to achieve victory. The insurgent movement conducts its campaign with a particular cruelty, targeting not only persons working for the state and security forces but also their relatives and families. Such typical means of terror as hostage taking, kidnapping, suicide bombings and planting of explosives in civilian areas are daily tactics used by insurgents. The law enforcement responds in a similarly brutal pattern by persecuting family members of suspected insurgents, torturing and unlawfully executing suspects (Amnesty International Report 2009). Blatant violations of human rights by both belligerent parties have become a daily reality in the North Caucasus. Lack of regard for human rights and desperate security situation are among the main obstacles for humanitarian action created by attitudes and behavior of conflict participants.

The above mentioned types of behavior and attitudes inevitably increase contradiction over an incompatibility and produce violence. According to Galtung’s (1990) typology of violence, both direct and structural types of violence are present in the North Caucasian conflict. These two forms of violence complement each other and effectively prevent a possibility for peaceful resolution of the conflict.
Structural violence is present in the form of institutionalized and regulated psychological and psychical oppression exercised by the state. As an outcome of this oppression the society produces direct violence exercised against the state and the state in its turn responds with both direct and structural forms of violence.

7. Power Relations

The power relations between the conflicting parties are clearly asymmetric, with the government holding an upper hand in terms of resources (human, military, technological, and financial). There are no precise estimates of insurgent manpower in the North Caucasus; however, it is easy to assume that they are significantly outnumbered by security forces in the region. According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, the North Caucasus Military District has approximately 70,000 military personnel. However, most of counter-insurgency activities are conducted by local law enforcement forces, special counter-terrorism units and Interior troops. Counter-terrorism operations in the North Caucasus are considered as a high priority by the federal government and therefore lavishly financed (Dzutsev, March 2010). The state heavily relies of local governments for the implementation of counter-insurgency measures.

However, in spite of military advantage it is obvious that the federal government is losing the battle for ‘hearts and minds’ of the local population. The insurgents manage to receive financial, human and moral support from local population throughout the region. Relying to a lesser extent on donations from abroad (in particular from Arab Gulf states), most of insurgent financing is gathered by jamaats locally by taxing local population and receiving donations from local supporters.

The secondary parties to the conflict, the local governments, have a relative symmetry in relations with Moscow; they are the ones providing invaluable local resources, in particular manpower. And accordingly, in many cases they are the ones being targeted by insurgents. In most of autonomous republics in the North Caucasus, local governments either have little support among population or rely

11 According to the Federal Security Service (FSB) Director Alexander Bortnikov, almost 800 militants have been detained in the North Caucasus in 2009 (Независимая Newspaper Dec 10, 2010). The Federal Prosecutor General’s Office reports that 316 militants have been killed in the North Caucasus in 2009 (ITAR-TASS, Feb 25, 2010).

12 According to the Chief Commander of the North Caucasus Military District, Gen. Nikolai Sivak “local population either supports armed groups or treats them neutrally, does not resist them and does not report them to the federal authorities. If not for the support of locals, armed groups would have long been eliminated.” (In interview to НЕЗАВИСИМАЯ newspaper on April 27, 2009)

13 “We created and systematized internal support techniques, and Sharia gives us clear rules for collecting military zakat (taxes). We prepared regulations and orders, which were distributed on our territories by our naibs (deputy commanders). In today’s situation, financial or any other types of support are no longer voluntary actions but fard ‘ain (compulsory) for every true Muslim because we are in war. We do not take anything that is above a fixed percentage rate, we do not rob poor families or those who suffered from the regime; instead, we support them as much as we can afford.”, Leader of Yarmuk jamaat, operating in Kabardino-Balkaria, in exclusive interview to North Caucasus Analysis, Volume: 10 Issue: 11, March 20, 2009.

14 After defeat in the first Chechen campaign (1994-96), the federal government in Moscow realized that it will be impossible to control North Caucasus effectively without local support. Therefore, the Putin administration heavily invested in bribing local elites and creating pro-Russian governments in every autonomous republic (Blandy 2007).
heavily on support among particular clans (Kadyrov’s government in Chechnya). In that respect, it might be concluded that the power relations between the disputing parties in the conflict are asymmetric with the government having an overwhelming advantage in military, financial, industrial and human resources and insurgents having an upper hand in local support.

Transformation of power relations created obstacles for humanitarian assistance in the region. In its 2009 report UNHCR emphasized tense security situation in Ingushetia, Dagestan, southern Chechnya and Kabardino-Balkaria, forcing the organization to close its office in Nazran, capital of Kabardino-Balkaria and postpone opening its field office in Grozny, capital of Chechnya.

8. Dynamics

In Galtung’s (1996) definition, the dynamic conflict is a process in which structures of the conflict as well as its behavior and attitudes are in constant transformation, influencing and altering each other. The North Caucasus conflict has undergone a number of dynamic transitions which have led it to the current stage of escalation. These transitions have been influenced by internal and external factors.

8.1 Composition of Parties

In spite of its recent origins, the North Caucasus conflict has experienced a considerable shift in the composition of warring parties. At the start of the conflict’s spillover in 2003-04, it was clear that the insurgency had a unipolar character with its core in Chechnya and its head command controlled by Basayev. Military jamaats, although already operating in different parts of the region had been unified by a central command of the Caucasus Front in Chechnya. The composition of insurgency has changed after the death of Basayev in 2006; the jamaats acquired more independence and self-reliance. De-polarization of the insurgent movement has been pursued by Umarov, who abolished the Republic of Ichkeria and therefore, reduced Chechen dominance in the rebel movement. Self-sufficient insurgent cells, jamaats, were meant to keep the rebel movement more united and equal, and accordingly more effective. Thus, under the current composition of the insurgent movement, military jamaats can continue to operate effectively even if the central command of the Caucasus Emirate will be eliminated (McGregor 2006).

The federal side, on the other hand, experienced a degree of polarization under the continuing trend of Kremlin’s goal of strengthening its grasp over local governments in the region. A tendency to replace unfavorable leaders to Moscow in the North Caucasus started by Putin with the support for Kadyrov’s administration and continued by Medvedev with the replacement of the Ingush president, Ruslan Aushev, unfavorable to Russia, with Gen. Zyazikov. This move has purged local governments from any pro-independence sentiment.

8.2 Escalation

As mentioned earlier, the North Caucasus conflict experienced significant escalation in the period 2008-2009. The data presented earlier suggests that the rate of violence has doubled in 2009 in comparison to 2008, and tripled in 2008 in comparison to 2007 (Figure 2). It must also be taken into consideration that
the conflict development tendency in the North Caucasus has been progressing on an upward scale from 2004 onwards (Figure 2).

8.3 Internal Factors

There has always been an internal pressure from moderate elites in the region urging the rebels to stop violence. The indigenous population of North Caucasus, traditionally adherent to Sufi, or moderate branch of Islam, is highly critical and hostile to radical Salafi and Wahhabi Islamic trends often advocated by insurgents in order to vouchsafe funding from jihad-supporters in Arab states (Kroupenev 2009). On the other hand, pro-Russian elites in The North Caucasian republics are often confronted by opposition unwilling to join neither rebels nor federal side (McGregor 2006).

8.4 External Factors

The creation of the Caucasus Emirate by Umarov in 2007, and ensuing abolition of the Republic of Ichkeria (notion of independent Chechnya) caused a wave of protest among the leadership of Ichkeria in exile. Chechen nationalists, the main advocates of the Chechen independence struggle in the early 1990s and members of Ichkeria’s government in exile have swiftly realized that the Caucasus Emirate and a new type of insurgency in the Caucasus promoted by Umarov and military jamaats, left no place for them and for Chechen nationalism as such (Leahy 2008). The main idea of the Caucasus Emirate is a multi-national front, based not on nationalism but on a common religious and cultural background and desire to end the Russian control of the Caucasus.

In 2009 a continuing international pressure on the Russian government to improve human rights records in the North Caucasus has been supported by Human Rights Watch 2009 and Amnesty International reports, urging the Russian government to curb violations of human rights and unlawful violence conducted by law enforcement forces against human rights defenders and journalists in the region (Amnesty Int. 2009). However, previous attempts to mount international pressure on the Russian government with the connection to North Caucasus have only led to a backlash and the Russian government’s adoption of a tougher legislation on foreign and local NGOs.

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15 Akhmed Zakayev, who is the current Foreign Minister of the Republic of Ichkeria in exile, resides in London, UK. Zakayev played an important role in negotiations with Russia in the 1994-96 Chechen War and occupied leading posts in Maskhadov’s government. After the Russian occupation of Chechnya in 1999, Zakayev fled to the United Kingdom (Prague Watchdog, August 5 2003). In 2003 a British court rejected the Russian extradition request extending Zakayev’s political asylum in the United Kingdom. Zakayev rejected the notion of the Caucasus Emirate created by Umarov and retains his post of Foreign Minister of Ichkeria supported by Chechen nationalists living abroad.

16 2006 NGO Law, adopted by the Putin administration, obliged all foreign and local NGOs working in Russia to undergo a lengthy registration process annually. NGOs with a history of criticizing government policies, particularly those on North Caucasus have been denied registration (Richter 2008).
9. International Humanitarian Response

The ongoing conflict in the North Caucasus is a scene of active humanitarian assistance conducted by international and local NGOs and INGOs, and financed by an international donor community.

9.1 Humanitarian Actors

The North Caucasus Theme Group (NC TG), established in 2007 comprises all UN agencies active in the North Caucasus and a list of NGO partners from the Russian Federation and from abroad.\(^\text{17}\) A Consolidated Appeal (CAP) developed by UN agencies for humanitarian assistance in 2006 has been later developed into Inter-Agency Transitional Workplan for the North Caucasus 2007. The Transitional Workplan consists of 9 UN agencies and 12 NGOs working in a multi-sector framework aimed at stabilizing the situation in the region. The program is financed by more than 10 countries, EU Commission (ECHO), UN funds and private donors. The United Nations in the North Caucasus are represented by UNDP, UNDSS, UNESCO, UNICEF and UNHCR (OCHA 2007). And the main humanitarian assistance providers in the region are the Danish Refugee Council, Islamic Relief, ICRC, International Rescue Committee (IRC), International Medical Corps (IMC), World Food Program (WFP), WHO, Doctors Without Borders (MSF), Amnesty International, etc.\(^\text{18}\) There are also a number of NGOs from the Russian Federation working in the region: Caucasian Refugee Council (CRC), Peace Mission of General Lebed, Voice of the Mountains, etc. (OCHA 2007).

9.2 Purpose of Assistance

According to OCHA, the main goals of the international humanitarian assistance are the following: protection of civilian population, basic humanitarian needs, partnership with the government, micro-credit, housing and employment, food relief, training, technical assistance and strengthening of institutional capacity (OCHA 2007).

Thus, humanitarian efforts in the region are mostly directed at alleviating humanitarian emergency and sustainable development and rehabilitation. Human rights and freedoms are another concern addressed by humanitarian actors in the North Caucasus. However, in spite of the fact that a number of NGOs are working with the warring sides on the exchange of hostages and prisoner relief, there is almost no progress in the peace-building area.


\(^\text{18}\) List could be continued: Association of Media Managers (ARS-Press), Children's Fund of North Ossetia-Alania, Civic Assistance, Centre for Inter-Cultural Education Ethnosfera, EquiLibre Solidarit, Guild of Russian Filmmakers, Magee WomenCare International, Memorial Human Rights Centre, Nizam, Stichting Russian Justice Initiative, Vesta, etc.
9.3 Target Groups

The main target groups are IDPs, civilians, in particular children and women (OCHA 2007). According to UNHCR 2009, the largest concentrations of IDPs are in Ingushetia, Dagestan and Chechnya. Ongoing violence in several north Caucasian republics affects civilians, who are often subject to inhumane treatment by law enforcement forces and are caught in crossfire between rebels and police and army.

9.4 Target Geographical Areas

The North Caucasus Theme Group (NC TG) identifies the following north Caucasian republics as the main target zones for humanitarian assistance: Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria and North Ossetia.

9.5 Target Problems

Humanitarian action in the region attempts to tackle the root causes of violence, in particular unemployment and economic underdevelopment by implementing programs on economic growth and poverty alleviation, and education. Other problems included into humanitarian aid assistance are food security, healthcare, landmine action, peace and tolerance, security, shelter, water, and sanitation.

9.6 Effects of Humanitarian Response

The effects of humanitarian assistance in conflict areas of the North Caucasus are diverse in different fields of aid. UNHCR reports indicate that approximately 1,000 IDPs have returned to their homes in the North Caucasus and the organization constructed dozens of houses (in Ingushetia) (UNHCR 2010). The Danish Refugee Council (DRC 2010) reports considerable progress in IDPs relief activities both in Chechnya and Ingushetia in 2008-09.

However, the human rights situation remains tense and there are no considerable advances made in that field by the international humanitarian community. As of 2009, The Human Rights Watch reports no improvement on human rights issues in the North Caucasus and the 2009 Amnesty International report confirms rampant human rights violations by federal authorities in the North Caucasus. In February 2009, Russia failed to pass the Universal Periodic Review conducted by the UN Human Rights Council (HRC). Human rights abuses were mentioned as one of the main causes by the HRC (HRW 2010:434).

The inability of civil groups to work on peace-building and conflict resolution in North Caucasus is an outcome of state’s policy to control NGOs working in the region. As mentioned earlier, stringent NGO legislation (2006 NGO Law) has been used by the state to bar ‘undesirable’ NGOs from the country, in particular those with a critical stance on Russian governments’ policy in North Caucasus.19 State persecution forced many civil groups either to stop their work in the country or adopt a softer stance and refocus on humanitarian service delivery solely.

19 According to the head of the Helsinki Rights Group in Moscow, the 2006 NGO Law reduced NGO numbers in the Russian Federation from approximately 600,000 in 2002 to 200,000 in 2008 (Newsru.com, April 8, 2008).
10. Conflict Settlement

As of February 2011, there have been no attempts made to peacefully resolve the ongoing conflict in the North Caucasus. With the start of the second Chechen campaign in the summer of 1999, Putin rejected any possibility of negotiating with rebels in Chechnya or elsewhere in the Caucasus, branding them as terrorists.\(^{20}\) In the following years, seven amnesties have been announced for rebel fighters in Chechnya, which have allowed hundreds of insurgents to surrender and resume peaceful life (McGregor 2007). However, with the official cancellation of counter-terrorism operation in Chechnya in April 2009, the federal government put an end to the issue. Besides, amnesties only covered fighters in Chechnya and not the militants from other north Caucasian republics which in fact, excluded the majority of insurgents participating in the current conflict.

By denying the existence of an armed conflict in the North Caucasus, the federal government excludes any possibility of its peaceful settlement. The president of the Russian Federation, Dmitry Medvedev admits that “the unstable situation in the North Caucasus is Russia’s biggest domestic problem.”\(^{21}\) However, his solution for the problem does not include peace talks with the rebels.\(^{22}\) Similarly, the last known mentioning of peace negotiations by rebels does not leave any significant hopes for peaceful resolution of the conflict any time soon.\(^{23}\)

11. Conclusion

The deadlock in the North Caucasus conflict resolution and escalating violence are outcomes of more than a decade long armed conflict in the region. Unwillingness of both sides to negotiate is unlikely to bring the conflict to peaceful resolution in the near future. As long as existent stereotypes (of insurgents as terrorists and federal government as oppressor) and reasons for incompatibility will persist, the chances for possible peace talks are minimal. Besides, as mentioned earlier, the current trend of north Caucasian insurgency is decentralization, i.e., transformation from unipolar structure with a single core command center to a multi-polar system, in which each insurgent group can exist and operate independently; it might be difficult to persuade all fractions within the rebel movement to participate in peace talks.

Bridging over contradictions and opening a dialog to discuss incompatibilities should be a very important step to consider in peace-building. In spite of active humanitarian efforts in the region, humanitarian assistance cannot be successful in an absence of peaceful conflict settlement. The international humanitarian community’s efforts in peace-building in the North Caucasus can be of a great assistance to the cause of peace in the region. Although as it was mentioned earlier, a whole plethora of

\(^{20}\) “We will chase those terrorists everywhere. And, I beg your pardon; even if we catch them in a latrine we will kill them there as well!” Vladimir Putin, at a press-conference in Astana, Russia, September 24, 1999.

\(^{21}\) Dmitry Medvedev, in his State of the Nation address on November 2009.

\(^{22}\) “As far as bandits are concerned ... they simply need to be eliminated,” Medvedev on January 2010, Radio Free Europe, Medvedev vows to wipe out ‘bandits’ in North Caucasus, January 08, 2010.

\(^{23}\) In his interview to Radio Liberty Chechen-language service on April 18, 2005, Doku Umarov stated, when asked about the possibility of negotiations with the federal government: “We offered them many times. But it turned out that we constantly press for negotiations and it’s as if we are always standing with an extended hand and this is taken as a sign of our weakness. Therefore we don’t plan to do this anymore.” North Caucasus Analysis Volume: 7 Issue: 16, December 31, 2005.
civil organizations is working in the conflict area, none seems to be actively engaging in peace-making efforts, reducing their presence by mere service-delivery. It might be suggested that economic, social and political developments should be followed by a dialog necessary to achieve the transformation of actors’ attitudes and behaviors.

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Prospects of Inclusive Peace in the post 9/11 Afghanistan

Abstract

This paper expresses guarded optimism at the prospects of success of an inclusive peace process in Afghanistan. It raises doubts whether the inclusion of the radical Taliban forces in the process will yield positive peace in the war-torn country mainly owing two reasons. First, the group has never pronounced its intention to give up violence; rather it has increased violent activities in recent months. Second, as the past experience shows, the Taliban which emerged as a religious organization will unlikely pursue a policy of detachment of politics from religion if returned to power to Kabul. It will likely continue implementing its fundamentalist ideology. The paper also argues there is lack of needed cooperation among diverse players in the region, which further adds to the complicated nature of fragile peace in Afghanistan.

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The conflict in Afghanistan is perhaps one of most fragile international conflicts with horrendous tangible and intangible costs. Fragile state apparatus plagued by corruption and criminalization further make the task of conflict transformation a difficult task. Instead of weakening of terrorist and fundamentalist forces, the recent trends show despite some success in eliminating sections of these forces, and despite efforts to wedge a dividing line between them such as radical and moderate Taliban, the radical forces appear to thrive. The region particularly the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan, characterized by the new construct Af-Pak has become a zone of violence with the international security assistance force (ISAF), as its scheduled departure draws near, renewed efforts to eliminate radical elements amidst stiff resistance. In this process it is the civilians who bear the brunt of violence in terms of loss of lives or livelihood or in terms of human capital. In terms of peace process the region has traversed a complicated path, particularly aftermath of the departure of the Taliban regime and with the international mediation, the prospects of peace in Afghanistan has appeared feasible though not easy. While players have divergent perceptions about how to craft peace, and while some advocate for a regional format for conflict transformation in the region, the intransigence on the part of the parties have made the solution to conflict a difficult prospect. The Taliban, also called 'Talibjan' (meaning brother) as a newly constructed mechanism to draw the radical group to the orbit of peace process, have not moderated its format of engagement and appear to have clung to its old policies of radicalism. The attempts at London and Kabul conferences held promises for conflict resolution. Hence, it will be nearsighted to discard the peace process, rather the intransigence of some players necessitate the urgency of a sustained peace process with regional and international collaboration.
Can Inclusive Peace be Possible?

The peace process in Afghanistan initiated after the fall of the Taliban government in 2001 is beset with hurdles despite the common agreement that the troublesome region requires peace. The Bonn Agreement endorsed by the United Nations Security Council in resolution 1383 in December 2001 envisioned an interim administration to be assisted by the ISAF. Led by an ethnic Pashtun leader, Hamid Karzai, and initially for a period of six months, the period of the transitional government was enhanced by the Emergency Loya Jirga (tribal council) till 2004. Karzai was elected President of Afghanistan in 2004 elections, and further reelected in 2009 elections though amidst contestations. While taking into account the nature of the transition process in the war ravaged country afflicted with the problems such as economic reconstruction and development, another crucial issue that has complicated the peace process is the prospect of reintegration of the Taliban into the mainstream. Other issues such as streamlining administration by weeding out corruption and handing over the system of administration to the Afghans by phasing out foreign forces, and most importantly bringing to the realization the adoption of a regional strategy to resolve the regional issue have factored in recent years.(Mahapatra 2010b) Various international conferences at Bonn (2001), Berlin (2004), London (2006), Rome (2007), Paris (2008), Moscow (2009), Hague (2009) and London (2010) have emphasized one or other aspects of the peace process in Afghanistan.

The Istanbul regional conference on Friendship and Cooperation in January 2010 emphasized on a regional approach for the resolution of the complicated issue. The London conference later that month was a significant step towards finding a feasible solution to the conflict as it emphasized on an inclusive peace process in which the moderate Taliban can participate. Hamid Karzai emphasized that unless the moderate Taliban, who comprise the majority population, are included in the peace process it would be difficult to expect any significant outcome from the peace process. It is thus crucial that the conference endeavoured to draw a line of distinction between the hard line and moderate Taliban as to the degree of their ideology and violent practices, and wedge a dividing line between the two by providing support both monetary and political to the later while alienating the former. In order to provide ballast to such a new format, the UN representative earlier that month had a discussion with representatives of Taliban in Dubai. Among important steps, the conference set up a Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund to steer the peace and integration process further.

The London conference could be considered a landmark in the peace process in Afghanistan as it talked about innovative ideas for Afghanistan, the most crucial of which is the emphasis on the idea to let the Afghans manage affairs on their own. This agenda is predicated on the principle of gradual phasing out of ISAF, and gradual shifting of power to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and other Afghan government agencies. The conference communiqué predicted that the Afghan provinces which are less turbulent can be handed over to the ANSF by late 2010 or 2011, and in other turbulent provinces the international force will gradually withdraw by playing a supportive role, while simultaneously training and enlarging the Afghan forces. Though the process of draw down of the forces has not started yet, the killing of Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden may foster the process of withdrawal, thus providing the Afghan people the leverage to handle their affairs. It will be a difficult task, providing the difference among the Afghan groups, and it will also depend on how things actually work on the ground, and how the immediate neighbours reshape their strategy towards the situation.
There is another crucial issue which is important for any peace process to succeed in Afghanistan. The forces of corruption, nepotism and favouritism with which Karzai government is much associated need to be tackled. Much of the aid money is siphoned off by the government officials thus leaving paltry amount for the common Afghans. The London conference urged (London Conference Communiqué 2010) the Afghan government to establish an oversight committee to work against corruption, and to focus on the issues of employment for the common Afghans, establishment of a civil service organization to create an administrative cadre in Afghanistan and to speed up infrastructure and other development projects. The establishment of Reconstruction Trust Fund and the Law and Order Trust Fund may aid this process. However, the peace efforts initiated in the London have not yet witnessed any significant results, owing mainly to the lack of coordination between varied elements including the Taliban and the mediators, the intransigence of the Taliban to come to the negotiating table, failure of efforts to alienate the hard line elements from the scenario.

The pertinent question that needs to be focused in the ongoing peace process is whether a dividing line can be drawn in the Taliban ranks with the formulations like moderate Taliban and hard line Taliban. Perhaps that was a tactical move to weaken the Taliban movement and urging the majority of its members who appear to be drawn to the movement due to various reasons other than fundamentalist ideology to join the peace process. This idea was implemented vigorously in the year 2010 when Hamid Karzai added a new terminology Talibjan to peace discourse in Afghanistan. The term Talibjan (a combination of Talib and Jan) is coined to impart a new meaning to the Taliban in Afghanistan in order to bring them to the orbit of the reintegration process. Taliban (the singular is Talib, which literally means ‘seeker’ or ‘student’) forces are enthusiastically goaded to the peace efforts by the Afghan leadership with the support of regional and international powers with the suffix Jan (meaning darling). The underpinnings of such a subtle change in approach towards reconciliation and reintegration efforts in Afghanistan are really far reaching, aiming at further reinforcing the spirit of reintegration by accommodating the diverse forces including the Taliban in the peace process. The Taliban, which belong to ethnic Pashtun community, to which Karzai also belongs to, has increasingly asserted its stakes in the recent years. However, the evolving scenario has to be seen in a wider framework of ethnic pluralism and peculiar travails that the war torn country is currently undergoing, particularly when members of other communities in Afghanistan have expressed scepticism at such a process of inclusion of the Taliban in the peace process.

The back channel diplomacy in the past few years have indicated that probably in order to bring peace to Afghanistan there is no other way but to invite Taliban to be part of the peace process. This effort led to the complex debate over the distinctive marks of moderate Taliban and radical Taliban. As such there is no clear cut demarcation line between moderate vs. radical Taliban. These forces which emerged during heydays of the cold war were intoxicated with the radical and orthodox dogmas. The collusion of these forces with other extremist forces like Al Qaeda made these forces further dreaded. The back channel diplomacy not withstanding and despite the efforts by the United Nations such as meeting the Taliban representatives in Dubai in January 2010, there is no sign that the Taliban has given up violence. None of the Taliban leaders has openly declared that the grouping will give up violence once they are part of the reintegration process; rather the Taliban leader Mullah Omar has openly expressed his resentment towards the peace process. The Taliban strategy appears to be a wait policy till the vacuum emerges after
the withdrawal of the international security assistance force so that they can with the support from Pakistan fill the vacuum. Other ethnic groups in Afghanistan such as Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, etc. have protested such moves. One of the prominent Tajik leaders Abdullah Abdullah, also at a time the Foreign Minister of Afghanistan strongly criticized this move of inclusion in unequivocal terms, ‘It’s not just the language he (Hamid Karzai) has used for months about ‘disaffected brothers’; now he says, ‘Talib-jan,’ which is like calling them ‘darling.’ To me, it shows the lack of a sense of direction and vision.” (King 2010)

The dilemma is that despite the call of Karzai to include the Taliban in the peace process it is the implementation part of this call and how the Taliban responds to this call on which will depend the crucial momentum of the peace process. Karzai does not control the whole of Afghanistan and with his popularity base shrinking particularly after the last 2009 elections alleged to be tainted; perhaps this argument for inclusion is a motive of Karzai to reach out to Taliban so that he can play a role of credible balancer among diverse forces. The move may be appreciated on an overarching ideal of peace and development in Afghanistan, but at a pragmatic level this approach is fraught with dangers and shortcomings. The Taliban has never discarded violence as a policy method. The same Taliban leaders like Mullah Omar who imposed radical Islam in Afghanistan is running his writ in Afghanistan while dictating orders from mountainous border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan, particularly from the cities like Quetta with a popular base among significant section of Pashtuns. Neither Karzai nor his supporters did take steps to groom moderate Taliban leadership who could replace the orthodox leaders like Omar. It is doubtful whether the Taliban will shun violence when coming to power or will use it to further its goal towards establishing Islamic caliphate in Afghanistan with a global agenda.

Hence the major dilemma in the peace process is how to convince the Taliban the utility and importance of dialogue and deliberation towards transformation of the conflict. Taliban still enjoys mass support and consists of the majority Pashtun community and is no more confined to Afghanistan alone as it has further entrenched to the North West areas of Pakistan. Broadly it has two branches: Afghan Taliban and Pakistan Taliban. In this context, the role of Pakistan is noteworthy as it not only shares common border with Afghanistan, but also has population of same ethnic stock (in fact there are more Pashtuns in Pakistan than in Afghanistan) as in Afghanistan. The Taliban enjoys the patronage of Pakistan, and it was Pakistan government which was among three countries to recognize the Taliban government in late 1990s. It will largely depend on the policy matrix of Pakistan and how the civilian government and the dominant army apparatus perceive the situation, the future course of peace and development in Afghanistan will be significantly based. Pakistan which has considered Afghanistan as its sphere of influence can play a major role in reconciliation and reintegration effort by urging the radical elements under its control to shun violence.

The Kabul conference of July 2010 reiterated the same inclusive mantra as a step towards reconciliation process. The huge gathering in the Afghan capital, attended by 70 countries including 40 foreign ministers, and international bodies and donor agencies, issued 32 point communiqué which in fact did not spell out anything novel, though its positive achievement might be it further committed the Afghan leadership towards evolving an inclusive approach to solve the contentious issue in a transparent manner. No doubt the image of the Afghan government before the international arena is not good as it is labelled corrupt and inefficient, but Karzai appeared confident during the conference when he
proclaimed, “I remain determined that our Afghan National Security Forces will be responsible for all military and law enforcement operations throughout our country by 2014.” (Farmer 2010) Though it is calculated that within a span of three years the international forces will depart, leaving the control of Afghanistan to Afghan people, it has to be seen how far the transition takes place in a smooth manner with a wily Taliban, and vacillating Pakistan, the two important players in Afghanistan politics. Though Karzai himself a Pashtun he lacks effective control over these groups, which spread across Afghanistan and the northwest of Pakistan.

Karzai has repeatedly emphasized that the peace process will continue without the radical Taliban but with moderate Taliban, and the prospective power sharing at Kabul will aim at reintegration of Taliban with the mainstream society towards ‘ultimate peace, stability and prosperity’ in Afghanistan. India has strongly objected to any peace format which includes the radical Taliban, which has not hidden its contempt for India and its policies. The Taliban government’s calibrated inaction during the hijacking of Indian Airlines flight to Kandahar in 1999 has undoubted one of the sullen memories, and the Taliban’s open support to militant groups in Indian part of Kashmir, are bones of contention not only between India and Taliban, but also between India and Pakistan. During his visit to New Delhi in April 2010, Karzai harped on this dimension of the peace process. Indian educated Karzai, known as an advocate of the regional format for peace, argues that India can play an effective role in this regional and inclusive format. In his first visit to India after he was reelected the leader of Afghanistan in October 2009, Karzai received warm welcome in New Delhi. India, which is the third largest donor in Afghanistan with the commitment of $2billion, has insisted, while formulating Afghan policy, the historical link of India with Afghanistan. Many of the Indian stories and mythologies are related to ancient and medieval Afghanistan and are etched in public memory. The famous Sanskrit Grammarian Panini was born in Kabul. (Sen 2005, p. 84) There is overall unanimity in Indian public and policy circles that New Delhi should continue its reconstruction activities in Afghanistan. (Mahapatra 2010a) According to a poll conducted in December 2009 by the Afghan Centre for Socio Economic and Opinion Research 71 per cent of 1534 respondents in 43 Afghan locations have overwhelmingly welcomed India’s role in developmental activities in Afghanistan. India has completed the Zaranj-Delaram road project and the Pul-e-Kumri to Kabul transmission line project, and is involved in projects such as the Salma dam hydropower project in Herat and the construction of the Afghan Parliament. Indian national budget since the last few years has allocated some amount for India’s reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. On the other hand, as pointed out earlier, Pakistan has viewed Karzai government’s friendly relations with India with suspicion. According to a Pak analyst Rasul Bakhsh Rais, “There is a degree of disappointment with him (Karzai), in particular over the way he has provided Afghanistan as a playing field for India.”

It is a very ambitious ideal to bring peace and stability in Afghanistan by including the Taliban in the power sharing arrangement, mainly owing to the difficulty in wedging a dividing line between moderate and radical Taliban. Afghanistan has throughout its history witnessed myriad violent phases including the great game and the recently emerging new great game. In fact, in a broader context the Afghan conundrum is a crucible in the wider fragility of Eurasia. The 2010 turmoil in Kyrgyzstan, the spread of drug trafficking and terror link throughout the region, the vested interests of diverse powers in this strategically rich region further makes the situation volatile and complex. The recent developments bring
into picture the assiduous task of making clear cut distinction between good and bad Taliban, towards reintegration, reconciliation and ultimate peace and stability in the war torn region.

Perceptions of Players and Peace Process

One of the important players in Afghanistan will be Pakistan for any conflict transformation in the region. The international forces present in Afghanistan appear to have well recognized this dimension, which in turn have provided Pakistan a leveraged position to bargain with forces led by the US. The US congress, under the Biden-Lugar Bill, has tripled civilian aid to Pakistan and also enhanced the assistance to fight terrorism and fundamentalism. It is a temptation hard to be resisted by Pakistan. The same is the case with Afghanistan. There are tens of thousands of US and NATO troops stationed in Afghanistan. As per a report, the US within just about a year from 11 September 2001 to 31 December 2002 spent $40 billion on its war efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan and some other areas. (Bailey 2003) Pakistan appears to have well managed the value of its crucial importance, and used it as a strategic and bargaining clout in its dealing with other players involved in the peace process in the region. Its closure of the strategic supply route Khyber Pass, about 35 kilometre route in the Hindu Kush mountain range, in October 2010 brought into focus Pakistan's increasing leverage in the politics of the region. While Pakistan alleged that the US drone attacks killed Pak soldier, the step was construed as rising assertion on part of Pakistan against the US presence in the region. The drone attacks have always been a sore point between Pakistan and the US, though the Pakistan government appears to have given tacit consent for such attacks notwithstanding the fact significant portion of the Pak population view it as encroachment into the sovereignty of their country. The Khyber Pass at present undoubtedly is the most important among all other routes for supply to NATO forces in Afghanistan. The route is considered to be vital for the success or failure of the war against terrorism and dismantling of Taliban fundamentalism in Afghanistan, as about 75 per cent of ammunition, food and fuel go through it for the NATO forces. (Synovitz 2008) The other route through the Chaman border range is not as crucial as this one. Some other routes through Central Asia so far have not played as crucial as the Khyber Pass. The mountain route, as its very location and situation suggest, has been subject to attacks by the militant Taliban groups. In the year 2008, five hundred vehicles were attacked by the Taliban. There appears differences emerging in a more protracted way between the US and Pakistan in recent months. The arrest of Raymond Davis a US diplomatic staff in Pakistan by Pak police for his alleged killing of two Pakistani citizens has further raised the ante between the two traditional allies. This row has threatened the bilateral relations, with the US unofficially threatening to curtail aids to Pakistan. The standoff was ended with the intervention of Saudi Arabia, a close ally of the US and Pakistan.

The stalemate in bilateral relations after the killing of Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, who was staying for years in a mansion in close vicinity of the garrison town of Abbotabad, in which the US expressed suspicions over Pakistan’s commitment in the global war against terrorism, may further drift Pakistan away from the US towards China, thus changing balance of power in the region and impacting the ongoing peace process significantly. The visit of Pakistan president to Russia and Prime Minister to China in May 2011 may prove game changers in this context. In an interview to the local media, Zardari invited Russia to use Pakistani territory to access to ‘southern seas.’ (The Hindu 2011) The visit of Pak prime minister to China in the same month to participate in the celebrations to mark 60 years of bilateral
relations and to improve them will also have bearing on the peace process. Aftermath of the Abbotabad episode, China has come to forefront to back Pakistan’s policies on ‘implementing counterterrorism strategies,’ and reiterated its promise to build nuclear reactor in Chashma of Pakistan despite objections from various countries. There are also reports that Pakistan has been persuading Afghanistan leadership to give up special relationship with the US and move closer to China. (Mohan 2011) China appears to have projected itself as a bridge between Washington and Islamabad, and intends to play a major role in developing a regional framework involving Beijing, Kabul and Islamabad towards the resolution of the Afghanistan problem. One Chinese scholar Li Xiguang has argued that “China, Pakistan and Afghanistan need to form a Pamir group, a strategic trilateral partnership to support sustainable peace and prosperity in the region.” (Mohan 2011)

India-Pakistan rivalry on various issues including the issue of Kashmir too colours the peace contours in the region. Pakistan views India’s engagement in Afghanistan with suspicion; the six decades of rivalry and four wars between these two countries further contribute to this suspicion factor. Besides, Pakistan considers Afghanistan as its strategic backyard; hence, it must have the determining voice in the affairs of the region. These factors lead Pakistan to suspect India’s reconstruction activities in Afghanistan as a cloak to foster India’s strategic objectives in the region at the cost of Pakistan. Hence when the US urged Pakistan to attack the militants in its North Waziristan area in 2010, the Pakistan army cited mainly two reasons behind its reluctance to divert forces in that direction. While the first reason that the military is involved in the activities to ameliorate the conditions of the victims of the floods that devastated Indus basin area in Pakistan appeared well founded, the second reason appeared more as a strategy. Pakistan raised the India factor, particularly threat of India in its east, as discouraging for the army to divert to north to fight the militants. Perhaps, this argument of Pakistan in a way emboldened the US to resolve to fight the militants solo in ‘hot pursuit’ by moving gunships and drone attacks. While Pakistan government has not appreciated the US hot pursuits in its territory owing to popular dissatisfaction but tolerated due to its heavy dependence on the US aids, some sections in the US policy establishment have expressed disillusionment over the Pak cooperation in counter terrorism activities particularly after the Osama episode. Bob Woodward’s book Obama’s Wars (Woodward 2010) has reflected this sentiment as it argued, among others, how despite the heavy US investments in Pakistan it has become difficult to realize the US objectives in the region. At present, the US aid to Pakistan has increased up to $2 billion per year. It appears this suspicion factor will grow further in coming months as Pakistan inches closer towards China.

It is also pertinent in the framework of conflict and peace in Afghanistan whether the global war against terrorism panned out as the major objective for the war in the region aftermath of the 9/11 could achieve its intended result. The question and its answer will vary but it will likely provide a parameter as to whether the efforts since the last decade could produce substantial results towards the needed peace and tranquillity so that the international security assistance force could depart in peace. Undoubtedly the war had its many positive impacts, the major being the rooting out the Taliban from power. The war though could not banish Taliban and Al Qaeda to their last, it could certainly dismantle their regime and strong bases in Afghanistan. Besides, the war also led to efforts towards establishment of a democratic regime, howsoever fledgling, in Afghanistan under Hamid Karzai as a vanguard towards strengthening peace and development in the war torn country. But, it would be too immature to conclude that the war has achieved its intended results. Taliban and Al Qaeda driven out from Afghanistan found safe havens
in mountainous border areas of Afghanistan-Pakistan and other regions and countries, and even in well secured towns such as Abbotabad in Pakistan from where the Al Qaeda leader was found and killed. In June 2010 the Afghan financial intelligence unit FinTraca alleged that donors from Saudi Arabia were funding Taliban activities in Afghanistan. The Director General of FinTraca Mohammed Mustafa Massoudi argued that the purpose of sending the money to the tune of $920 million is none other than promotion of terrorist activities. (The Hindu 2010) The funding came through Pakistan, particularly its Waziristan area, which is the hub of radical elements including Al Qaeda. Massoudi asked ‘Why would anyone want to put such money into Waziristan?’ and replied, there is one reason, ‘terrorism.’ (The Hindu 2010)

The name of Saudi Arabia has figured in recent months towards promoting radical variety of Islam in other countries including Afghanistan and Pakistan. Called Wahabbism, this extremist version of Islam has not only been embraced by Al Qaeda and Taliban but by almost all radical groups across the globe. Besides Afghanistan, other countries too have alleged the financial support provided by the donors of Saudi Arabia to terrorist groups. Saudi Arabia needs to take steps towards reviewing its policies in terms of supporting radical elements and organizations around the world. The Gulf country which appears to have poised to play a crucial role towards reconciliation in Afghanistan has to take seriously the new revelation. Saudi Arabia has supported the peace process and expressed interest to play mediatory role between Afghan government and the Taliban. The likely establishment of Saudi Arabia’s image as a fund provider to Taliban or as a silent spectator to the donations from its soil made to Taliban ostensibly for terrorist activities will definitely reduce trust on Riyadh as a peace maker in Afghanistan. It appears further complex in view of the Afghan government’s resolve to exclude those elements of Taliban who are still engaged in violent activities from the reconciliation process in the war torn country. It is indeed crucial to realize that terror funding and peacemaking, or broadly terrorism and peace cannot go together. Funding terrorist activities will in no way help the cause of peace or stability in Afghanistan; rather it will further aid fragility of the war torn country, and make peace prospects precarious. It is a matter of serious concern and also needs to be taken into account by international powers and other players in the region. Similar is the case in the context of fighting drug trafficking and smuggling. Afghanistan alone is the home to the largest poppy cultivation in the world. In May 2009 one of the largest-ever drugs seizure in Afghanistan was undertaken in a Taliban stronghold and opium-production centre in the south of the country that led to the killing of 60 Taliban members. The point that needs emphasis is whether Afghanistan or Pakistan or the combined force have the wherewithal to fight the menace of terrorism, fundamentalism and drug trafficking that are so much embedded in their systems. Also, from a broader point of view, it may be factored whether the US and the NATO presence in this region is sufficient enough to counter the growing menace of these forces? Or there needs to be the urgency to tackle these issues by evolving an international approach which will have the acceptability by the countries of the region as well as other regional and international powers?

The Afghanistan problem, particularly the issue of supply routes, can be a scope and at the same time a point of contention in the wider US-Russia relations. The NATO forces lost 90 supply lorries in December 2008 on a bridge in Khyber Pass from Pakistan by the Taliban attacks. How far the US, European Union, Russia and other powers in the region come together and eschew their old rivalry and develop a common goal towards peace in Afghanistan and dismantle radical forces like the Taliban, which is perhaps the sole
beneficiary from lack of a coordinated agenda on part of the international players. While Russia has argued that its experiences in Afghanistan in the 1980s could be used to fight terrorism and fundamentalism, NATO forces appeared to have viewed Russian offer with an eye of suspicion. This suspicion might have behind it a rationale as it was the US backed forces which fought a decade long war against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Russia argues that this region is well connected by the Soviet era railroad system. The route from Russia, and then through Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to Afghanistan can help the NATO to achieve its targets with Russian cooperation. There are some positive signs towards possible NATO-Russia cooperation after Moscow gave green signal to NATO by allowing ‘non-lethal’ supplies to use Russian territory as transit to Afghanistan and in November 2008, and allowed the forces of Spain and Germany to use its territory to transport goods to Afghanistan. The partnership between the US led NATO and Russia will help defuse tensions in the region, besides help tackling the radical elements and menaces like drug trafficking. Lack of any such cooperation will only advantage the radical forces, and as the developments indicate so far there are feeble signs that the two cold war rivals will come together in Afghanistan in a full-fledged agenda of peace, cooperation and development.

**Conclusion**

It sounds logical and appropriate to argue that any peace process and its sustainability in Afghanistan must require effective participation of all parties to the ongoing conflict including the Taliban, which constitute the majority Pashtun population in the country. But how far on an empirical plane this is possible is open to speculation and continuous Taliban violence as the recent Taliban attack in Kabul displays, the attempts towards positive peace is often laced with pessimism. Undoubtedly, the Afghanistan conflict is much complex, hence necessitating a multilayered, difficult and arduous peace process with involvement of all players. The drawdown of international security forces starting in July 2011, however, is not in this context instructive enough that peace will dawn after the departure of the foreign troops. One may only agree with Amrullah Saleh, the former head of the National Directorate of Security in Afghanistan from 2004 to 2010, that “Afghans like me increasingly worry that we will wind up in a situation worse than the civil war of past years.” (Saleh 2011) However, as any complex peace process demands, peace in Afghanistan needs a slow but steady momentum while nudging the Taliban towards the peace process. Another crucial difficulty in the Afghan peace process is the lack of coordination among diverse players in the region partly arising out of past years of animosity as was during the great game years and partly due to divergent interests of the players in the region. Whether it is international players, or regional players, or immediate neighbours of Afghanistan – their different and at times contradictory perspectives on the issue makes the peace process a very difficult endeavour. Though factors like religious fundamentalism and terrorism may bring countries together, issues like strategic interests, resources in the country and religion factor may pull the players in different directions thus further jeopardizing the peace process.
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ECONOMY
ABILIOV, Shamkhal

IMF: Is It the Embodiment of Western Dominance or Global Civilizer?

The Case of the Korean Financial Crisis of 1997-98

It was expected that the early post-war world would witness a degree of unity and good-will in international political relationships among the victorious allies [including Russia] never before reached in peace-time. It was expected that the world would move rapidly . . . toward “One World”. . . No influential person, as far as I can remember, expressed the expectation or the fear that international relations would worsen during those years.

Harry Dexter White

Harry Dexter White was an American economist, senior United States Treasury official, and one of the chief drafters of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The idea behind his aforementioned statement was that the creation of international institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank after World War II were serving the unification of the world, preventing crises and stabilizing economic growth. But, unlike his optimistic thought, over the years these institutions have been subject of much criticism and there is a great debate among scholars whether they do indeed prevent international crises and serve as economic stabilizers or hurt the poor countries (Third World) and damage economic growth while serving the interests of the big powers that lead these institutions.

Therefore, this research paper seeks to investigate the international condition after World War II, provides a general overview of the Bretton Wood system developed from 1944 onwards, creation of IMF, end of the Bretton Wood System (1970s), Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), as well as addresses several questions: is IMF embodiment of Western (US) dominance, or civilizer of the world? Do powerful states use it as an effective instrument for their foreign policy? Is it an effective crisis manager?

The Bretton Woods System

After World War II the economic condition in the world was totally devastating. The great European powers were in political and economic ruin, the Soviet Union, in its turn, was ideologically isolated from the rest of the world. It was the US only that became the new superpower after the war. As a

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consequence, in order to avoid repetition of the disastrous Great Depression of the 1930s, to reconstruct the postwar financial system, to prevent future economic crisis, to promote international monetary cooperation and exchange rate stability, and to expand international trade, politicians of leading countries, with the direct leadership of the US, had founded the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, known as the Bretton Woods System, in July 1944. For that delegations from 44 countries came together in the town of Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in the northeastern part of the US and agreed for the international economic cooperation.\(^2\) Ngaire Wood elucidates the emergence of the Bretton Woods system as follows:

Two serious problems faced policy makers in the last stage of World War II. First, Europe had been devastated by war and needed to be reconstructed. Second, the "beggar thy neighbor" economic policies of the interwar years had led to disastrous outcomes. Countries try to devalue their way out of crisis, strangle production in other countries through cheap exports and trade protectionism. The result was catastrophic. The challenge for economic officials meeting at Bretton Woods in 1944 was to gain agreement among states about how to finance postwar reconstruction, stabilize exchange rates, foster trade, and prevent balance of payments crises from unraveling the system.\(^3\)

Orlin Grabbe in his article "The Rise and Fall of Bretton Woods" indicates that the Bretton Woods agreement was signed by 44 countries, but only the US and Great Britain were negotiating and had a rivalry on the vision of their government's policy over the postwar monetary arrangement. The two principal persons, Harry Dexter White headed the US delegation and John Maynard Keynes was representing Great Britain. According to him, one of the reasons of Bretton Woods was to counter the "New Order" propaganda of the German government during World War II, the National Socialist vision of the German government of how the world will be financially and economically under German rule. He argued that the German propaganda led to the suspicion among the leaders of great powers opposing Germany that it would win the hearts and minds of many people. The British Ministry of Information asked John Maynard Keynes in 1940 to prepare a new program as counter propaganda that should illustrate the financial system of the world after the war. On the US side, in 1941, Henry Morgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury, ordered Harry Dexter White to make a plan for the future international money arrangement. He thought that the international financial system should be based on international cooperation, fixed exchange rates, and settlement in gold. The two proposals, made by John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White, formed the basis for the formation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank.\(^4\)

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\(^4\) Ibid, (Grabbe, J. Orlin).
The International Monetary Fund came officially into existence on December 27, 1945, when 29 countries signed the treaty called Articles of Agreement. Washington D.C. was chosen as the permanent headquarters of the IMF. The financial operations of the IMF started on March 1, 1947. The purposes of the International Monetary Fund are outlined in Article I of IMF “Article of Agreement”:

(i) To promote international monetary cooperation through a permanent institution which provides the machinery for consultation and collaboration on international monetary problems.

(ii) To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and real income and to the development of the productive resources of all members as primary objectives of economic policy.

(iii) To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements among members, and to avoid competitive exchange depreciation.

(iv) To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments in respect of current transactions between members and in the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions which hamper the growth of world trade.

(v) To give confidence to members by making the general resources of the Fund temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity.

(vi) In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and lessen the degree of disequilibrium in the international balances of payments of members.

The major financial source of IMF comes from the quotas that are deposited by member countries when they join it. Currently it has 186 members. Quotas are related to the economic size of member countries and their position in world economy. The financially and economically developed countries tend to have larger quotas. This factor determines their voting power and borrowing capacity. For instance, the US, with the largest economy in the world, shares the largest quota of International Monetary Fund. After its foundation, for three decades, the IMF was essentially a dollar-centric institution, with the United States providing most of its loanable resources and effectively controlling most of its lending decisions. During that period the US dollar was the principle reserve currency, which was pegged to gold, and other countries articulated their currencies vis-à-vis the US dollar. The export and import of member countries was carried out in US dollar, in order to keep market exchange rates

stable, until the end of Bretton Woods system in the 1970s. This made the national monetary and fiscal policy of the United States free from external economic pressures, while heavily influencing those external economies.8

The “End” of the Bretton Woods System

There is a great debate going on about the above mentioned factors, whether they were not valid any more after three decades of the creation of the Bretton Woods System. The 1970s will long be remembered as a decade of poor economic performance and “brake-down” of the Bretton Woods system. John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos argued that it was not the Bretton Woods system that collapsed after all. According to them the Bretton Woods system founded the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in 1944 at the Bretton Woods Conference, and these institutions are still functional and play an important role in world economic policy. But what did end in 1970s was the cooperation among the IMF member states for the convertibility of the dollar into gold, thus decreasing the role of the dollar as an international reserve currency and the end of the exchange rate regime.9 Hereby, I would like to highlight several events that caused the economic crisis in the 1970s and brought the above mentioned processes to an end.

Bretton Woods was characterized by extensive capital controls. The dates of the System (Gold Standard) run from 1944 until the 1970s. But in reality it was functional only after 1959, when the European currencies fully converted to gold. The years between 1959 and 1967 are considered the heyday of the system.10 During those years there was no alternative currency that could challenge the US dollar as a key international currency. The US was in the center of the international capital and goods markets. The European countries and Japan were considered peripheries to the US hegemony over the world economy due to their destroyed economies after World War II. Member countries of the International Monetary Fund were required to establish a par value vis-à-vis the US dollar and the US began to play the role of world banker.11

The Bretton Woods I System continued to operate until early 1973, but the years from 1969 until 1973 marked the dissolution of the System. In the 1960s the world experienced a substantial economic expansion, especially the warring nations of World War II, mainly the European countries and Japan, grew unexpectedly fast.12 Once the economy of these countries had been reconstructed, their institutions restored and strategy shifted towards free market, the periphery (Europe and Japan) gradually became a center and financial controls were lifted. However, they ran a very inflationary policy and these events limited the convertibility of the US dollar because the reserves were insufficient to meet the demand for

their currencies. European governments attempted to limit dollar holdings, converting those holdings into gold. These developments in the Western industrialized countries caused the weakening of the US position in the world economy and a devaluation of the US dollar.\textsuperscript{13}

Scholars argue that one of the several factors that caused the devolution of the dollar was a sizable increase in expansionary domestic programs in the US and the rise of military spending due to the Vietnam War gradually worsened the overvaluation of the dollar and brought inflation, and increase of deficit in the US financial system, which led the states to seek the conversion of their dollars into gold.\textsuperscript{14} France attempted to pressure the US by threatening to convert French holdings of US dollars into gold. The general view was that during the 1960s the position of France was obviously determined by President de Gaulle’s anti-American policy in order to challenge the economic and political dominance of the US over Western Europe rather than economic objectives.\textsuperscript{15}

Another consequence of the collapse of the Bretton Woods System was lack of confidence in the US dollar and the European Community’s plan to create a monetary union in order to keep its currencies stable and independent from US influence, which resulted in the establishment of the European Monetary System in 1979. The purpose of the European Monetary System was to bring exchange rate stability to Europe, by which currencies of member states would be adjusted against each other.\textsuperscript{16}

The “Oil Shock” of the mid seventies was the final inflationary impulse of the economic crisis in the 1970s. For last two decades prior to the 1970s oil prices in the US had risen less than two percent per year. But beginning from 1971, OPEC (Oil Petroleum Exporting Countries) slowly readjusted oil prices. In 1973, during the Yom Kippur War between Israel and Egypt, OPEC announced that it would not sell oil to those countries that are supporting Israel in the conflict with the Arab world.\textsuperscript{17}

Summing up the major events that caused the international economic crisis in the 1970s and the devolution of dollar, leads to the following list:

- Suspicion of the convertibility of US dollar into gold
- Vietnam War
- French anti-American policy
- “Oil Shock” by OPEC
- Attempt to reconstruct the European financial system and the effort to establish the European Monetary System by the European Union at the end of the 1980s.


\textsuperscript{16} Ibid, Braithwaite, John & Drahos, Peter, p. 101.

Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) and Korea

Between 1950 and 1973 the world economy peaked in terms of GDP, and it is called in world history as the “Golden Age” of economy. But as the result of the crisis of the 1970s the dollar lost its convertibility into gold and its position of being the only currency central to the international monetary system. The rate of overall economic growth suffered a major decline due to the events mentioned above. As a result of that crisis, developing countries faced a combination of severe balance of payments problem, high and variable inflation, slow growth, and high unemployment rate. In order to respond to these difficulties that the world’s developing countries faced, a new loan program at IMF was established, the so called Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). SAP was an economic policy; its objectives were to achieve sustainable reforms in trade, industry, agriculture, as well as in the financial and energy sectors.\(^{18}\) It was designed for individual countries and generally countries needed to devalue their currencies against the dollar, lift import and export restrictions, balance their budget deficit, and remove price controls and state subsidies. Free market, privatization of assets and liberalization in economy were the guiding principles of SAP. During the 1980s a large number of developing countries adopted a structural adjustment program with its conditions, but later were unable to meet its terms.\(^{19}\)

A common criticism is that the policies promoted by the IMF are virtually similar across countries. The Whirled Bank Group argue that devaluation of national currencies as the result of IMF’s Structural Adjustment Program, makes the countries’ products cheaper for foreigners to buy but at the same time makes the foreign products more expensive. Following this, governments of developing countries try to limit the buying of expensive foreign products in order to prevent budget deficits. But by large foreign currency loans, the IMF encourages them to import, which makes them dependent of foreign loan. The IMF policy of balancing national budgets in developing countries, which can be done only by higher taxes or less government spending, is facing criticism, highlighting that it hurts the poor segments of the population, mainly through reductions in public expenditures on health, education, and other social services.\(^{20}\)

In order to assess the issue of how the functions of SAP are successful and beneficial for the developing countries during the crisis time I would like to explain it in the context of the great Asian crisis of the late 1990s, mainly in the context of the Korean case. Beginning in February 1997, the Asian economic crisis quickly erupted from the Southeast Asian countries of Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines and spread to East Asia, namely Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong.\(^{21}\) According to the Asian Development Bank there were two main causes of the Asian crisis:

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\(^{19}\) Ibid.


Prior to the crisis, the Korean economy was characterized by a dichotomy between a strong real economy and a growing financial problem. The first overt signs of crisis in Korea began in 1996, when the current account deficit widened from 2% of GNP in 1995 to 5% in 1996, the rate of growth of exports slowed down from a phenomenal 31% to a merely high 15% and the GNP declined from an exceedingly high 14.6% to a very high 7.1%.\footnote{Adelman, Irma, Nak, Song Byung, “The Korean Financial Crisis of 1997-98”; (http://areweb.berkeley.edu/~adelman/crisis.pdf). Accessed on May 10, 2011.} In consequence, at the end of 1997, the IMF came with rescue packages worth of 18 billion dollars for Thailand, 43 billion dollars for Indonesia, and 58 billion dollars for Korea.\footnote{Suk H, Kim, “Asian financial crisis of 1997: The case of Korea, The”, \textit{Multinational Business Review}, Spring 2001, Vol. 9, Is. 1. retrieved from (http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3674/is_200104/ai_n8940217/). Accessed on May 11, 2011.}

The intention behind the rescue package was to turn the Korean economy into recording a positive international balance of payments, decrease its budget deficit by lowering wages, privatize its banking system and public companies, and liberalize its markets, which were later gradually regulated and supervised by IMF. On 3 December 1997, the Korean government signed the papers with the IMF in order to completely reconstruct the Korean economy, also set macroeconomic guidelines for arranging monetary and fiscal policies and liberalize capital market, investment, and trade. In 2001, the Korean President announced that the Korean economy finally was rescued. But the consequences of the IMF policies in Korea were much more devastating than the crisis itself. In his article, “Four Years of IMF Structural Adjustment Program: What It Has Done to Korean Economy and People” Kim Hee Joon, defines the result of SAP in Korea as follows:

Since the economic crisis and restructuring that followed did benefit some. However, for the vast majority of ordinary peoples and workers, it has only been a continuation of a nightmare that sees no end. Almost four years have passed since Korea started its restructuring process, and now Korea stands as the world’s highest-indebted country in short-term (maturity of less than one year) debt, ranks seventh in total debt, and State debt has reached dangerous levels due to the astronomical amount of public funds poured into the restructuring process. Millions of workers have been thrown onto the streets and wages have plummeted - resulting in unprecedented level of poverty and inequality.....Korea has only fallen deeper into the debt crisis, which was the core of the one that came in 1997. Moreover, the IMF package of structural adjustment programs has deepened the reliance of Korean economy on imperialists and the neo-liberal system that they impose. The liberalization of capital and the financial market only implies direct control on Korean capital and the working class. At the end of year 2000, the
percentage of foreign-owned stocks in the Korean market amounted to recorded 30.1%, more than a double from the 14.6% recorded at the end of 1997. Control from transnational capital has drastically increased, especially in the financial market. Weak banks were revitalized by using public funds and then sold off to foreign capital at bargain prices. The government is moving even more quickly to invite more and more foreign direct investments, under the false hopes that it will bring employment and technology transfers.25

Following this result in Korea, one of the leading US magazines, "Business Week", addressed a criticism to IMF that “to restart its economic engine, Asia needs deep structural change that promotes markets and breaks up elite power, not out of date contractionary policies that put common people out of work”.26 According to the same magazine, in Korea alone, job losses are expected to top one million in a country of only about 44 million people.27

The 1990s were marked in the history of international monetary system as turbulent years. The fall of Berlin Wall in 1989 and later the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991 let the IMF to be a universal institution; the field of its activities was broadened by the economic changes of the Eastern bloc, which was moving away from a centrally planned economy towards a liberal market one. According to IMF statistics, during the 1990s most of these countries worked together with IMF, benefited from its advices, technical assistance, and financial support and consequently those countries successfully transformed their economies within several years.28 As a first line of international economic defense during international crisis, IMF was also involved in the Mexican Tequila crisis of 1994 and the Asian financial crisis of 1997, which I mentioned above.29

In 2000, the international community agreed on a set of development targets known as the UN Millennium Development Goals, which include reducing poverty, preventing the spread of HIV/AIDS, and providing universal primary education, all of these by the target date of 2015. They have been agreed by all countries and the leading development institutions. The areas for which the IMF offers financial assistance and advice to its member countries in helping them achieve their goals are: eradicating extreme poverty and hunger; achieving universal primary education; promoting gender equality and empowering women; reducing child mortality; improving maternal health; combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; ensuring environmental sustainability; and develop a global partnership for development.30

27 Ibid.
IMF as A Tool of New Imperialism

“No nation will be world leader in a way modern European nations were”.

Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in their article “Globalization as Empire” introduce a new hypothesis of “Empire” and differentiate it from old type imperialism, which had certain borders and was ruled from a political center. They define the term “Empire” as follows:

In contrast to imperialism, Empire established no territorial centre of power and does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers. It is decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers....The United States does indeed occupy a privileged position in Empire, but this privilege derives not from its similarities to the old European imperialist powers, but from its differences.

- Globalization as Empire - The question arises, what is this new concept of “Empire” and how the US was standing at the core of it? Hereby, I will try to explain it in the context of IMF, as used by the US for preserving its hegemony over the world. Over the years, the International Monetary Fund has been criticized by several scholars from various disciplines. Critics often argue that the IMF is undemocratic and capitalist centric institution, which extracts profit from developing countries, maintaining a financial low-intensity conflict against the South, and transfers national sovereignty to the IMF by reducing the autonomy of domestic governments with its conditionality.

According to Kenneth Rogoff, “[t]he IMF is not particularly interested in hearing the thoughts of its “client countries” on such topics as development strategy or fiscal austerity. All too often, the Fund’s approach to developing countries has had the feel of a colonial ruler”.

The IMF’s adjustment policies are considered economically, socially, and politically unsustainable, its economic stabilization, especially conditionality has been subject of much contradiction. Concerning this Ariel Buira is of opinion that:

Conditionality is perhaps the most controversial aspect of the IMF’s policies. In particular, fiscal and monetary policies, the core of programs, are seen as too restrictive, having a strong deflationary impact, to the point where the essence of the correction of the external payments imbalance came from deflation.
Richard Swedberg, in his article “Doctrine of Economic Neutrality of IMF and the World Bank” defines the result of conditionality for the adopted countries as follows:

A third world country which follows these prescriptions has great difficulty in constructing a strong industrial base of its own, since it is not allowed any protection against foreign capital. The country is also likely to have little control over its own raw materials, and nationalization, as mentioned before, is frowned upon. The IMF is also hostile to labor movements and large public sectors. In brief, a country that follows IMF’s advice is likely to lose quite a bit in economic and political independence. Through the use of conditionality, the Fund can be said to exert indirect and undue political pressure by constantly demanding changes that only fit a certain type of society.35

If we bear in mind the result of the Korean economic crisis and the result of IMF assistance to it, we can characterize IMF’s adjustment programs as damageable to economic growth, harmful to the poor, and not responsible to the various needs and circumstances of member countries. Large scale agrarian and industrial projects initiated by IMF programs destabilize the national economic system and damage the environment and social shape.36 In this regard one of the prominent scholars of world economy Stiglitz comments:

IMF structural adjustment policies – the policies designed to help a country adjust to crises as well as to more persistent imbalances – led to hunger and riots in many countries; and even when results were not so dire, even when they managed to eke out some growth for a while, often the benefits went disproportionately to the better-off, with those at the bottom sometimes facing even greater poverty...IMF funds and programs not only failed to stabilize the situation but in many cases actually made matters worse, especially for poor.37

Further in his book Stiglitz argues that one of the IMF’s problems is governance, “who decide what they do”. According to his view IMF is dominated by the wealthiest industrial countries and this reflects itself in the political nature of the Institutions.38 The Board of Governors is the highest decision-making body of the IMF. It consists of one governor and one alternate governor for each member country and appointed by the member country. But its daily work is carried out by the Executive Board, which has 24 members. Countries with large economy, such as US and China have their own seat on the Board, but

38 Ibid, Schwartz, Anna J.
most of the member countries are grouped in representative constituencies. When countries join the IMF, they deposit funds to the institution, which are called quotas and are considered the main source of IMF. The larger quotas of member countries of IMF are determinant factor for “voting power and borrowing capacity”. After World War II, international trade was circulated by the US dollar. It enjoyed a unique and central position in the Bretton Woods system. At the beginning the US had political control over the System’s institutions: IMF and World Bank. It is still the dominating power of IMF. Currently, the US control 17.83 % of the voting power of IMF, which means that it has an effective veto. In this regard Donald Edward Moggridge in his “Maynard Keynes: An Economist’s Biography”, indicates the policy and intention of the US throughout IMF’s history as follows: “The Americans at the top seem to have no conception of international cooperation; since they are the biggest partners they think they have the right to call the tune on every point. If they knew the music that would not matter so much; but unfortunately they don’t”.

Conclusion

The overarching argument of IMF’s critics is that international and multilateral institutions are dominated and politically influenced by their most powerful members, and in the IMF case, as Stiglitz argued, the US is major culprit. It is obvious from the evidence that these institutions are used by the great powers in order to achieve their political and economic goals over the developing world, by leaving them in a dependable position. Using the words of Strom C. Thacker, “a poorly managed international organization not only can be ineffective but also can destabilize the international system”. The political interests of IMF’s powerful members play an important role in the Fund’s functionality and statistical analyzes obviously demonstrate that they use it as an instrument for expanding their hegemony to the world.

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DAR, Mushtaq Ahmad & DAR, Ab. Majid

Irrigation Management Initiatives and its Impact on Crop Production in Central Asian States

Abstract

Agricultural growth has remained one of the foremost components of development strategy in the Central Asian States, particularly in view of the long Soviet agrarian policy and owing to comparatively weak industrial base of the region. With the overall strategy in agriculture growth, irrigation has been accepted as a major programme for modernizing Central Asian agriculture. Irrigation has been assigned such a crucial role because this is the single most important factor, which can facilitate the future utilization of the scarce farm land resources and can facilitate acceptance of improved technology. While examining the performance of irrigation vis-à-vis agricultural development, it has been observed that irrigation has played a significant role in shaping the agriculture of the region and no other factor seems to be so decisive. However, sustainable management of land and water resources in arid and semi-arid regions is of concern as a result of merciless and inefficient use of waters. Soil and water salinity is widespread across the arid and semi-arid regions of South Central Asia\(^1\). Here, agriculture productivity, the strongest indicator of agriculture development, is positively correlated with irrigation intensity and water use efficiency.

Key Words

Water Management, Cereal Production, Yield, Irrigation Efficiency

Introduction

Agriculture is a significant component of the Central Asian economies, accounting for between 10 and 45% of GDP, 20 and 50% of employment and a growing share of exports. (World Bank 2002, IMF, 2001). Sustainable development, focus of any regional planning perspective, demands the proper management of resources both renewable and non-renewable along with addressing the regional imbalances. Agriculture in Central Asia is entirely dependent on irrigation. Thus, its productivity and additional production generated an extended cropland which gives shape to the production scenario of the region. The Brandt report also identified irrigation and water management as the biggest single category of investment required especially in semi-arid transitional economies. Therefore in order to develop a study of the problems and challenges agriculture is faced with in this region, we need to carefully study it on a priority basis. One area of concern is the improvement in agriculture production, which, in turn, largely depends on increasing the intensity of irrigation and simultaneously improving water use efficiency which is related to the irrigation management initiatives taken from time to time.

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Regional variation in agriculture productivity and its measurement-cum-evaluation forms an interesting study in agriculture geography. A survey of the areal variation in agriculture production might be useful to differentiate areas whose performance is poor in comparison with others. Variation in production and productivity helps in understanding the extent of accomplishment. Measurement and evaluation of agricultural production and productivity forms a basis for planning, evaluating and taking appropriate measures for improving productivity and production at various levels contributing to more economic growth. Such a study is also necessary to locate depressed areas that need greater attention towards minimizing imbalances.

The agriculture production of the Central Asian States reveals that the state has an isolating nature of production trend. The production of different crops exhibit marked variation both in time and space (see Table 1.).

Table 1. Cereal Crop Production and Yield of Central Asian States (1991-2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>Parameters of the Aral Sea</th>
<th>Cereals</th>
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<td>Agricultural water withdrawal %</td>
<td>Area km²</td>
<td>Volume km³</td>
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It is evident from Table 1 that the production of cereal crops shows both positive and negative trends. So far as the changing parameter of water sector of Kazakhstan is concerned, there has been a decrease of 8.74 per cent in agricultural water supply in the period 1991 to 2005 leading to a decrease of 36 per cent of the area of the Aral Sea, 31 per cent volume and 4.53 per cent of the sea level. All these three factors have declined and their influence on the production of cereals as the production declined 47.6 per cent with decrease in area of 31.28 per cent; but after 1995 there has been positive growth of production of cereals in Kazakhstan with 28.9 per cent and 15.1 per cent in area under cereals, compared to very less withdrawal of agricultural water, decrease in volume area and sea level in the Aral Sea with a respective percentage of -0.60, -4.11, -5.7 and -2.7 as compared to the period 2002-03 with -1.87 agriculture water withdrawals, -14.8 of decrease in area of Aral Sea, -4.3 of volume and -3 of sea level. So from the above it is clearly shown that in Kazakhstan, area, volume and sea level have direct influence on the crop production of cereals with increase in volume and sea level, increase in crop production; however, the general trend is negative.

As far as Kyrgyzstan is concerned, there have been both negative and positive trends. The agricultural water withdrawal decreased the area of the Aral Sea, both its volume and the sea level. The parameters of water sector of all the Central Asian States are the same with reference to Kazakhstan. The agriculture withdrawal was 6.73 in the period 1991-2005 with -6.03 per cent in 1991, 0.94 per cent in 1994, 0.53 per cent in 1996 and 0.31 per cent in 2005, as compared to 26 per cent of area, 21 per cent of volume and 4.53 per cent of sea level. The production of cereal crop shows increasing trend from 1993 with 0.06 per cent and area of 11.30 per cent from 1993 to 2005; it shows fluctuation but the highest production was recorded in the period 2000-02 with an increase of 38.36 per cent while the area also showed an increase up to 8.53 per cent in that particular year.

In Tajikistan production of cereals increased from the post-independence phase with a respective percentage of 29.62, 43.42, 5.57, and 2.26 in the periods 1991-93, 1994-96, 1997-99, 2000-02, 2003-05 with highest percentage of cereal production in the period 1993-95. The overall increase is 100 per cent production with almost similar agriculture water withdrawal, reduction in volume, area, and sea level of the Aral Sea.

Similarly, in the case of Turkmenistan, where the production and area increased with a decrease in agricultural water withdrawal. The overall decrease in agricultural water is 1.63 per cent from 1991 to 2005 with highest decrease in 1994-1996 i.e. 4.62 per cent while in that period the production and area registered an increase of 35 per cent and 98 per cent. The overall trend in the cereal production is positive. In every year with percentages of 34.34, 29.77, 9.50, and 5.22 Uzbekistan registered the highest agricultural water withdrawal compared to other Central Asian States, which is almost 55 per cent. The production level has increased up to 46 per cent, 30 per cent in the period 1991-2003 with an overall increase of 107 per cent. Similarly decreased the water level, volume and area of the Aral Sea. Not only the production, the area also increased from 31 per cent to 9 per cent but there has been a decrease in the period 2001-03 with -14.47 area and increase production 1.60. The overall increase in area is 42.5 per cent.

The table brings to light the fact that in the four states, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, the production trends registered a positive growth despite the fact that the volume, area, and sea level decreased during the same period. The analysis further reveals that the volume of water decreased about 70 per cent before 1991, but after 1991 due to water management the water level, volume
decreased less, about 20 per cent from 1991 to 2005 at an average rate of 1.5 per cent. The area was similarly reduced in these periods.

The production of cereals increased in four states and decreased in only one state mainly due to changing cropping pattern in favour of food and highly remunerated crops mostly at the cost of cotton monoculture. Among cereals, wheat has particularly increased in all states except Kazakhstan because every state wants to achieve self-sufficiency in grain production especially wheat. More ever it was planned to diversify agriculture with the introduction of new crops. Kazakhstan has lagged behind, because of greater focus on industrial development which has neglected the agricultural development, and secondly, the industrial effluents into water resources have reduced their suitability for agricultural use, resulting in decrease in agricultural production. Thus, there was an increase in cereal production on an average total area; production increased by 38 per cent to 47 per cent except in Kazakhstan. The increase in arable land area was greater in Turkmenistan: 24 per cent in 1991 to 52 per cent in 2005, followed by Tajikistan 31 per cent in 1991 to 42 per cent in 2005 and Uzbekistan 27 per cent to 37 per cent. Among the crops, cereal production per hectare had increased by more than one third especially wheat yield which doubled in the period 1992-2004. Cereal yield increased in Uzbekistan followed by Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, but decreased in Kazakhstan. Change in agricultural production was related to a similar change in use of the fertilizers and pesticides. Total fertilizers decreased from 1540000 mg/y in 1991 to 938046 mg/y in 2004-2005. Thus water use in the form of water management gains strategic significance.

The production of non-cereals is concerned with the agricultural water withdrawals and the parameters of the Aral Sea, such as area, volume and sea level. As far the production of non-cereals is concerned Uzbekistan is leading followed by Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In Kazakhstan agricultural water withdrawal has decreased 8 per cent in the period 1991-2005 while the production and area also decreased in all the years due to the reduction in area by 36 per cent, volume 4.53 per cent and sea level 31.28 per cent of the Aral Sea. The production of non-cereals also decreased during that time period, the production decreased at a slower rate due to water management initiatives, i.e. 30.16 per cent in the period 1991-93, 17.55 per cent in the period 94-96, 1.20 per cent in the period 2003-05. The overall decrease in production is 24.61 per cent from 1991 to 2005. Kyrgyzstan showed positive trends of growth of production with 20.64, 84.56, 29.55 and 1.30 per cent and the overall production growth is 162 per cent. Tajikistan has registered a mild increase of production and has shown positive trends from 2000 onwards. This increase is due to efficient water management strategies and technological improvement. Production increased from -17.03 per cent to 1.40 per cent in 2005. In Tajikistan the production increased in case of cereals in the period 1991-2005 with almost 100 per cent. Similarly in Turkmenistan the agriculture water withdrawal is almost similar in the period 1991 to 2005, but the area increased while the production decreased except in the period 2000-02 when production showed positive growth due to the water sharing agreement; in this state the production increased with almost 91 per cent in the period 1991-2005 in cereals while as the production of non-cereals decreased in that period. In Uzbekistan the production of non-cereals decreased with 5.46 per cent in the period 1994-96, 3.52 per cent in 97-99 per cent, 0.93 per cent in the period 2000-02 and 4.16 per cent in the period 2003-

05 but during the same period the production of cereals showed increase with 107.56 per cent. Thus it can be inferred from the table that whereas the production of cereals increased, the production of non-cereals decreased.

The higher rate of production increase as shown by some states, particularly in the post-independence phase with respect of cereals and non-cereals could be attributed to the changing cropping pattern in favour of food and highly remunerative crops mostly at the cost of cotton monoculture. The comparatively effective water management strategies led to planned irrigation and minimum water waste and this played a significant role in improving the productivity; next to that the highly remunerative crops are getting increasing importance in global markets so their acreages also gets momentum by the day.

However, the Central Asian States are not responding properly to this equation. The main reason could be their recent sovereign character and getting lessons from some historical evidences and even some contemporary changes, that everyone should be self-sufficient at least in foodstuffs. Although in the global village this thinking seems redundant, nevertheless the political leadership of the Central Asian states, especially that of Uzbekistan, almost forced the farmers to abandon cotton culture in favour of food crops. This policy has resulted in the decline of both area and productivity of cash crops. However, at the same time the agricultural diversification has been also planned by introducing new crops like sugar beet and soya bean. Kazakhstan lagged behind in cereals and non-cereals due to the focus on industries and people’s traditional lack of attention towards the agriculture. That is the main reason why the disposal of effluent from municipal and industrial processes resulted in the accumulation of harmful containment in surface water resources, reducing their suitability for use; the reduction of crops automatically declined.4

The grain area of the five states in 1986 was about half of the level in the 1940s. But after 1991 the grain area increased a little bit, except Kazakhstan, as each country aimed at achieving complete food self-sufficiency and increased production of commercial crops destined for the export market. Grain production was assigned particular importance and was expected to increase by 340 per cent. Thus the production of non-cereals showed positive growth except Kazakhstan. Taking the initiatives into consideration an analysis of data showes that total agricultural land decreased by more than 1 per cent, irrigated land increased by 2 per cent, crop production increased by more than one third.

Table 2. Cereal Crop Production and Yield of Central Asian States (1991-2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Agricultural water withdrawal %</th>
<th>Parameters of the Aral Sea</th>
<th>% of irrigated area to total cropped area</th>
<th>% of commercial cropland to total cropland</th>
<th>% of pasture area to total geographical area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Area (km²)</td>
<td>Volume (km²)</td>
<td>Sea level (m³)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>242</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>6.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>34034</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>11.47</td>
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<td>8.36</td>
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<td>7.38</td>
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<tr>
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<td>165</td>
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<td>7.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>175</td>
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<td>74.70</td>
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<td>23160</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>74.80</td>
</tr>
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<td>84.00</td>
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<td>03-05</td>
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<td>23160</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>87.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Most of the Central Asia’s land is made up of desert or mountain pastures for livestock, typically with very low productivity. Arable lands in the five Central Asian States ranges from 5.36 per cent of all agriculture lands in Turkmenistan to 20.56 per cent in Tajikistan⁵. Emphasis has been shifting steadily towards use of irrigation, both to expand the area of cultivation and to increase productivity and reduce the effects of drought. Table 2 shows the land use spectrum within the republics. In Kazakhstan, where all the parameters of the Aral Sea, i.e. area, volume, and sea level have registered a decrease with 36 per cent, 31 per cent, and 4.53 per cent respectively in the period 1991-2005, due to decrease in agriculture water withdrawals of 8.74 per cent but the percentage of irrigated to total cropped area increased from 0.38 per cent to 0.89. The overall change is 72 per cent in irrigated to total cropped area in the period 1991-2005 and

134 per cent change in case of commercial cropland to total cropland while that of cropped area to geographical area and pasture area to geographical area has shown a small decrease. Cropped area to geographical area changed at a rate of 37 per cent while that of pasture to geographical area 1.41 per cent in the period 1991-2005. The agricultural water withdrawal also shows decreasing trend in the period 1991-2005, 8.74 per cent. The basic reason of decreasing pasture area to geographical area has been due to less livestock because of more industrialization.

In Kyrgyzstan all categories of the agricultural land use, cropped area to total geographical area, irrigated area, commercial cropland to total cropped area and pasture area to total cropped area have shown a positive growth in the period 1991-2005. In the same period the agriculture water withdrawal has decreased by 6.73 per cent in the period 1991-2005 and the volume, area and the sea level of the Aral Sea are also showing negative trends but not as high as before independence. Thus the impact of the water management initiatives showed a positive impact as can be seen from the above table.

In Tajikistan the percentage of irrigated to total cropped area and percentage of commercial cropland to total cropland showed positive trends. The percentage of cropped area to total geographical area decreased from 6.95 to 6.03 per cent and that of pasture area to total geographical area decreased from 24.72 to 23.13 in the period 1991-2005.

In Turkmenistan all indicators are showing positive trend in the period 1991-2005 and there is a decrease in agriculture water withdrawal. The proportion of cropped area to the total geographical area increased by 38 per cent, irrigated to total cropped area by 5.47 per cent and commercial crop by 11.60 per cent. There has been a decrease in agricultural water withdrawal from 24.42 to 24.02 per cent.

Whereas there has been increase in the above mentioned three indicators, there has been a marginal increase in irrigated to total cropped area, i.e. 0.52 per cent while the other cropped area to the total geographical area more or less remains constant in case of Uzbekistan.

Thus after independence irrigated to cropland area increased in all Central Asian states, particularly in Turkmenistan where major new irrigation projects were implemented, especially the Kara Kum Canal; some older areas of irrigation such as the Ferghana Valley, Tashk Oblast had relatively little new land development. The administration greatly reduced the importance of non-irrigated sowing area in total geographical production.

Table 3. Irrigation Potential (1991-2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Changing Parameters of Water Sector</th>
<th>Change in Irrigated Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>91-93</td>
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<td>36300 242 37.5 3217</td>
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</tr>
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<td>94-96</td>
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<td>34034 236 36.0 3557</td>
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<td>97-99</td>
<td>26.95</td>
<td>28246 183 35.7 3650</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-02</td>
<td>26.63</td>
<td>24154 175 36.8 3650</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03-05</td>
<td>26.79</td>
<td>23160 165 35.8 3745</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parameters of Aral Sea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Km²</td>
<td>Volume Km³</td>
<td>Sea Level (m²)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>36300</td>
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<td>37.5</td>
<td>3217</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>23160</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>3745</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3 indicates the irrigated area increases in all states after the. Turkmenistan has registered the highest percentage of irrigated area with a figure of 106.03 which is followed by Uzbekistan with a percentage of 87.67, Tajikistan 79.81, Kyrgyzstan 75.76, and Kazakhstan having 9.65 per cent cropped area under irrigation. Turkmenistan is 1.49 times above the regional average while Uzbekistan is having 1.22 more irrigated areas than the normal figures. Tajikistan is having 1.11 times more irrigated area and Kyrgyzstan is bit higher where Kazakhstan is below the mean. The change in irrigated area in the period 1991-2005 varies from state to state. In Kazakhstan the change in the year 1991-93 is 10.56 per cent while in the period 2000-03 it is lowest i.e. zero, however the irrigated area from 1991 onwards has registered a positive change. In Kyrgyzstan the highest change is observed after the independence which is 0.46 per cent but the lowest is shown in 2000-03 which is -0.18 per cent but the average percentage change is 0.112 per cent. In Tajikistan after the independence there has been positive change in irrigated area ranging from 1.84 per cent to 0.97 per cent, the average positive change is 0.46 per cent. In Turkmenistan a marked change in irrigated area has been observed after the attaining of independence, which is 15.42 per cent followed by 1.77 per cent, 0.84 per cent, 0.55 per cent in 94-96, 97-99, 2000-02, 03-05, respectively. Similarly for Uzbekistan the irrigated area registered a positive change trend except in the period 97-99, when it registered a negative change in irrigated area. The overall change in irrigated area is 0.39 per cent. The main contributory factor towards the positive change in irrigated area has been the minimum loss of water through water management institutions, as the area of the Aral Sea decreased from 6.42 to 4.11 per cent, while that of sea level from 4 to 2 per cent and volume from 2.4 to 5.7 per cent. Before independence the role of the water management institution was minimal, which lead to dramatic decreases of the area (46 per cent), volume (76 per cent) and sea level at least 34 per cent). The main reason in improvement could be the impact of water management institutions and the technology used. The sea level increases.
particularly due to inflow into the Aral Sea from Amu and Syr Darya from the year 1993 as shown in the Table 4.

Table 4. Water Resources of the Amu and Syr Darya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Water Resources When Rivers Pass from Mountains to Arid Lands</th>
<th>Inflow of Aral Sea Km³/year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Syr Darya</td>
<td>Amu Darya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>70.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>43.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>85.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 4 demonstrates that the inflow into the Aral Sea from the two main rivers, i.e. Amu and Syr Darya Rivers, has increased after the independence. Before independence it was 7.5 km³/year which increased to 21.6 km³/year in 2006 from Syr Darya and 23.1 km³/year in 1990 to 42.7 km³ in 2001. It means that 188 per cent increase has been registered in the period 1990-2001 in Syr Darya and 84 per cent in Amu Darya.

Correlation between Irrigation and Production

The casual relationship among various characteristics of any study is an essential concern of scientific investigation. In geography the cause-effect relationship leading to regional variation is one of the cornerstones of the discipline. It is a well known fact that with the development of irrigation facilities the agriculture production has also increased. There is positive correlation and in so many cases nearer to linear relationship between the irrigated area and level of agriculture production and change in one variable triggers an almost proportionate change in the other variable. The aggregate value of such correlation is 0.67, which was earlier 0.64. The data is shown in Table 5, for the period 1991-2005.

Table 5. Area and Production of crops (1991-2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area (000) ha</th>
<th>Production (000) met tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<tr>
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<td>2003-2005</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1997-1999</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>2539</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The data has been analysed and the correlation between various indicators is calculated using the Karl Pearson formula, see Table 6.

**Table 6. The correlation coefficients (r) for the Central Asian States**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Total Irrigated Area And Total Crop Production “r”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>0.09</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>0.79</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>0.67</td>
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</table>

An insight in the Table 6 reveals that there exists positive correlation between the independent variable of irrigation and the dependent variable of agriculture production in Central Asian States and the calculated value of "r" comes to be 0.67. The correlation coefficient between total irrigated area and the total crop production ranges between 0.09 to 0.94 in the five Central Asian States. Kyrgyzstan recorded the highest correlation coefficient of 0.94 followed by Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan. Before independence the value of coefficient of correlation (r) between the irrigated area and levels of agriculture productivity was -0.902 which was mainly due to relatively lower rate of irrigation efficiency due to inefficient water management practices. But after independence the irrigation efficiency increased and hence the correlation coefficient increased, it is mainly due to water management institutions and initiatives taken by these five Central Asian States after 1991. Tajikistan registered low...
correlation coefficient due to shift of emphasis from agriculture to industry. Next to that Tajikistan has very low irrigated area for crop production because it is a mountainous country. The rivers drain less than in the downstream states. As far as Kyrgyzstan is concerned, it is also a mountainous state but the correlation coefficient is higher than in the other four republics mainly due to the use of high yielding variety of seeds and fertilizers leading to increased crop production. This suggests that irrigation is a very important ingredient for agricultural production.

It could be inferred from the correlation analysis that irrigation constitutes an important ingredient for agricultural production in these states as the increase in intensity of irrigation has triggered the increased use of other important agricultural inputs like fertilizers and high yielding variety seeds.
LITERATURE & ARTS
Identification of Cultural Structures in the Turkish Society through the Arabesque Culture

Following the reforms of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in the 1930s, a radical socio-cultural transformation began in Turkey. A prominent phenomenon of the cultural change was the emergence and blooming of the so-called arabesque music, which virtually became the symbol of it. As Özbek explained: “with its words of song and musical structure, music, as a system of symbols, characterizes the term in which it emerges. In this sense arabesque music can be examined as the indicator of the cultural ‘modernization’ period of Turkey” (Özbek, 2002: 24). Besides, arabesque is a field where the transformations of popular culture can be traced: it is a field where the old meets the new. Or, using Stuart Hall’s expression: arabesque is the culture of those who were formerly “beyond the official walls” and now enter inside “the walls”. Arabesque tells the story of a community that bursts out of its previous isolation from “the systems of law, power and authority” and enters into “the stage of power with a threatening noise”. It is also the story of rebellion, especially in the late 1960s and 1970s, against the limits of ‘official’ music and – in general– the values of modernization (Özbek, 2002: 114; Hall, 1981b: 228-229).

From a social aspect, arabesque showed a complicated general “sub-culture” style, being itself the reply of a “silent majority” to modernization efforts and prohibitions. Concerning both text and musical structure, arabesque represents the duality of the transitional period: it combines traditional Turkish music with Western music resulting in a unique and novel style. Because of all these reasons, arabesque is one of the most important concepts in the examination of the modernization process in Turkey.

In a general sense, arabesque means “Arabian style ornament or decoration”. The word has a French origin and it usually comprises two meanings: first, arabesque is a decoration style consisting of flowers and leaves placed inside one other; second, arabesque is defined as the elements of a decoration. In our society, arabesque is used more generally: it nominates concepts which bring various elements together that do not come to an organic synthesis and therefore suggest complication. In the music encyclopaedia, arabesque is defined as “in harmony with the environment” or “the music of alienation”. According to Önder Şenyapılı, arabesque music, which is “oriental”, “unsystematic” and “based on words”, is “a mass culture of population which begins to turn its back on and feel enmity towards citizen culture and which satisfies the needs of expressing, shouting and relaxing these pains, crisis and discord experienced in the city” (Şenyapılı, 1985: 79-86).

Arabesque music appeared in Turkey at the end of the 60s. At that time, it expressed the pain and adverse feelings of those who had low incomes and lived in the provinces or suburbs. The first consumers

1 in more detail, see our previous article: (Ekuklu, 2011)
2 For the analysis of arabesque as a “joint” culture and mixed formation which involves both the East and the West, but belongs to none of them, refer to: (Belge, 1997: 67-68).
3 Arabesque (in French arabesque, in German Arabeske): “Arabian style. Spread into Europe especially through Endulus and a free, intricate, ornamented style used in decoration, music and ballet” (Öztuna, 1969 (I): 43).
en masse of arabesque music were the squatter dwellers. By the '70s its audience grew wider in the rural areas as well as in the cities, both in the lower and the middle classes. Next to the increasing number of listeners, arabesque music gained a political aspect, too. Arabesque, which was associated with the squatter dwellers between 1968 and 1979 (Ergönültas, 1979), began to be identified with the neo-conservative\textsuperscript{4} Anavatan Party after 1983.

The progress in music industry in the 80s made it possible for arabesque music to develop technically. It also led to standardization\textsuperscript{5}, filling the market with similar products. As Ross-Haag described, “while a cultural product begins to appeal to common tastes, it gains the characteristics of reaching the society and being cheap due to the sale advantage; it begins to lose its characteristics of individuality, uniqueness and spontaneity” (Ross-Haag, 1957: 178). Arabesque, which was originated in the city, whose expansion took place from the outskirts of the city to the centre and the countryside, had such a comprehensive and cosmopolitan structure and it was so widespread that it could not be compared to any traditional music regarding the number of listeners by the early ‘90s.

Comparing the social significance of the arabesque of the ‘70s with that of the ‘80s, we can observe clear changes in relation to musical production, musical structure, words of songs, consumer profile and social meaning. These changes are closely related to the joint factors of the developing music industry at the one hand (i.e. increasing technology import, the reduced prices of cassettes and cassette players, overall recording, stereo followed by recording facility with 32 channels, development of performance and technique), and the alteration of socio-political atmosphere at the other hand (i.e. the change of population density in cities, changes of tastes, the development of a new provincial bourgeoisie with a commercial and financial basis) (Özbek, 2002: 120). Through above factors the arabesque music grew out of its previous “sub-culture” status and became a general phenomenon. During the Ö zal-ANAP era the political pressure lessened, arabesque became fully commercialized and was given a pop style. Gradually, arabesque turned towards pop music themes, such as indifference.

From the second half of the 90s, arabesque began to lose its popularity. It got replaced by its analogue, popular music (shortly and commonly called pop) which emerged too as an “outburst”. There are differences and similarities between the two. Arabesque is more general, regarding both the content and the music. It depicts life, a thorough look at life, a general attitude, fate, past and future, that is to say, existence. Arabesque got its themes from the oriental culture: “in its centre there was grief” (Uğur, 2002: 66). But it also used Western instruments. It was a kind of music which had its roots in the East and turned its face towards the West.

Pop music, on the contrary, depicts the moment and all kinds of specific things: a specific relationship, a specific feeling, and of course, a specific love... The themes of pop music are based on the moment, and are directed to the West. The East appears in pop music as reminiscences. Pop music did not only use the sound of the West, but also its basic concept, musical structure and technology. Contrary to arabesque, pop set its foot in the West, but its face is turned towards the East. Regarding its musical content, pop was nourished by a narrower field than arabesque. However, pop was able to keep pace with the speeding up of life in the 90s where arabesque was too slow. Moreover, by that time, people had fewer expectations

\textsuperscript{4} The concept of “neo-conservative” is used in the sense of Hall (1987) and Laclau (1985).

\textsuperscript{5} Concerning standardization in music refer to: (Adorno, 1941).
than in the 80s. Although there were still many promises, people would not take them granted. Shortly, the culture of complaint and rebellion, and with it, the culture of arabesque, was taken over by bemoaning and/or indifference (and a preference for pop music).

### General musical and cultural characteristics of arabesque

We apply Nurdan Gürbilek’s definition on arabesque; “The different music styles combined under the name of ‘arabesque’ in the 80s owed their wide popularity and productivity to the people who were separated from their own culture, could not take part in the city culture and became alienated from both; as well as to being the musical synthesis of different tendencies which were otherwise unable to create a whole. Arabesque successfully united these different tendencies and therefore helped to restore their connection with the atmosphere which they had once been a part of” (Gürbilek, 1992:24).6

The dominant element of arabesque is “suffering” from deprivations. Interestingly, the general approach of arabesque is not how to prevent suffering, but how to suffer. In arabesque, suffering is expressed by themes such as desperate love, death, never ending sadness. “The problem of suffering is paradox because the problem here is not how to prevent suffering, but how to suffer; that is to say, it is about how to tolerate and bear the suffering of thinking on physical pain, personal loss, worldly defeat and suffering of others” (Geertz, 1973: 104). As a map of meanings7 arabesque explains daily and practical relationships and makes them conceptual; besides it seems to be interested in emotional experience and turn it into a problem (Özbek, 2002: 103).

According to Ünsal Oskay “arabesque ... is the musical expression of a specific point of view to life” (Oskay, 1988). In Murat Belge’s definition: “With the word arabesque, at first a music kind is understood. But the question is not only music. This is a world consisting of furniture, ornaments, carpets with pictures, films and other things. It is a life style” (Belge, 1997: 80-83).

In his essay called “Metropol and Intellectual Life”, George Simmel described a stranger as a “person who comes today and stays tomorrow” (Simmel, 1971). If we can call a person who comes today and goes tomorrow, a tourist; a stranger is a person who comes today, but cannot go tomorrow, who has no possibility to return. According to this definition, it can be said that as a culture, arabesque calls out to the stranger in the city, the one who is foreign to the city, the one who is in the city but does not belong to the city. Arabesque was the music and culture of people who had come to the city but had no possibility to go back to the village, who were neither villager nor citizen, who changed, since changed, could not preserve the ‘old’ and their essence, but could not transform into ‘something else’, something entirely new. And this music reached at this mass very rapidly and through a natural movement, created its own canals and rose on the shoulders of this mass.8 Since it is not a product of the tradition arabesque is able to assimilate symbols of different times and cultures. According to Nurdan Gürbilek, arabesque “is the music of “no one” in one sense. With the words of Hilmi Yavuz, arabesque is the place where the current and former

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6 Concerning the analysis of the relationship between “music”, “performance” and “version” refer to: (Behar, 1988).
7 For Weber’s detailed analysis of “sense problem” refer to: (Geertz, 1973). Regarding the analysis on arabesque’s map of meaning refer to: (Özbek, 2002: 99-106).
8 Concerning the problem of reaching of musical products to the society, refer to: (Oskay, 1982c: 42-46).
culture of the one “who comes today and stays tomorrow” compromises: it is both this and the other. It is the place which separates him from both the place where he comes from and the place where he stays; the place where he broke out from his former culture and where he resists the new culture he meets: it is neither this nor the other (Yavuz, 1987: 99-103).

Arabesque developed its own language, symbols and icons, and it turned into a common culture - involving many different elements and people- from a common music. However, meanwhile a part of the society fully accepted arabesque, another part showed a reaction and despise against it. Especially intellectuals associated arabesque with the “vulgar people, chilly pepper, lahmacun9, wailing songs”. The cultural change starting in the 80s was later commonly called an “outburst of lower culture”. The tensions that it created were depicted by many movie makers, among which Yavuz Turgul is the most prominent.

The main cultural tendencies of the period can be effectively discussed through three cultural icons: Zeki Müren, Orhan Gencebay and İbrahim Tatlıses. Icon, in this context, is an ‘acquired’ identity. Socially, one becomes an icon if people can look at themselves through him and according to him (Oktay, 1987: 20).10 Socially meaningful symbols give meaning to reality by both shaping it and also by being shaped by it (Geertz, 1973: 93-94).

The history of arabesque music and culture through cultural icons

In Republican history, from the very beginning, there has always been emigration and thus guest workers. But the medium scale industrialization attempt of the 50s and the 60s resulted in a huge throng of immigrants from the rural areas to the big cities. Big cities, especially İstanbul, were invaded by the rush of thousands of villagers. The acceleration of unity with the world capitalist system after World War II, brought about both the confrontation and integration of “the centre” and “the environs” (Shils,1981), and also the development and expansion of rapid urbanization, industrialization, mass media, education and transportation. After 1950 new economical, political and cultural forms emerged in Turkey through the acceleration of industrialization and urbanization. While the structures of traditional production were spoiled, the main actors of these structures; villagers, small producers and labourers went through a rapid change. The expansion of industry in the 60s intensified the construction of highways and as a result, transportation in all sense. Emigration from villages to cities sped up enormously. Unplanned and unhealthy urbanization caused the emergence of squatter districts which were so big that they could form a second city and those living in these places became “the villagers in cities”. Part of the working force was absorbed by the construction industry which created thousands of new homes by pulling down old and detached houses and replacing it with new block houses. Most immigrants ‘guest workers’ were living in squatters.11 Their attitude to city life to which they were not yet accustomed, was timid and passive.12 Thus arabesque was the product of a period when social revival and

9 The Turkish version of pizza
10 Concerning the concept of icon in popular culture, refer to: “Explanations of Popular Icons” (Oskay, 1982a).
11 On analysis of manners of the squatter dwellers in order to lead their lives, refer to: (Şenyapılı, T., 1978, 1980; Türkdoğan, 1974; Akşit, 1985; Ersoy, 1985; Kartal, 1983).
12 For an overall analysis on squatter dwellers regarding their economic structure, social change, political attitude, etc. in Turkey, refer to: (Kartal, 1983: 40-41, footnote 19).
“modernization” accelerated in the 1960s\(^{13}\), and “the first popular product of Turkey’s emigration towards Westernization and the encounter between Turkey’s West and East (the city and the country)” (Özbek, 2002: 16, 141).

It is Zeki Müren who most fully embodied the culture of the 50s and 60s. He was approved and loved not only by the lower class but by the distinguished, too. His unprecedented popularity was due to the fact –according to the sociologist Ünsal Oskay– that Zeki Müren united the former middle class citizens with new citizen lower class in sorrow (Oskay, 1982b). The source of sorrow in the case of the latter originated from the longing after their former prosperity.

However, from the mid-‘60s the status and interest of the two groups has become increasingly different. This is the time when Orhan Gencebay arose. His most famous records: “What Can’t Be Cured Must Be Endured”, “Give Consolation” and “Lovers Can’t Be Happy” were mostly loved by the scatter dwellers. While Gencebay shared the restlessness they felt about their life, he could also join in their longings and dreams for the future. “Gencebay, who was both a fellow sufferer and a messenger of good news for the people of squatters, became an ‘icon’” (Güngör, 1990: 74). Confronted with the cruelty of city life, this mass felt oppressed, frightened and excluded, thought that it would only reach happiness through ordeal and pain, and believed that salvation (e.g. in the form of being famous and rich in a very short time) only depended on the help of God. Arabesque music fit in this frame with its submissive speech, desperate love, poverty, sorrow, death and never ending troubles\(^{14}\).

By the 70s the popularity of Orhan Gencebay (and his kind) was a thing of the past. By that time the ‘guests workers’ became fully settled and adapted to the city life, they brought in new insights and experiences. Some of them could reach high positions in commerce, politics and entertainment. In the personal view of these people the past and the present lived together and became the source of a new national feeling. It was at that time (in the 80s) that Gencebay’s music was discussed as a rising social fact. The term “arabesque”, meaning “Arabian style, Arabian manner” originates from this period, emphasizing that Gencebay’s music was also inspired by Arabian music. With time, the term originally applied to Gencebay, gave name to a whole movement.

Zeki Müren and partially Orhan Gencebay were the favourites of the period where bureaucracy, moderate politics, moderate commerce and moderate entertainment were dominant, whereas the 80s were the years of liberal commerce, entertainment and politics which pushed bureaucracy back. Although in the 1980s Orhan Gencebay’s music went through a change, he had to pass his throne to a far more successful representative of the new values, İbrahim Tatlıses. He was able to express the feelings of the strengthened lower and middle classes. Their necks were not as bent as they used to be in front of the distinguished, why should their voice be twisted. That is the key to İbrahim Tatlıses’s success. “The melody of ‘Allah, Allah, Allah. What kind of love is this?’ is the voice of the emerging self-confidence which is surprised to see its strength and also wants others to see it” (Uğur, 2002: 157-158).

Tatlıses’ life story resembles the story of arabesque in many ways: it represents arabesque’s dynamism, origin, sources of nourishment, speed and motion, even its vehemence. İbrahim Tatlıses’ career is deeply

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\(^{13}\) On “social revival” in the 1960s and the effects of 1961 Constitution, refer to: Boratav, 1983.

intertwined with the development of arabesque music. He simultaneously directed arabesque and changed its direction. Being himself of Kurdish origin, Tatlıses also symbolized the social rising of the Kurdish nation. However, he never regarded himself the spokesman of national questions. With few exceptions, he preferred to stay away from politics and gave messages of unity.

In the 80s a rapid and important diversification took place in the arabesque music. The rebellious fatalism which formed the main vein of most of the songs up to that day, was suddenly reduced. It was the end of the classical period of arabesque. Being fully established, the new worker class searched for new identities and new values. They aimed for the values and life presented in television series and advertisements.

By the late ‘80s the distinguished have lost control over the “others”. Although they still held control over the official (vertical) communicational channels such as radio and television, the voice of the “others” was spreading horizontally, in a more spontaneous way in the form of videos and cassettes.

When it came to the 90s there was not only one type of arabesque. Arabesque shifted from being the voice of a specific group towards a universal cultural phenomenon which combined many different themes, music sorts, techniques, etc. It became the first unique mass culture which brought together the different sides of the Turkish society in the Republican period. Arabesque, in a spontaneous way, reached the necessary consensus among intellectuals and realised a synthesis between the East and the West. In fact, “arabesque was the first great cultural formation in Turkey which moved from the bottom to the top, non-selectively” (Özbek, 2002: 25).

There were two main reasons behind the acceptance of arabesque by the higher classes: the first one, already pointed out, concerned the common feelings of disappointment and grief about the social changes; the second was purely commercial: arabesque was popular, and therefore, profitable15. As a result, arabesque became the most popular element of Turkey’s citizen culture, leaving behind its previous “step-child” position (Özbek, 2002: 125). The once critical character of arabesque cemented into conservative pragmatism and thus enjoyed an approximately twenty-year-long dominance in the society’s cultural life between 1980 and 2000.

…to be continued…

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MURAKEÖZY, Éva Patrícia

Splendour and Glory

Exhibition review on “Splendour and Glory: Art of the Russian Orthodox Church”, held at Hermitage Amsterdam, from 19.03.2011 to 16.09.2011

The exhibition exhales an air of distant serenity. This comes directly from the old icons which look at us from a distance of centuries. It is like looking at the bright night sky and knowing that the light reaching our eyes might have travelled for billions of years.

Icons are not paintings in the traditional sense. They are not aimed to entertain and only in some measure to confer religious ideas. Icons are gateways, channels for prayer through which believers can connect to the archetype or event depicted on them. They are sacred, and are miraculous by nature (thaumaturge). In Ancient Rus, protective icons were placed on city gates. Every Russian home, no matter how big or small, had an icon corner where the family would pray together every morning and evening. Icons were carried as banners during campaigns and as special folding icons on journeys. Practically all actions were consecrated by icons1.

Fig.1: Icon of St. Nicholas from the late 13th—14th century, Novgorod.

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1 Maltseva (2011)
History comes to life in front of our eyes as we walk among the objects of the exhibition. Numerous texts accompany the objects helping us to understand the development of Russian Orthodoxy; starting from the Viking (Varangian)-ruled Kievan Rus whose ruler, Prince Vladimir of Kiev adapted the Orthodox Christian faith in 989; its Byzantine origins but independent development; its heydays in the 15th and 16th century when Moscow appeared as the ‘Third Rome’ after the Turkish occupation of Byzantium; its gradually declining power from the 17th century, hastened by the church reforms of Metropolitan Nikon; the abolition of Patriarchate under Peter I and the deprivation of its financial independence during Catherine II; to the concrete extermination of clergy and demolition of church buildings by the Bolsheviks in the 1920s and 1930s. Nevertheless, the 21st century witnesses a revival of religious interest in Russia. The intrinsic development of religious belief in Russia is excellently mirrored by the exhibits, and — most of all — by the painted icons.

The international recognition of icons as works of art is a recent phenomenon. It is interesting to read the personal account of a British icon expert who, around the 1960s, asked the opinion of the British National Gallery’s curator about an icon in his possession. ‘The curator on duty took it in his hands and quite literally looked down his nose and said, ‘Oh, this is a Russian icon. We don’t really count these as paintings,’ and dismissed me...’”

Within two decades, the opinion of the Western academics has changed profoundly. All that was needed is a different mindset: the abandonment of the Western idea of realism, compared to which the figures of the icons seemed simple, even naïve, purely of historical/religious interest only. The academic opinion was no different in Russia. Starting from the 17th century, Russian artists adopted the more realistic and earthly Western-European ideas of painting, leading first to the development of secular art which then, in turn, profoundly influenced and ‘Westernised’ icon painting. By the 19th century, the traditionally painted icons appeared inferior and valued as a folk art. (Interestingly, it is from the 17th century, that icon painters started to sign their works4.) Presently, there is no more doubt about the great artistic value of early Russian icons. They are recognized of their incomparable depth of expression and unparalleled spirituality. Fedor Ivanovich Buslaev5 wrote about the atmosphere in which the traditional icon painting developed: “The whole life of Ancient Rus was permeated by poetry because all the spiritual concerns were conceived on the basis of a sincere faith, although it was not always purely Christian.”

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2 The Church reforms of Metropolitan Nikon, announced in 1653-54, aimed to bring in accord the Russian Orthodox texts and rituals with the rest of Eastern Orthodoxy, maybe in an attempt to establish a Moscow-ruled Orthodox world (in addition to establish a theocratic state in Russia). Those who opposed the reforms were called ‘Old Believers’. Although, at the short term, the ‘Old Believers’ suffered from persecution, their community persisted and, in the long term, they became the propelling force for cultural and industrial development.

3 Interview with Richard Temple, art historian and gallery holder specialised in Russian icon painting. Published in the Antiques Trade Gazette, 12th October 2002.

4 Maltseva (2011)

5 Fedor Ivanovich Buslaev (1818-1897) was the first scholar who systematically studied early Russian painting. In: Lazarev (1997).
Presently there is a revived interest in icon painting in Russia as well as in other countries. The organizers of the exhibition are pioneering with the presentation of some more recent, 19th century icons in order to help to reconsider their artistic status. It becomes obvious at the exhibition that icons from this period lost from their sincerity and spirituality; meanwhile they gained in perspective, facial expression, and improvisation. The pomposity which once symbolised the power of the heavenly king now became the representation of earthly power. However, deprived of their spiritual content, icons simply became paintings, at times even kitschy paintings.

Early Russian icons sell at very high prices nowadays. They have become the symbols of national pride. Russian tycoons are spending hundreds of millions of dollars to reacquire all kinds of Russian art. "A patriotic wave has appeared in Russia," said Mikhail Elizavetin, who made his fortune in construction and now has one of Russia’s finest private collections of icons. "There is a pride in returning these icons to their motherland. I’m not talking about speculation in icons, I’m talking about real national pride. Many people have a sincere, pure reaction to this kind of art." One thing is sure: icons used to and continue to have a deep impression on the Russian public.

It is a special merit of the exhibition to introduce us the different schools of icon painting through wonderful examples from the Novgorod, Pskov, and Moscow schools. Unfortunately, there are but two examples of painted icons from the period prior to 1500. The 14th century frescos from Pskov are exceptional relics, as frescos were rare in Russia where mostly wooden churches were built. They recall the church atmosphere of a firmly based and well organized medieval state. The organizers excelled in

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Fig.2: Icon: Christ Pantocrator from the Deesis Row of an iconostasis, Northern Russia, late 13th — early 14th century.

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reconstituting the sacred atmosphere of an orthodox church inside the exhibition by building an iconostasis. It is placed in the centre, as in real churches, and is equipped with two beautiful wing doors.

Next to the icons, the exhibition presents the — perhaps most salient — side of orthodoxy: that of “splendour and glory”. Doubtless, the brilliance of the Byzantine court played an important role in Prince Vladimir’s choice of adapting the orthodox faith. According to the Chronicle of Nestor⁷, written around 1111, Prince Vladimir “sent envoys to various countries to study their religion; the envoys who visited Roman-Catholic Germany found no beauty there, while the Islamic Volga Bulgarians were labelled ‘joyless’. However, in Constantinople the envoys were so struck by the magnificent churches, ritual and splendid singing they no longer knew whether they were in heaven or on earth. An attractive bonus for the grand prince of Kiev was the fact that the Byzantine emperor was accorded divine status.” The oriental pomposity of the Byzantine court and that of the orthodox ritual fitted best to the Russian imagery of the divine greatness and power.

Fig.3: Presentation vase for Easter Eggs, Russia, St. Petersburg, Imperial Porcelain Factory, mid-19th century

There is tremendous skill in the decorative and applied art objects. Among them excel some breathtaking examples of chalices, crosses and censers from the Romanov period.

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⁷ Chronicle of Nestor (‘Tale of Bygone Years’), is a history of Kievan Rus, originally written in Kiev about 1111. Although it is named after the monk Saint Nestor the Chronicler, it is now generally held to be a compilation of the work of many.
The vestment of a Major Schematic Monk, worn by the highest initiates in Eastern monasticism, illustrates the deep contrast of the monastic life with the pomposity of the Orthodox Church. The vestment is made of black textile and covers the body from head to toe, making a rather awesome impression. It expresses the Orthodox doctrine of monks being ‘the unburied dead’ who, in a continual spiritual battle with temptation, spend their life in prayer, fasting and hard labour.

Other interesting examples include small bronze coils from the 12th century. On their obverse side there is a Christian image (usually the owner’s patron saint) while on their reverse side a depiction of the evil (a goddess with snakes for feet or a nest of snake) is found. These objects reveal how Christian doctrines were genuinely mixed with “pagan” thoughts in the spiritual life of Ancient Rus.

Altogether more than 300 religious artefacts form the material of the present exhibition. In addition to the thoroughly written texts that accompany the exhibits, moving images and a short film provide insights into the Orthodox ritual and the massive destruction during the Soviet regime.

The exhibition is accompanied by a 250-pages, beautifully illustrated catalogue. In addition to a historical overview, the catalogue contains useful texts on the Russian Orthodox Church: the life of the saints, the great feasts and church architecture.
Bibliography


Photo credits

Fig.1: Icon of St Nicholas, Old Russia, Novgorod, late 13th—14th century, Wood, with ark; pavoloka (linen canvas), levkas (gesso), tempera; 107.5 x 79.3 x 3 cm. © State Hermitage Museum, St Petersburg

Fig.2: Christ Pantocrator from the Deesis Row of an iconostasis, Northern Russia, late 13th—early 14th century. Wood, with ark; levkas (gesso), tempera; 65 x 42 cm. © State Hermitage Museum, St Petersburg

Fig.3: Presentation vase for Easter Eggs, Russia, St.Petersburg, Imperial Porcelain Factory, mid-19th century, Porcelain, overglaze painting in gold; velvet; 22.5 x 36.5 x 36.5 cm. © State Hermitage Museum, St Petersburg

Fig.4: Vestments of a Major Schematic Monk. Russia. Late 19th – early 20th century, silk, satin, wool, cotton fabric; machine and hand stitching, satin-stitching, appliqué with silk, kukula 163 x 63 cm, robe 172 x 440 cm. © State Museum of the History of Religion, St Petersburg
TRAVELOGUE
MARÁCZ, László

On Mission in Kazakhstan

April 3, 2011 was an important day for Kazakhstan. On this day, the Kazakh people chose a new president. The presidential elections offered a possibility to visit this Central Asian country. Actually, it was a great opportunity to make a case study in international politics and policy-making; to get a glimpse of what is going on in the world of high politics and diplomacy today and why countries, like Kazakhstan that were not long ago down below make such a quick progress in recent times. Kazakhstan is the geographical pivot of Central Asia and has been the subject of Mackinder’s geopolitical analyses. Although Central Asia’s geopolitics is more complicated than Mackinder has thought, as has been argued convincingly by Mazen Labban in a recent article in the journal ‘Geopolitics’, new “Great Games” are on the agenda of 21st century world politics. Kazakhstan is balancing between Russia, China and the West, although the Western pillar is not what it was before. The West has a hard time to maintain its position in Central Asia. To analyze and watch carefully this balancing act of Kazakhstan is a fascinating exercise for anyone interested in international politics. But not less fascinating is to watch the Kazakh people who deploy a great dynamism in order to push forward the modernization program of their country.

Hence, a number of reasons to visit Kazakhstan and to act as an independent observer at a presidential election. In March, I requested the Kazakh Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be accredited as an ‘independent observer’ to monitor the Kazakh election. To my surprise, I received the accreditation to visit the capital in the period around election day. In order to prepare my trip to this almost mythical land called Kazakhstan I had already contacted Rini Wagtmans, honorary consul of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Mr. Wagtmans, one day a cyclo-professional is one of the Dutch pioneers of Kazakhstan. Of course, I also consulted the OCSE head-quarters in The Hague led by the Norwegian Knut Vollebaek. Later on April 3, I would meet a number of observers from the OCSE/ODIHR in the field. There were so much observers of the OCSE in Astana – more than five hundred; true Kazakhstan is a big country - it had something like the invasion of a foreign army. That’s why I coined my colleagues from the OCSE/ODIHR “Knut’s army” and used this term when I spoke with my fellow independent observers who came from all over the world demonstrating the importance of the Kazakh electoral events.

It is a long trip from Amsterdam to Astana. From the Lowlands at the North Sea to the heart of Central Asia takes seven hours of flying. I arrived at April the First and took my residence in a hotel in Astana. Before I could start my work as an independent observer I had to pick my accreditation card. So I visited the Central Election Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan in Astana where I was kindly received. I got my accreditation card and an impressive book with the rules and regulations of the election which I
had to work through before election day. Now I was definitely registered as an independent observer and I could take up my task.

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The first impressions of Astana were quite impressive. Large parts of Astana, the new capital of Kazakhstan are built anew. You can find an impressive collection of buildings in Astana that reflects the topics and architecture of the world heritage, including a true pyramid which I visited later during my trip when I consulted the International Turkic Academy, a research institute for Turkic heritage sponsored by Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in the pyramid. Kazakhstan is a quickly developing country with impressive macro-economic figures of growth. The country is helped in this development by its vast reserves of oil and gas but there is of course something else necessary for economic growth, namely stability and wise leadership. Progress has been enormous from one of the soviet republics with the lowest economic performance to the most rapidly developing CIS republic in the new age. In the nineties, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in the intermediate period the future looked bleak for the Kazakhs but they could manage to survive and over win the period of necessary and painful restructuring and transformation. This is an important reason to study Kazakh society and politics.

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Kazakhstan is an ethnically heterogeneous country where the ethnic Kazakhs have a slight majority and there is a large Russian minority living closely to the border areas with Russia, the country that colonized Kazakhstan from the 19th century on to the communist era. But there are also a number of other national and ethnic minorities, including Ukrainians, Germans, Uzbeks and Tatars. Even Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter’s foreign policy advisor and one of the leading strategists of the US during the Cold War warned in his ‘The Grand Chessboard’ published in 1997 for ethnic clashes in the Central Asian countries comparable to the Balkans. Although Brzezinski certainly had a point if we take into account recent ethnic clashes in states like Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan turned out to be different in this respect. The country has managed its ethnic diversity successfully, even drawing the attention of the OSCE searching for reliable models of controlling ethnic diversity. As a researcher interested in the managing of ethnic diversity in the European Union it is important to know more of the Kazakh controlling mechanism. Hence, I consulted Yeraly Tugzhanov, the vice-chairman of the Assembly of the Nation of Kazakhstan. Mr. Tugzhanov receiving me kindly in his Astana office close to the Parliament was very well informed about the position of national and ethnic minorities in the European Union. When I mentioned the Frisian-speaking minority in the northern part of the Netherlands his eyes started to twinkle. “Yes, I have visited the Frisian Academy and Leeuwarden,” Mr. Tugzhanov said. Well, the vice-chairman of the Assembly of the Nation emphasized that national and ethnic minorities should have next to constitutional rights a fixed representation in the Assembly in order to have their voices heard. I had to admit a situation far from being guaranteed in the European Union.

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Election day was a big success. First of all, for the Kazakh president, Nursultan Nazarbayev who won a landslide victory. It is clear that the Kazakh people are happy with their faith and have an enormous trust in the road pointed out by the president. I guess the man has a good chance to go into history as the
Kazakh 'Ata Turk' of his nation. Carrying out the seemingly paradoxical program of modernizing his country but keeping in touch with the roots of Kazakh culture. Nevertheless, this is one of the pillars of the successful developments in Kazakhstan. At election day, I visited eight polling stations in Astana in different neighbourhoods. Everywhere I met motivated voters who knew very well what was at stake. The electorate told me: "the future of their country." In all the polling stations, I spoke with the chairman of the local election committee. Most of the times these chairs were women being directors of the local primary schools. It was obvious that they knew how to keep order in the polling stations. But I also spoke with a number of voters. An old Russian lady made an enormous impression on me explaining that she fully supported the president Nazarbayev because he has taken care for the old people. "During communism the old and retired people had no food and housing," she explained. Under the leadership of Nazarbayev this has changed for the better. Hence, for her it was not difficult who to vote for. In my press conference at the media centre in the hotel Ramada Plaza I stressed before a room full of journalists that the elections were fair and correct and very well-organized, at least on the basis of what I had seen that day. In contrary, to what had appeared in some Western press articles I had not seen voters being given presents for casting their votes. At some polling stations there was music, singing and dance but this contributed only to the peaceful atmosphere in the city. Maybe this is an idea to overcome the democratic deficit at European elections.

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A completely different impression of the Kazakh presidential elections had Daan Evers, the local representative of the OCSE/ODIHR. In his press conference, which he obviously misused to perform the 'Daan Evers show', he preached the gospel of democracy and wanted to teach the Kazakhs a lesson in democracy. But he failed to do so. Especially his remark that "everywhere in the country people had been forced to vote for the president in office" was a classical political boomerang, a case of failing in international diplomacy and policy. His remark struck me as an untrue statement and I went to the mic. I told him that this was not my impression on the basis of the eight polling stations I had been visiting and asked him kindly to specify his remark. He remained vague and referred to the work done by "Knut's army" all over the country, more investigation was needed, etc. Actually, this mistake was not overcome by the senior diplomat because a few minutes later the issue was taken up by the journalists from the New York Times and The Guardian. They wanted to know more and right they were. Evers was asked to specify where people had been "forced" to vote and from which level the instructions had come. Mr. Evers could not answer these questions and this made a bad impression. It is my conviction that in international politics ethics should be restored. You should not insinuate in order to hide your embarrassment about a landslide victory. Evers stated that he and "Knut's army" would stay for another three months in Kazakhstan to verify the results. Hopefully after the three months pass by we will hear something of their initial accusations. Poor Latvia! Because it was their turn to pay the bills of the OCSE/ODIHR missions. After this shameful press conference of Evers, for me the work on the case study in international politics was completed. But there remained another important task to fulfil.

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Almost as important as to elaborate on a case study in international politics I investigated the 'Gold of the Scythians' in Astana. In order to do so I visited the State Museum of Gold and Precious Metals in Astana. An impressively new museum in the heart of the centre of the city exhibiting a copy of the
'Golden Man'. The original is exhibited in Alma Aty. There in this museum he, the 'Golden Man' stood right in the middle of a beautiful exhibition hall. I looked at the 'Golden Man' who was a Scythian (Saka) prince from the 4-5th century B.C. that was excavated in the late sixties of the 20th century in Issyk of Almaty region. In one of the imperial Saka burial grounds, a perfectly remained majestic burial place of the young man in a golden attire had been found. Anthropological researchers have shown that the young man was around 17-18 years old. A truly impressive appearance.

*The museum has a lot to offer to those who are interested in the ancient history of Central Asia. The Scythian treasures are relevant for those who work on the reconstruction of the ancient history of the Hungarians as well. The ancient history of the Hungarians has a lot to do with the Scythians. But the treasures in the Astana State Museum are also relevant for the medieval history of Europe. In the hall opposed to the 'Golden Man' you can find a reconstruction of a Kipchak Turk warrior from the 10-11th century. Those dealing with medieval European and Hungarian history know the Kipchak Turks as well, maybe under a different name: the Cumans. The Kipchacks Turks or the Cumans have been attacking the Hungarian state in the 11th century but were defeated in the battle at Kerlés in Transylvania in 1068 by the Hungarian king St. László I. Later on in the 13th century the Cumans fleeing for the attacks of the Mongols received asylum in the Hungarian Kingdom when they settled in the Great Plain. In Astana, you can see the Cuman warrior in complete military outfit which the army of King St. László had to fight.
Upon arriving in Latvia’s capital, Rīga, I went straight to the red light district. Even though it was the afternoon, there were already a couple of whores working the streets. However, I wasn’t seeking their services, I was just looking for a cheap hotel. I found the one mentioned in my guidebook. I didn’t have a reservation, but they had vacancy and a great price: $22 per night.

The room was minimalist. The wallpaper was peeling off, the bed was squeaky, and the bathroom needed a makeover. However, it was clean and its lack of luxury encouraged me to get out and explore Rīga. I was excited to explore Latvia because it brought back childhood memories.

Latveria vs. Latvia

Like Estonia, Latvia sounds like a place where a comic book villain would be based. In fact, it is. Dilbert has Elbonia, but Marvel Comics has Latveria. When I was a boy, I knew all about Latveria—it is an Eastern European country run by the brilliant and sinister Doctor Doom. His Romanian gypsy sorceress mother named him Victor von Doom. After getting his PhD, he got his cuddly nickname: Dr. Doom. He reigns over Latveria with an iron fist, literally. Like Darth Vader, Dr. Doom is a human underneath an armored suit. To prevent a potential coup d’état, Dr. Doom built a look-a-like Doombot to stand in for him while he’s off subduing other countries. Before he took power, Latveria’s capital was called Hassenstadt, which in German means “Hatetown.” Dr. Doom changed it to a more cheerful, touristy name: Doomstadt.

Although Latveria is mentioned several times in the Fantastic Four movies, there’s one fact that’s omitted. It’s that Latveria has a special holiday that can happen whenever Dr. Doom feels like his nation needs a break. He calls it Doom’s Day. He hates when people confuse it with doomsday. Lastly, Dr. Doom’s three main goals in life are modest: prove his superiority to Reed Richards of the Fantastic Four, venture to the underworld to recover his dead mother, and conquer the world.

Therefore, unlike most ignorant Americans, I knew exactly what Latvia was about. It was obvious to me that Latveria was simply modeled after Latvia and that the honest folks at Marvel Comics had just changed the name slightly for legal reasons. However, as I walked through the streets of Rīga and failed to see Dr. Doom’s castle high on a mountaintop, I started questioning my preparation for this country.

Latvian cuisine will make a vegetarian cry

I entered a random restaurant to have a meal and get organized. I ordered a typical Latvian starter, the aukstā zupa. This beet and kefir soup is often topped with sour cream and is quite delicious. I asked the waitress to bring an entrée with lots of veggies, so she brought me an entrée with lots of ham.
It’s hard for Latvians to imagine a meal without meat. They’re afraid that if they don’t get meat at every meal, they might not survive the winter. When they do feature vegetables, they often like to cook them to death. Latvians also avoid seasoning their veggies for fear that you might like them and become a vegetarian.

While I ate bland potatoes, cooked cabbage, and overcooked peas, I tried to learn the Latvian language. Latvian has little in common with Lithuanian and nothing in common with Estonian. It uses a turbo-charged version of the Latin alphabet with 33 letters. Letters with diacritics can change a word’s meaning. For example, pile means drop, but pīle means duck. In addition, the verbal pitch can alter the meaning of a word. For example, if you say loks with a level tone, it means green onion; say loks with a falling tone, it means arch or bow.

Šis žagaru saišķis ir mans žagaru saišķis. — Latvian tongue twister meaning, “This bundle of sticks is my bundle of sticks.”

Among Latvia’s 2.2 million citizens, only 60 percent consider Latvian their mother tongue. Most of the rest speak Russian. Still, it’s useful to learn sveiki (hello), paldies (thanks), jā (yes), nē (no), lūžu (please), piedod (sorry), and cik? (how much?). Saying goodbye is a tongue twister: uz redzēšanos. This is guaranteed that you’ll never say goodbye to a Latvian. If you must say bye, then say the informal version: atā. Lastly, in emergency situations, these two phrases are helpful: kur ir tualete? (where is the toilet?) and es tevi mīlu (I love you).

After you master Latvia’s basic phrases, graduate to swear words. The good news is that you already know them. Latvians think their swear words lack the punch of English swear words. Therefore, when you eavesdrop on young Latvians, you’ll occasionally hear them say, in their Latvian accent, fucked up, shit, and fucking asshole.

A few Latvians have spiced up their swearing repertoire with Russian swear words. The most popular is bljin. It’s a derivation of brutally rude Russian word of bljadj, which few Latvians dare to utter because it’s so strong (Russians use it like Americans use fuck). Therefore, Latvians toned bljadj down to bljin, which sounds better to their sensitive ears. I think they’ve toned it down a bit too much: bljin means pancake. When I accidentally hit my finger with a hammer, I need to scream something that has a bit more sting than pancake!

History etched in Rīga’s buildings

Rīga is one of those towns that give you a sore neck. It’s hard not to spend the whole time craning your neck to scrutinize every intricately sculptured church. In fact, every building is a work of art. If you know where to look, you’ll see Rīga’s famous whimsical melnais kaķis (black cat) on the top of an elegant yellow building. Inviting alleys, cobblestoned streets, and quaint cafés are everywhere. Rīga prides itself as being the jewel of the Baltic. In 2014, it will serve as The European Capital of Culture—a perfect choice.

There’s something to learn from every building. For example, from the mighty Daugava River you can see three steeples dominating the Rīga’s skyline. Built in 1211, the Doma Baznīca (Dome Basilica) is still the biggest cathedral in the Baltic. It had the largest pipe organ in the world in 1884. UNESCO recognized
Riga’s new town (which isn’t that new) as showing off some of the finest examples of Art Nouveau. Gargoyles, goblins, and ghouls seem to watch you wherever you go. St. Peter’s Church is an 800-year-old Gothic masterpiece. The Rātslaukums (Town Hall Square) has the colorful House of the Blackheads, which was built in 1344 and recently had a fresh makeover. It’s seems like an important building, but it’s just where the Blackheads, a guild of unmarried foreign merchants, hooked up with chicks hundreds of years ago.

The Blackheads had another good tradition a few centuries ago that, unfortunately, has gone away. When a Latvian joined a guild, they started out as a tradesman. After spending three to five years as an apprentice, Latvians would travel for three to four years. After those years of wandering, they returned to make a masterpiece in their area of expertise. If the masterpiece was noteworthy, then the apprentice would be accepted into the guild. It’s a pity we don’t do this today. Our educational system underestimates how much young people learn by traveling.

The last 800 years have been rough for Latvia

Having the most desirable location in the Baltic isn’t always a good thing, especially when you live between two strong and rich men: Germany and Russia.

Never wrestle with a strong man, nor bring a rich man to court. — Latvian proverb

In the last 800 years Latvia has been beaten more heavily than a rented mule. If they can devote an entire museum to all the times someone has occupied their land, you know they’ve had some rough times. When I entered Latvia’s Museum of Occupation, I learned that the first person to pummel Latvia was the Pope. In 1198, the curiously named Pope Innocent III declared war on Latvia. However, God wasn’t on his side that year and he lost to the pagans. A couple of years later, the Pope tried again, but now armed with even more brutal German soldiers. This time the Christians managed to slaughter the Latvians and convince the survivors that their God was good.

For centuries, the fates of Estonia and Latvia were intertwined as they were considered one territory: Livonia. As a result, their histories are similar. It’s an endless story of one country manhandling Latvia after another: first Germany, then Poland, then Sweden, then Russia, then Germany, then Russia. The Baltic states are like that little nerdy guy at school who always got beat up for his lunch money.

Consider their history since 1935. The Soviets gave Latvia just six hours to elect a pro-Soviet government. The Estonians and Latvians gave flowers to the Nazis because they liberated them from the Russian bear. However, the Nazis showed their true colors and killed almost 500,000 Baltic folks in concentration camps. They also imposed their ugly language and did all those nasty things that Nazis do. The Soviets forced Latvians to fight for the USSR; meanwhile, Nazis rounded up Latvians and threatened to kill them unless they joined the “Latvian SS Volunteer Legion.” As a result, Latvians were shooting each other in WWII. After WWII, Joseph Stalin picked up where Adolf Hitler left off: he deported 250,000 Baltic citizens to Siberia.

Americans may often feel frustrated that we have to choose between a Democrat and a Republican. However, think of the Latvians: they had the pleasure of choosing between Stalin and Hitler. Wouldn’t
that make you want to stay home on election day? In 1989, however, the citizens of the Baltic did not stay home. They stepped outside and did something extraordinary.

The Baltic Way—the longest human chain ever

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was a secret agreement between the Soviets and the Nazis right before WWII. In it, Stalin and Hitler agreed to split up Eastern Europe between themselves. For 49 years, the USSR denied that the pact had existed and they would punish anyone who mentioned it. However, in 1989, one week before the pact’s 50th anniversary, the USSR admitted that the pact was real, although they claimed that the three Baltic states joined the USSR “voluntarily.” On the 50th anniversary, the Baltic states performed what is arguably the most amazing collective act in human history.

On August 23, 1989 at 7:00 p.m., two million demonstrators formed a human chain that spanned 600 kilometers (373 miles). They held hands for 15 minutes. It started from the capital of Estonia (Tallinn), went through the capital of Latvia (Riga), and finished in the capital of Lithuania (Vilnius). There were eight million people in those three states; therefore, one in four was in the chain. It was one of the longest unbroken human chains in history.

Maiu was nine years old during the Baltic Way protest. She held hands with her twin sister and her aunt. They were in the countryside while Maiu’s parents were in Tallinn, participating in the protest there. It’s impressive that even though Maiu and her twin sister were hundreds of kilometers away from their parents, for 15 minutes they were connected to them via a two-million person chain.

Jana Ladusāne, a Latvian that I met in Riga, was also in the middle of the countryside during the Baltic Way demonstration. Her family drove to where people were stretching their arms far to stay connected. Although she was only 11 years old at the time, Jana recalled the event, “Many people had transistor radios to hear the live news. It was great feeling, and when I recently saw a movie about the Baltic Way, it gave me shivers to remember. I was kind of proud that I was there. This feeling of unity—that was really something.”

Before the Baltic Way even happened, the communist leaders of East Germany and Romania both offered to help the USSR break up the demonstrations. Hey, what are friends for anyway? However, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev let the protest happen. Perhaps he figured, “How could a couple of million unarmed people holding hands harm the mighty USSR?”

Less than three months after the Baltic Way, the Berlin Wall came crashing down. A month later, Gorbachev condemned the secret Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. About three months after that, the Baltic states declared their independence. In January 1991, Latvians erected barricades in and around Riga to fight for independence. They ultimately succeeded, although about five people died in the process. I had come to the end of the Museum of Occupation. It inspired me to go to the symbol of Latvia’s freedom.

Russians in Latvia

Unveiled in 1935, Riga’s Freedom Monument is a tall obelisk with a copper woman holding three gilded stars. These stars represented Latvia’s three constitutional districts. Starting in the late 1940s, the
devious Soviets taught schoolchildren that the copper woman was Mother Russia, who was three stars represented her three grateful Baltic republics: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Despite the Orwellian attempts to rewrite history, the true history was quietly kept alive in every Latvian home.

Soon after their independence, Latvians would gather around the Freedom Monument once a year to honor Latvians who fought against the Soviets in WWII. That sounds reasonable, but Russians argue that Latvians are effectively honoring Nazi sympathizers, since those Latvians fought alongside Germany. Just like Russia said that the “zealots of Nazism” moved the Bronze Soldier in Estonia, Russians said that Latvian parties around their Freedom Monument is a glorification of Nazism. It’s the standard Russian tactic: if there’s any group you don’t like, call them Nazi fascists.

Latvia’s Russophone situation parallels Estonia’s. About 100 years ago, Russophones made up about 10 percent of Latvia’s population; by 2011, they made up a third. Latvia’s new government was slow to offer Russophones citizenship and gave most of them Alien Passports. I asked Edite Lucava, a Latvian I met in Belarus, how Latvian-Russian were relations today. She said, “It’s a very political and also an everyday problem. For example, Rīga is 40 percent Russian, and in some cities close to the Russian border it’s over 60 percent Russian! Our relationship is easy in everyday life, but difficult in politics. Some Russians are isolated in their own societies. They can’t talk in Latvian, but some are brave and integrate very well!”

I asked her, “Do you have Russian friends?”

“Yes, I have some nice, wonderful Russian friends, but they understand that Latvia is an independent country and not part of Russia! The problem is that the elder generation still doesn’t accept that communism is over and they will never learn our language, they will never get citizenship and somehow they are isolated. Sad, but true!”

**Boom, bust, but better than before**

Visiting Latvia in 2004 was fun because it seemed like everyone was high on drugs. The economy was booming and Latvia had joined the EU and NATO. People were proud. When I returned to Latvia in 2006, it had become the fastest growing economy in Europe. Latvians acted like they had just won the lottery, or at least moved away from their mother-in-law.

I approached a professionally dressed banker who was eating alone at a café in Rīga. Her name was Maria. She was young, plump, and friendly. I asked her how things were in the banking industry. “Oh, it’s crazy,” she said with a smile. “Everyone is buying homes and apartments. Before you couldn’t get a mortgage. Now it’s so easy. Prices have doubled in nearly a year. People now have credit cards and car loans. It’s out of control.”

“When will it end?” I asked.

“I don’t know,” she admitted, looking at her coffee.

The following two years Latvia’s economy continued surging 10 percent per year. Latvia experienced nearly a decade of explosive growth as it tried to catch up to Western Europe. Japanese call the 1990s the “Lost Decade” because, economically, they went nowhere for those 10 years. Latvians (as well as most
Eastern Europeans) could call their lousy period the “Lost Century.” They feel that they wasted the last century either in violent wars or under oppressive communism. There is a palpable sensation among Latvians that they want to make up for their Lost Century. They’re tired of being in the Hidden Europe.

Latvia’s small size makes it vulnerable to boom-bust cycles. Geographically, Latvia is about the same size as Ireland or West Virginia. Economically, it is smaller than North Dakota and accounts for just 0.15 percent of the EU’s GDP. Thus, it quickly soared after communism, but then crashed hard during the Great Recession. It went from the fastest growing economy in the EU to the weakest economy. By 2011, its economy shrank 20 percent and housing prices dropped 66 percent from their peak. Many blame the excesses on unregulated capitalism. They forget that communism also experienced booms and busts. We often underestimate the role that human psychology plays in economic cycles.

In 2011, a Latvian told me, “What we call an ‘economic crisis’ today was our everyday existence during the Soviet period. Yes, poor people today are hurting more than they were under communism, but look at the average Latvian: they’re driving modern cars, wearing nice clothes, shopping at well-stocked grocery stores, and watching satellite TV. Under communism, we would have loved to have such a ‘crisis.’”

Maiu told me, “During the Soviet period, a popular gift was toilet paper.”

“Why is that?” I asked.

“Because back then, everyone used newspapers to wipe their asses.”

That’s worth remembering next time anyone romanticizes about the government’s ability to do anything well. If governments can’t even make toilet paper well, what can they do well?

* * *

Francis Tapon’s mother is from Chile and his father is from France. They met in San Francisco thanks to a slow elevator. His brother, Philippe Tapon, is the author of two novels. His family spoke Spanish at home, unless an English swear word was necessary.

Francis was born in San Francisco, California where he attended the French American International School for 12 years. Native French teachers convinced him that France is the coolest country in the universe. He is fluent in English, French, and Spanish. He struggles with Italian, Portuguese, Slovenian, and Russian. If you point a gun to his head, he’ll start speaking other languages too.

He earned a Religion Degree with honors from Amherst College. He also has an MBA from Harvard Business School. After Harvard, he co-founded a robotic vision company in Silicon Valley. Then he decided to change his life forever.

In 2001, he sold the little he had to hike the 3,000 km Appalachian Trail. Then, after consulting for Hitachi, he visited all 25 countries in Eastern Europe in 2004. He consulted at Microsoft before hiking the 4,200 km Pacific Crest Trail in 2006. In 2007, he became the first person to do a round-trip on the Continental Divide Trail—a seven-month journey spanning 9,000 km. In 2008-2011, he visited over 40 European countries, but focused on revisiting all the Eastern European ones. In 2009, he climbed up Mont
Blanc and walked across Spain twice (once by traversing the Pyrenees from the Mediterranean Sea to the Atlantic Ocean, and then by hiking El Camino Santiago). He’s backpacked over 20,000 kilometers (12,500 miles) and traveled to over 80 countries.

He is the author of *Hike Your Own Hike: 7 Life Lessons from Backpacking Across America*. This book can be also ordered at: [http://francistapon.com/shop](http://francistapon.com/shop). He is donating half of his book royalty to America’s three major scenic trails.

*The Hidden Europe: What Eastern Europeans Can Teach Us* is his second book of his WanderLearn Series, to be published as ebook on August 19, 2011, and hardcover on December 8, 2011.

In 2012-2015, he plans to visit every country in Africa and write a book about that in 2016. His goal is to wander to all 193 countries of the world, see what we can learn from them, and share it with everyone.

Francis’ website is [http://FrancisTapon.com](http://FrancisTapon.com)
BOOK REVIEW
FARKAS, Flórián

From the Netherlands to Russia

Dr. Kaveh Farrokh concludes his volume ‘Shadows in the Desert — Ancient Persia at War’ published in 2004 with the following somber remark: “Perhaps the most interesting development in Iranian studies has been the overall decline of programs and studies of Iranica in western Europe and the United States since 1980. While excellent departments do exist in prestigious universities such as Cambridge or Harvard, these cannot be compared to rapidly expanding Islamic, Arabian, and Turkish studies programs in the West. England has now the largest collection of Arabic and Islamic libraries in the world and the largest number of Arabic studies programs, while Iranian studies correspondingly decline.”

In the light of this remark the official launching of the Iranian Studies Series at the University of Leiden, the Netherlands, on 8 December 2010 is highly welcome. Having A.A. Seyed-Gohrab (Leiden University) as Chief Editor and an international Advisory Board, the Iranian Studies Series mission statements reads as follows: “The Iranian Studies Series publishes high-quality scholarship on various aspects of Iranian civilisation, covering both contemporary and classical cultures of the Persian cultural area. The contemporary Persian-speaking area includes Iran, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Central Asia, while classical societies using Persian as a literary and cultural language were located in Anatolia, Caucasus, Central Asia and the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent. The objective of the series is to foster studies of the literary, historical, religious and linguistic products in Iranian languages. In addition to research monographs and reference works, the series publishes English-Persian critical text-editions of important texts. The series intends to publish resources and original research and make them accessible to a wide audience.”

In this section the following Iranian Studies Series volumes are reviewed:
- Jos Coumans: The Rubáiyát of Omar Khayyám — An Updated Bibliography —
- Sassan Tabatabai: Father of the Persian Verse — Rudaki and his Poetry —

Next to the Iranian Studies Series selected volumes the following books are reviewed, too:
- Liza Mügge: Beyond Dutch Borders — Transnational Politics among Colonial Migrants, Guest Workers and the Second Generation —
- Joseph Alagha: Hizbullah’s Documents — From the 1985 Open Letter to the 2009 Manifesto —
- Joseph Alagha: Hizbullah’s Identity Construction
- Paul van de Velde and Sebastian Bersick (Eds.): The Asia-Europe Meeting: Contributing to a New Global Governance Architecture — The Eight ASEM Summit in Brussels (2010) —
- Vadim Kononenko and Arkady Moshes (Eds.): Russia as a Network State — What Works in Russia When State Institutions Do Not —
Jos Coumans: The Rubáiyát of Omar Khayyám

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It may be more than symbolic that one of the opening volumes of the Iranian Studies Series is related to Omar Khayyám, the famous 11-12th century astronomer-poet from Nishapur, who is probably the best-known and beloved Persian poet among the Western general public next to Rūmī. Without doubt his fame in the West owes a lot to Edward FitzGerald who rendered much of his poetry into English and published it first in 1859. Within a few years the book was discovered by a broader audience and then it began its triumphal march. So many printings and publications, of FitzGerald and others, including translations to other languages saw the light of day that in 1929 a bibliography was published in the US by A.G. Potter. Since then the number of publications of the Rubáiyát further grew constantly, while the secondary literature exploded. The digital age made Omar Khayyám even more accessible, a search on his name in search engines provides millions of hits. Luckily there are always people who voluntarily take up the difficult but much needed task of producing bibliographies. One such person is Jos Coumans, librarian and secretary of the Dutch Omar Khayyám Society since 1997, who spent several decades to fill the gap between 1930 and present day with ‘An Updated Bibliography’ of the Rubáiyát of Omar Khayyám.

This bibliography is by its nature not propaedeutics to Omar Khayyám, but an invaluable volume for the lovers and knowers of his poetry. In order to place this work in context, the author wrote an extensive introduction to the bibliography wherein he provides interesting insights into the following topics: first a brief introduction to Omar Khayyám and his Rubáiyát is given, followed by a historical account of FitzGerald’s work. While his role in making Omar Khayyám and his Rubáiyát known to the general Western public is presented, the serious deficiencies of FitzGerald’s translation are not discussed.
The bibliography is divided into seven chapters:

Chapter 1. FitzGerald's versions deals with all the five versions of FitzGerald, including the selections and combined versions.

Chapter 2. Other translations lists translations other than Fitzgerald's, including those editions that have Fitzgerald's as well. Bilingual editions are also included.

Chapter 3. Multilingual editions deals with editions that have more than two different texts, from different translators or in different languages.

Chapter 4. Miniature books is included as a separate chapter, acknowledged by the author as being the reflection of the compiler's predilection.

Chapter 5. Miscellanea contains references to objects such as calendars, playing cards or caligraphed items.

Chapter 6. Study & criticism lists editions that explore or analyze various aspects of the text. Nevertheless, only those editions are listed that include a complete or substantial translation.

Chapter 7. Interpretation lists those editions that provide a translation, usually FitzGerald's, together with a version or adaptation that expresses the translator's views, beliefs, philosophies or ethics.

The four appendices included in the bibliography provide valuable information, too. The first one, Manuscripts, list some of the more important ones. The second one, Bibliographic references, presents a selection of the more important bibliographic reference material. The third one, Statistics, provides statistical information from several angles. It highlights more than anything else the world-wide success of Omar Khayyám. The last one, A word on Potter's bibliography, briefly presents the most important facts about Potter's bibliography.

Finally, the volume contains Indices, broken down as: Authors index, Artists index, Publishers index, Publisher not given, Not in Potter, and Index languages.

This meticulously compiled and prepared volume is a must have for every lover of Omar Khayyám!
Sassan Tabatabai: Father of the Persian Verse

Author: Sassan Tabatabatai
Title: Father of the Persian Verse
— Rudaki and His Poetry —
Publisher: Leiden University Press
Year of publishing: 2010
Language: English
Number of pages: 134
ISBN: 9789087280925
http://www.lup.nl/

The longevity and the uniqueness of the ancient Persian Empire and civilization, despite the disruption caused by Alexander the Great, was a major factor in world history. The Arab conquest in the seventh century therefore came as a huge shock and according to an Iranian scholar the conquest caused a “two centuries of silence” in the Persian civilization. The Abbasid rule gradually brought the Persian civilization back to the heart of the empire, and the weakening of the caliphate led to the rise of local dynasties, which by the tenth century controlled much of Iran, though nominally they remained under the authority of the caliph. In the west there were the Buyids and in the north-east the Sāmānids. Under Sāmānid rule, in Khorāsān and Transoxiana, the area they controlled, a true Persian cultural renaissance is taking place. Above all, through the use of new Persian as a court language rather than Arabic, a court poetry in Persian of great brilliance was born. In this historic process Abu ‘Abdallāh’ Jafar ibn Mohammad Rudaki (c. 880 – 941) played a pioneering and determinant role.

Little is known of his life; most biographical data is found in his poetry. What is quintessential in understanding him and his poetry is that he was during most of his creative life in the service of the Sāmānid Amir Nasr ibn Ahmad II (r. 914-943). He was a prolific poet; at least 100,000 couplets are attributed to him, the majority of which was lost (less than 1,000 survived). Most of his poetry survived in anthologies and biographical works. His poems are written in a simple style, oriented towards the imagery of the physical world and reflect a pre-Islamic Persian world-view. His is rightly considered as the founder of classical Persian literature.

Unfortunately, his poetry is not generally available to the English speaking world. Therefore this splendid volume is a great gift for all those who wish to learn more about this highly influential poet, who
lived and created in such an important period in Persian history. The volume is the work of Sassan Tabatabai, who teaches Persian and the Humanities at Boston University. Next to being a translator and editor (he is Poetry Editor of The Republic of Letters), he is a poet, too.

An introductory chapter precludes the body of translated poetry. In its first part the life and poetry of Rudaki is presented in an interesting way. What makes this part so enjoyable is the fact that both the biographical facts and the poetry elements are highlighted with selections of Rudaki’s poetry. In this way the reader is immediately introduced to the power and beauty of Rudaki’s genius. The second part of the introduction deals with translation issues in general and translating Rudaki in particular. Here the translator provides us with a detailed account of his translation ethos, which I cannot praise enough. At the start he sets his scope: “My first priority in translating Rudaki has been to convey the meaning of his poems. … A translation that in any way alters the sense of the original poem ceases to be a translation altogether and becomes nothing more than an imitation.” I wish all translators had the intellectual humility to subscribe to this ethos!

The main body of the volume contains a wide selection of Rudaki’s poetry, including: Elegies (3), Panegyric poems (8), Poems of complaint (3), Meditation on life, death and destiny (12), Love and its afflictions (12), Nature poems (4), Wine poems (2), and Rubā’iyāt (14). Next to the English translation the original Persian is also printed on mirror pages.

The volume ‘Father of Persian Verse – Rudaki and His Poetry’, introduction and translated poetry, is a real jewel, which needs to find its way into the library of every lover of Persian poetry.
Iran entered the modern era under four dynasties; beginning with the Safavids (1501-1722), whose rule was followed by two short-lived dynasties, the Afsharids (1736-1796) and Zands (1751-1794). The anarchy at the end of the 18th century was ended by the Qajar dynasty, which ruled until 1925 when its last monarch, Ahmad Shah, was deposed by Riza Khan Pahlavi in 1925.

The 19th century witnessed the advent and culmination of the so-called ‘Great Game’ between Britain and Russia, played out in most parts of Asia, whereby Iran also became a major region for contest. In fact every monarch of the Qajar dynasty had to deal with this game, as Iran found herself entrapped between these two great and seemingly omnipotent imperial powers. The major problem the country and dynasty faced in this period was how to accommodate itself to the requirements of the modern era, dictated by the Western powers and in the same time maintain independence and identity.

The topic of the volume ‘One Word – Yak Kaleme’ is directly related to these developments. Its author, Mirzā Yūsuf Khān Mustashār ad-Dowla Tabrīzī, a prominent liberal thinker of the 19th century, pursued a political career mostly during the reign of Nāşr al-Dīn Shah (r. 1848-1896). In this treatise, published in the last third of the 19th century, Mustashār ad-Dowla examined the root causes of Western developments and he came to the conclusion that the technological advancement of the Western-European powers was only the consequence of their state and societal organization, i.e. constitutional government. Subsequently he looks at the 19 principles that are the foundation of the general law in France and then argues that each of them can be found in Islamic sources. His work is an unparalleled achievement in explaining the universal character of these principles and thus showing a way to the Persian audience of how to
accommodate the homeland to the realities of the era based on indigenous values. His work had a significant influence during the Constitutional Revolution of 1906.

Although Mustashār ad-Dowla is universally known and acknowledged in Iran, he is hardly known in the West. Therefore it is of great value that this highly influential work appears now in an excellent edition. Two translators created the volume ‘One Word – Yak Kaleme’: A.A. Seyed-Gohrab, who is track-leader of the Persian Studies Programme Leiden University and elected member of the Young Academy of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW), and S. McGlinn, who is an independent scholar and writes and translates in the fields of Bahai studies, Iranian studies and Islamic studies.

These two scholars produced a wonderful volume, which comprises an in-depth introduction to Mustashār ad-Dowla’s background, the era in general and the context wherein it was created. The reader is also introduced to the reception of the treatise and its publication history is briefly presented, too. The introduction is followed by the English translation of Mustashār ad-Dowla’s letter to Muzaffar ad- Dīn Shah, the Crown Prince, written in 1888. In this he again reiterates the main ideas of Yak Kaleme and the need to implement them in practice. The main body of the volume contains a clear and annotated English translation of the treatise. Next to the English translation the original Persian is also printed on mirror pages. The well-written introduction and the clear annotated translation make it all clear that the message of the treatise transcends the epoch in which it was created; it is as topical now when it was written.

The volume ‘One Word – Yak Kaleme; 19th Century Persian Treatise Introducing Western Codified Law’ is an invaluable source for all those who are interested in the interplay between Western and Eastern political thought in the 19th century Persia.
Liza Mügge: Beyond Dutch Borders

Author: Liza Mügge
Title: Beyond Dutch Borders
— Transnational Politics among Colonial Migrants, Guest Workers and the Second Generation —
Publisher: Amsterdam University Press
Year of publishing: 2011
Language: English
Number of pages: 264
ISBN: 978 90 8964 244 8
http://www.aup.nl/

Present volume is one of the latest publications of the IMISCOE Research Network (International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion in Europe — http://www.imiscoe.org/). The author, Liza Mügge (née Nell), is assistant professor in the department of political science at the University of Amsterdam. In this study she researched transnational migrant politics in the Netherlands, a phenomenon for which is growing scholarly interest; nevertheless, there remain gaps in our understanding of it. The current political discourse both in Europe and in the Netherlands focuses almost solely on the integration of migrants and therefore the transnational political activities of second generation migrants remain fairly unnoticed. Therefore it is more than welcome that such an empirical research was undertaken.

The volume comprises seven chapters, which cover the following topics:

Chapter 1. Introduction provides a general introduction to the subject, and introduces the key questions to which it seeks answer: 1. What explains the emergence and development of transnational migrant politics? 2. How this transnational political participation evolved over time, particularly in light of globalized communications and the coming to age of a second generation in countries of settlement? 3. How does migrants’ political integration in receiving societies impact on political transnationalism and vice versa?

The target groups of research are also introduced, namely the migrants from Surinam and Turkey and their descendants, and later the similarities and differences between them are presented. This introductory chapter positions the theoretical framework that was used during the research, and which is centered on transnational actors, activities and ties.
Chapter 2. *Individual transnationalists* presents in fair detail the results of the fieldwork. First, the background of the individual respondents is identified, followed by the presentation of the results grouped around topics like interest in Dutch and homeland politics, social participation, electoral sympathies, impact of kinship and opportunities in the Netherlands.

Chapter 3. *Migrant organisations and transnational politics* takes up the task of studying the ties of migrant organizations in the Netherlands to homeland organizations or states. Most studies focused on migrant organizations’ role in helping their compatriots integrate into the Dutch society. This chapter attempts to fill the gap, analyzing the transnational ties of Surinamese and Turkish (including Kurdish) organizational networks in the Netherlands over the periods 2001-2005 and 1999-2005, respectively.

The next chapters, Chapter 4. *Surinam: Student activism to transnational party politics*, Chapter 5. *Turkey: Labour migration to transnational party politics*, and Chapter 6. *Kurdish diaspora politics* deal with the specificities of the particular ethnic group, including an overview of the sending country’s historical background back to a couple of decades, the constitution of the migrant community and its relationships with the country of origin.

Chapter 7. *Conclusion: Looking both ways* summarizes the main conclusions drawn in the previous chapters.

The volume is complemented with a rich scholarly apparatus: appendices including a detailed description of the methodology used, a table with the Surinamese political parties, family trees of Turkish and Kurdish political parties (1920s-2005), extensive notes and references, and index.

All in all a well researched book, written with much scholarly integrity. It fills the gap in the field of empirical research of transnational migrant politics. It may be hoped that based on its results further studies will be carried out in the Netherlands and beyond in order to improve our analytical understanding of how transnational migrant politics plays out in the decades to come.

A good companion to this volume is Peter Scholten’s book *Framing Immigrant Integration — Dutch Research-Policy Dialogues in Comparitive Perspective*, also publishd by the Amsterdam University Press; it will be reviewed in the next issue of the Journal of Eurasian Studies.
Joseph Alagha: 
Hizbullah’s Documents 
Hizbullah’s Identity Construction

Author: Joseph Alagha 
Title: Hizbullah’s Documents 
— From the 1985 Open Letter to the 2009 Manifesto — 
Publisher: Amsterdam University Press 
Year of publishing: 2011 
Language: English 
Number of pages: 224 
ISBN: 978 90 8555 037 2 
http://www.aup.nl/

Author: Joseph Alagha 
Title: Hizbullah’s Identity Construction 
Publisher: Amsterdam University Press 
Year of publishing: 2011 
Language: English 
Number of pages: 314 
ISBN: 9789089642974 
http://www.aup.nl/
The author of these recently published two books, Joseph Alagha, is associate professor of Islamic studies at Radboud University Nijmegen. He already published numerous papers on Hizbullah and a book entitled ‘The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology’, published in 2006 by the Amsterdam University Press.

These two volumes go hand in hand, hence the reader profits most if (s)he reads them together. They form an invaluable source for scholars and policymakers who are interested and/or involved in geopolitics in general and in the Middle-East in particular; especially for those who due to language barrier and/or lack of channels to reliable primary sources were limited to superficial journalistic-type literature on Hizbullah. The volume ‘Hizbullah’s Documents — From the 1985 Open Letter to the 2009 Manifesto’ is basically a text book, the English translations of compiled primary documents in Arabic, which was possible due to the author’s privileged access to the Party, and the ‘Hizbullah’s Identity Construction’ is the accompanying volume, which provides a detailed analysis of Hizbullah’s identity construction and metamorphosis based on a theoretical framework.

The volume ‘Hizbullah’s Documents — From the 1985 Open Letter to the 2009 Manifesto’ comprises five chapters, which cover the following topics:

The Introduction chapter provides a concise analysis of the first official public document of Hizbullah, the Open Letter [of 1985], a brief overview of the conclaves, and a concise analysis of the new Manifesto [2009]. The documents are analyzed from a domestic, regional and international perspective. From the analysis it becomes obvious how Hizbullah was and is still busy with continuous identity construction and reconstruction, continuously adapting itself to the changing realities both in the domestic, regional and international sphere.

Chapter 1. Primary Documents contains the English translation of key documents, including the Open Letter [1985] and three other statements that were released in 1997, 1998 and 2004 respectively.

Chapter 2. Election Programs provides the English translation of the Parliamentary Election Program of Hizbullah for the years 1992, 1996, 2000, 2005 as well as the Legislative Election Program in 2009, which is complemented by the Party’s secretary-general, Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, post-elections press conference. This chapter also contains the Municipal Election Program for the year 2004.

Chapter 3. Agreements, Understandings, Pacts contains the English translation/version of political documents that played a critical role in the domestic, regional and international sphere, especially in the past five years. Documents included are: Paper of Common Understanding between Hizbullah and The Free Patriotic Movement [6 February 2006], The Beirut Declaration [15 May 2008], Doha Accord [21 May 2008], Hizbullah’s Understanding with the Salafi Movement [18 August 2008], and President Al-Assad Issues a Decree Stipulating the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with Lebanon [14 October 2008].

Chapter 4. The New Manifesto (30 November 2009) provides the complete English translation of ‘The New Manifesto’ as well as the full press conference held on 30 November 2009 by the Party’s secretary-general, Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah.

The volume is complemented with a Chronology of Events (1975-2010), which highlights the key domestic, regional and international events that are necessary for understanding the context in which
Hizbullah operated and operates. Next to that an extensive apparatus is provided including List of Abbreviations, Glossary, very extensive Notes and Index.

As mentioned before, the volume ‘Hizbullah’s Documents — From the 1985 Open Letter to the 2009 Manifesto’ is a text book that contains the raw material, the basic facts. Although even from this volume Hizbullah’s spectacular identity construction and reconstruction becomes clear, for a deeper understanding its sequel, the volume ‘Hizbullah’s Identity Construction’ is an essential reading. This volume, based on field research and an unparalleled access to primary sources, provides a fundamentally new perspective on Hizbullah, from its birth up until present. It is structured as follows:

The Introduction and Analytical Framework chapter begins with a brief overview of Hizbullah’s past three decades, highlighting the different phases the movement went through and its key milestones in identity reconstruction. Following this the major analytical models are presented, which are used throughout the volume, including Manuel Castells’ identity model, Hinnebusch’ three conceptually distinct environments model, and finally Pierre Bourdieu’s capitals model in the interpretation of Ousmane Kane.

Chapter 1. Tolerance and Discrimination: Ahl Al-Dhimma in the Islamic Order presents the transition path of Hizbullah vis-à-vis the Christian populace; from considering them as potential dhimmis (= residents within an Islamic state holding limited rights and required to pay a poll tax in lieu of zakat) to accepting them as full citizens in a pluralistic polity.

Chapter 2. Interpretation and Authority: Wilayat Al-Faqih elaborates on Hizbullah’s molding of the doctrine of wilayat al-faqih of Imam Khumayni in order to accommodate its ideology to the changing circumstance in the political system. Due to this process Hizbullah succeeded in becoming a key player in the Lebanese polity. This chapter also dismisses the misconception that Hizbullah is a mere proxy of Syria and/or Iran, showing how Hizbullah pursued an independent path in its quest to shape and influence the Lebanese political system.

Chapter 3. Political Violence: Terrorism and 9/11 discusses the movement’s stance toward terrorism. As the author himself introduces this chapter: “In this chapter, I am going to put myself in Hizbullah’s shoes to expose the party’s own discourse, views, and arguments on terrorism and 9/11, and some of the responses and polemics dealing with these issues.”

Chapter 4. Political Violence: Suicide Operations deals with probably one of the most misunderstood phenomena relating to Hizbullah. Joseph Alagha is attempting to debunk a few myths; “I contest the commonly held view that regards martyrdom as a specifically Shi’ite phenomenon, arguing that, in addition to Sunni Palestinians, Lebanese nationalists, from all religious denominations, have also carried out such operations.” … “I argue that martyrdom operations – whether carried out by Islamic movements or resistance movements – are altruistic, self-sacrificial operations conveyed in the form of symbolic capital (honor and dignity).”

The remaining chapters, Chapter 5. From Cooptation to Contestation to Political Power, Chapter 6. The Doha 2008 Accord and its Aftermath, Chapter 7. The Eight Conclave: A New Manifesto (November 2009) and Chapter 8. Epilogue: Future Prospects – Disarmament and the Peace Process shift the tenor of the book to more practical matters, navigating through Hizbullah’s continuous identity reconstruction, which resulted first in its
participation in the multi-party, multi-confessional Lebanese public sphere to becoming a key, dominating factor of it.

Last but not least the volume contains top-notch scholarly apparatus, including a Glossary, Additional Reading, extensive Notes, Selected Bibliography and Index.

The volumes ‘Hizbullah’s Documents — From the 1985 Open Letter to the 2009 Manifesto’ and ‘Hizbullah’s Identity Construction’ contribute immensely to a better understanding of Hizbullah, an organization that is surrounded by so much mystery for so many people in the West. Without doubt these two volumes will end up in the top echelon of books in geopolitics published in 2011.
The Asia-Europe Meeting: Contributing to a New Global Governance Architecture

Editors: Paul van der Velde and Sebastian Bersick

Title: The Asia-Europe Meeting: Contributing to a New Global Governance Architecture

— The Eighth ASEM Summit in Brussels (2010) —

Publisher: Amsterdam University Press

Year of publishing: 2011

Language: English

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The edited volume ‘The Asia-Europe Meeting: Contributing to a New Global Governance Architecture — The Eighth ASEM Summit in Brussels (2010)’ is the 15th volume in the ICAS (The International Convention of Asia Scholars – www.icassecretariat.org) Publications Series. Its main goal is to present and analyze topics discussed and document the process of the eighth summit of Asian and European leaders, held on 4-5 October 2010 in Brussels. The Asia-Europe Meeting was established in 1996 with the aim to bring Asia and Europe together. Since its foundation the leaders of the member Asian and European countries met with a remarkable regularity every second year to share their views on major world developments and to maintain their personal relationship.

The volume comprises the following chapters:

Chapter 1. The Asia-Europe Meeting: Contributing to a New Global Governance Architecture by Sebastian Bersick (Lecturer with the Department of Government, National University of Ireland, University College Cork) and Paul van der Velde (Chief Executive Officer of the International Convention of Asia Scholars and General Editor of the IIAS and ICAS Publications Series published by Amsterdam University Press) provides an introduction and scene-setting for the rest of the volume. The two editors of this volume briefly position ASEM, touch on the previous four edited volumes covering previous ASEM summits, then introduce the 11 papers, grouped into four units: ASEM 8: The Brussels Summit, Financial and Economic Governance, Security Governance, and ASEM Enlargement. The first group deals with the
history, structure and working methods of ASEM, the second and third one with the major topics on the table during the Brussels summit, and the last one with the issues of enlargement.

ASEM 8: THE BRUSSELS SUMMIT

Chapter 2. ASEM 8 Summit Texts – The Negotiation History by Bertrand de Crombrugghe (Head of the Asia and Oceania Department of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) takes the reader through the process of preparing, organizing and directing the summit. Mr. De Crombrugghe was ASEM senior official for Belgium chairing the task force that prepared the eighth ASEM summit in 2010 and led the negotiations on the summit outcome.

Chapter 3. ASEM 8: The Narrative by Paul Lambert (member of the Asia desk of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) sheds lights on the broader ‘family’ of ASEM, presenting briefly those for a, that complement the main meeting of heads of states and governments, i.e. the Asia-Europe Parliamentary Partnership, the Asia-Europe People’s Forum, the Asia-Europe Foundation and the Asia-Europe Business Forum. Next a summary is given of the programs that took place within the framework of these for a before, during and after the summit.

Chapter 4. ASEM Working Methods Reform: An Identity Issue by Tom Vandenkendelaere (research scholar at the University of Kent) examines the internal working of ASEM, its strength and weaknesses and the efforts taken to increase its efficiency.

Chapter 5. Perception and ASEM Visibility in the European Media by Sebastian Bersick and Tanja Bauer (PhD student at the Universität der Bundeswehr in Munich) presents the results of the empirical research conducted to measure the visibility of ASEM in the European printed and electronic media. Due to research constrains, eight European countries were selected and during a period of three months the visibility of Asia in general and ASEM in particular was measured. The results of the media are published in this volume for the first time. The actual results clearly demonstrate that ASEM is perceived mainly as a political actor, interest is limited to the summit itself and there is a media attention deficit.

FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE

Chapter 6. IMF: The Road from Rescue to Reform by J. Thomas Lindblad (Associate Professor in Economic History and the History of Southeast Asia at Leiden University, the Netherlands) presents the developments taking place within and around the International Monetary Fund since the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s. The IMF’s handling of that crisis came under much criticism, which led to soul-searching and finally to reform initiatives in several areas like selection of top cadres, internal monitoring mechanisms, and probably the most important and sensitive issue: quota reform. The relationship of ASEM to these developments is highlighted, since all members of ASEM have a vested interest in reforming IMF.

Chapter 7. In Search of a New Global Financial Architecture: China, the G20 and ASEM by Jörn-Carsten Gottwald (Permanent Lecturer with the Irish Institute of Chinese Studies at the National University of Ireland in Cork) examines the developments that are centered on the growing role and responsibility of China in shaping and reforming the global economic governance structure. The interplay between G20 and ASEM are in the forefront of the examination.
Chapter 8. *Banking Regulations at a Crossroads* by Bram de Roos (analyst at the commercial banking department of ING Bank in the Netherlands) looks into the root causes that prevented the meltdown of the Asian financial sector in contrary to the US and European ones, when the 2007 subprime crisis hit the global economy. It examines in detail the differences in regulatory structures, highlighting ASEM's role in information and experience sharing in this area. It also consecrates a fair amount of space to the new regulatory framework Basel III.

**SECURITY GOVERNANCE**

Chapter 9. *Asia and Europe: Meeting Future Energy Security Challenges* by Christopher M. Dent (Professor of East Asia’s International Political Economy, Department of East Asian Studies, University of Leeds in the UK) deals with the second top issue of the ASEM Brussels Summit: energy security. First, the definition of energy security is enlarged, and then the energy strategies of both the Asian and European ASEM members are sketched. Again, the role of ASEM in this area is highlighted, since the Asian and European ASEM members are both serviced by the same energy suppliers. The admission of Russia into ASEM makes the role of this organization in global energy security more important.

Chapter 10. *Enhancing Maritime Security Governance: European and Asian Naval Missions against Somali Piracy* by Susanne Kamerling (Research Fellow at Clingendael Asia Studies and the Security and Conflict Programme of the Clingendael Institute in The Hague, the Netherlands) and Frans-Paul van der Putten (Senior Research Fellow at the same institute) examines the growing cooperation against the Somali piracy, a topic which was first brought to the fore on the Brussels Summit. The Horn of Africa is one of the world’s most important naval routes and the Somali piracy has grown significantly in recent years, threatening global naval commerce. The international cooperation in this area, both of the ASEM members and others is examined, highlighting the conflicting geopolitical interests as well.

**ASEM ENLARGEMENT**

Chapter 11. *Bridging Asia and Europe? Australia and New Zealand Membership in ASEM* by David Capie (Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Victoria University in Wellington, New Zealand) summarizes the road towards accession into ASEM of Australia and New Zealand, examining in detail the changed political and economic environment for these two ‘Tasman’ countries.

Chapter 12. *ASEM’s Future Enlargement: The Way Forward* by Bernard de Crombrugghe examines the problems created by the admission of Russia, Australia and New Zealand into ASEM. ASEM is a bi-regional organization by definition and the geographical position of Russia posed a significant challenge due to the stance of the European members who consider Europe as analogous to EU. The Asian members strongly disagree with this and a compromise was reached wherein Russia, Australia and New Zealand were placed in a so-called temporary third category. This issue needs a final solution, also for future enlargements.

*Annex* includes ASEM related primary sources not available in the public space.

The edited volume *The Asia-Europe Meeting: Contributing to a New Global Governance Architecture — The Eighth ASEM Summit in Brussels (2010)* is an excellent book. Due to its structure it is very useful and informative for those who are already familiar with ASEM and also for those who are new to it.
Russia as a Network State

Editors: Vadim Kononenko and Arkady Moshes

Title: Russia as a Network State

— What Works in Russia When State Institutions Do Not? —

Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan

Year of publishing: 2011

Language: English

Number of pages: 208


http://www.palgrave.com/

Russia, as heir of several Eurasian empires, is a very resilient entity. Nothing shows this better than the period after the collapse of the Soviet Union. After a total collapse in 1991, in less than a decade, the country, albeit rolled back to its core, came back from the brink of chaos. In 2000 Vladimir Putin was elected President of the Russian Federation and that event was a turning point in the history of the largest country in the world. From the outset President Putin had a very clear vision in which direction he wanted to move his country, as reflected in the book ‘First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President Vladimir Putin’, published in 2000 by Hutchinson in London.

The edited volume ‘Russia as a Network State — What Works in Russia When State Institutions Do Not? ’ is an attempt to empirically analyze the current governance structure of the Russian Federation, basically the governance in the Putin-era. The two editors, Vadim Kononenko (Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs) and Arkady Moshes (Programme Director of the Russia in the Regional and Global Context Programme of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs) compiled the volume of the material presented at the expert round-table seminar on Russia’s network governance, held in Helsinki in October 2008 and funded by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

The volume comprises the following chapters:

The Introduction is signed by one of the editors, Vadim Kononenko. In it he explains the term ‘network state’ in the context it is used for the current affairs of state in Russia as an analytical category. It is explained why the classical Weberian model of the state is dismissed as not useful for an in-depth analysis of the current Russian situation. Next to that the functions performed by network politics are
briefly analyzed and the model’s aimed results are contextualized, pointing out that it can only provide qualitative analysis and its complexity necessitates a narrowing down of its scope.

Chapter 1. The Formation of Russia’s Network Directorate, by Olga Kryshtanovskaya (Director of the Institute for Applied Political Sciences and Head of the Department for the Study of Hierarchical Elites – Russian Academy of Sciences) and Stephen White (James Bryce Professor of Politics and Senior Research Associate of the University of Glasgow’s School of Central and East European Studies) examines the emergence and evolution of elite networks under President Putin and their further transformation under President Medvedev. The structure and working mechanisms of the former Communist nomenklatura are briefly presented in order to provide the background for the analysis of the transitional period and the formation of the new network elites.

Chapter 2. Can Medvedev Change Sistema? Informal Networks and Public Administration in Russia, by Alena Ledeneva (Reader in Russian Politics and Society at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London) looks at the informal element within the networks, where the focus is laid on informality within the formal structures.

Chapter 3. Crooked Hierarchy and Reshuffled Networks: Reforming Russia’s Dysfunctional Military Machine, by Pavel Baev (Senior Researcher in the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo) critically examines the command structure of the Russian military and highlights the interplay between competing networks inside the military hierarchy. As a practical case he provides a retrospective analysis of the way the 2008 war with Georgia was conducted.

Chapter 4. Who is Running Russia’s Regions, by Nikolay Petrov (Scholar-in-Residence at Carnegie Moscow Centre) examines the altered center-region relationship during the Putin-Medvedev era vis-à-vis the Yeltsin period. It is shown that its nature was transformed significantly; it is a ‘managerial network with overdeveloped radial and underdeveloped concentric ties’.

Chapter 5. Networks, Cronies and Business Plans: Business-State Relations in Russia, by Philip Hanson (Consultant on the Russian and Baltic Economies for the Economist Intelligence Unit and Oxford Analytica and Associate Fellow of the Royal Institute of International Affairs Russia and Eurasia Programme) is a qualitative analysis of the relationship between the central state and big business. The author cautions the reader from the outset that the reference point, i.e. the liberal ideal of anonymous dealings between the state and particular firms, has a severely limited applicability in any country. Because it covers the domain when humans interact with humans, the whole process is prone to corruption, everywhere in the world. A number of Russian case histories are reviewed.

Chapter 6. The Russian Network State as a Great Power, by Stefanie Ortmann (Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Sussex) examines the narrative about both democracy and ‘Great Power’ that are in the forefront of discussions since 1991. She argues that the discussion has primarily a domestic focus. The paper bounds the discussion on the ‘Great Power’ status exclusively to a Western perspective; Russia’s Asian contacts, the Moscow-Beijing axis is unmentioned, likewise the whole Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
Chapter 7. Conclusions, by Vadim Kononenko sums up the volume by looking at the future: what challenges the network state in Russia faces, how is the network governance going to evolve, and how unique is Russia’s experience.

The edited volume ‘Russia as a Network State — What Works in Russia When State Institutions Do Not?’ is a scholarly and passionately argued volume. Hopefully it will stimulate similar research on the network nature of governance of such great federative political structures like the US, EU, India or China, because only those federal entities are comparable to the Russian Federation.
CLASSICAL WRITINGS ON EURASIA
YOUNGHUSBAND, Francis Edward

A Winter in Kashgar

* * *

Lieutenant Colonel Sir Francis Edward Younghusband, (1863–1942) was a British Army officer, explorer, and spiritual writer. He is remembered chiefly for his travels in the Far East and Central Asia; especially the 1904 British expedition to Tibet, and for his writings on Asia and foreign policy. Younghusband held positions including British commissioner to Tibet and President of the Royal Geographical Society.

Present writing is a chapter taken from his book entitled ‘THE HEART OF A CONTINENT — A Narrative of Travels in Manchuria, across the Gobi Desert, through the Himalayas, the Pamirs, and Chitral, 1884-1894.’ published by John Murray in London in 1896.

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PREFACE

The first thing a man who travels from London to Scotland wants to do is to describe to his friends at the end of his journey his experiences on the way — whether the train was crowded or not, what the weather was like, and how perfect or imperfect the arrangements of the railway company were. It is the same general instinct of wishing to tell out to others the experiences one has had that is now acting in me. To do this in conversation is, in my case, a hopeless task — because, for one thing, my experiences of travel have now accumulated so heavily; and, for another, I find insuperable difficulties in giving by word of mouth accounts of travels in strange lands unfamiliar to the hearer. At the same time I am always experiencing the wish that my friends should be able to share with me, as much as it is possible to do so, the enjoyment I have felt in looking upon Nature in its aspects wild, in distant unfrequented parts of the earth, and in mixing with strange and little-known peoples, who, semi-barbarians though they may be, have often more interesting traits of character than others in a higher scale of civilization.

I have, therefore, been year by year impelled to write out my experiences in a collected form, and in such a way as may be accessible, not only to those with whom I am personally acquainted, but also, I hope, to many another kindred spirit, who shares with me that love for adventure and seeking out the unknown which has grown up within me. The great pleasure in writing is to feel that it is possible, by this means, to reach such men; to feel that I can speak to them just as they, by their books and by their works, have spoken to me, and that I may, in some slight degree, be passing on to others about to start on careers of adventure, the same keen love of travel and of Nature which I have received from those who have gone before.

There are others, too, whom I hope my book may reach — some few among those thousands and thousands who stay at home in England. Amongst these there are numbers who have that longing to go
out and see the world which is the characteristic of Englishmen. It is not natural to an Englishman to sit at an office desk, or spend his whole existence amid such tame excitement as life in London, and shooting partridges and pheasants afford. Many consider themselves tied down to home; but they often tie themselves down. And if a man has indeed the spirit of travel in him, nothing should be allowed to stand in the way of his doing as he wishes. And one of the hopes I have as I write this book is, that it may tempt some few among the stay-at-homes to go out and breathe a little of the pure fresh air of Nature, and inhale into their beings some of the revivifying force and heightened power of enjoyment of all that is on this earth which it can give.

My book cannot claim to be scientific, nor to be written in any correct literary style, but I have endeavoured to speak out, as clearly and impressively as I can, what I saw, what I did, and what I felt in the little-known, and sometimes unknown, regions which I have visited, and to give the impressions which formed themselves in my mind of the various peoples whom I met. Some portion of this will, I hope, prove of value to others besides the general reader; but it has been a ceaseless cause of regret to me that I had never undergone a scientific training before undertaking my journeys. During the last year or two I have done what I can by myself to supply this deficiency; but amongst the Himalaya mountains in the desert of Gobi, and amid the forests of Manchuria, how much would I not have given to be able to exchange that smattering of Greek and Latin which I had drilled into me at school for a little knowledge of the great forces of Nature which I saw at work around me!

With these few remarks of introduction, and with the hope that there may be some among my readers to whom the spirit in which it has been written may appeal; that there may be among the busy crowds in England some to whom it may give an hour's change of scene, and a momentary glimpse into the great world of Nature beyond our little isle; and that there may be some among my countrymen scattered over the world to whom this description of still other lands than those they have so far seen may give pleasure, I send out this story of a wanderer's doings, of the scenes which he has witnessed, and of the feelings which have moved him.

"Where rose the mountains, there to him were friends;
Where roll'd the ocean, thereon was his home;
Where a blue sky, and glowing clime, extends,
He had the passion and the power to roam;
The desert, forest, cavern, breaker's foam.
Were unto him companionship; they spake
A mutual language, clearer than the tome
Of his land's tongue, which he would oft forsake
For Nature's pages glass'd by sunbeams on the lake.

* * * * *
Perils he sought not, but ne'er shrank to meet:
The scene was savage, but the scene was new;
This made the ceaseless toil of travel sweet.
Beat back keen winter's blast, and welcom'd summer's heat."

Byron.
CHAPTER XIV. — A WINTER IN KASHGAR.

During the first days of our stay in Kashgar, we had a round of visits to make on Chinese officials. Kashgar is the principal town of the western part of Chinese Turkestan, and there is here a Taotai in civil charge of the Kashgar, Yarkand, and Khotan districts, as well as of the Kirghiz along the frontier. There is also, at Kashgar, a general in command of the troops in these districts, who lives in the new town, about two and a half miles to the south of the old town of Kashgar, in which the Taotai lives. Of these two functionaries, the civil governor is the most important, and he is surrounded with a good deal of state. His official residence is of the usual Chinese type, with fine rooms and courtyards, and the massive gateways so characteristic of these places. Here he receives visitors of distinction with considerable ceremony; but it is when he goes out that he appears in greatest pomp. Then men with gongs and trumpets go in front, a large procession is formed, and both on leaving and returning to his residence a salute is fired. He is carried along in a handsome sedan chair, and every sign of respect is paid to him. Here again the Chinese show their skill in the art of impressing those they govern, for the sight — not too common — of their governor parading through the streets of the city in this ceremonial manner undoubtedly has its effect. I do not say that this ruling by effect is a good way of ruling, and as a good deal of the effect is obtained by keeping the rulers aloof and inaccessible, it is in that respect bad. But in this particular line of governing the Chinese certainly are at the top of the tree.

The Taotai and I performed the usual civilities to each other. I called on him first, of course, and he returned my visit, accompanied by his usual procession. The visits of Chinese officials are always of considerable length, and the Taotai would remain for a couple of hours or so talking away upon any subject which cropped up. He was an old man, who had done much good service in Chinese Turkestan during the Mohammedan rebellion, but he was now weak and past his best. When we had become more intimate, he told me that he had no very high idea of European civilization, for we were always fighting with one another. We were not bad at inventing machines and guns, but we had none of that calm, lofty spirit which the Chinese possessed, and which enabled them to look at the petty squabbles between nations with equanimity and dignity. We spent all our time in matters which should only concern mechanics and low-class people of that sort, and gave ourselves no opportunity for contemplating higher things. These were the Taotai's ideas on Europeans, and it was interesting to see the calm air of superiority with which these views were given.

The Taotai's secretary — a thorough scamp, who was subsequently removed for gross bribery — was another official with whom we had a good deal of intercourse at Kashgar. He had been at Shanghai, and had some knowledge of Europeans. He used to say that the Chinese could never understand why the Russians went to all the trouble and expense of keeping a consulate at Kashgar to look after the trade there, when in a whole year only as much merchandise was brought into the country as is imported into Shanghai by a single British steamer.

The official, however, whom we came to know the best, was the general in command of the troops quartered in the old or native city, near which our house was situated. Old General Wang was very friendly, and used to get up dinner-parties for us in his barracks, and insisted upon calling me by my Christian name. Like all Chinese military officials, he was very indifferently educated, and having learnt the art of writing long scrolls with quotations from classics, he was very proud of it. The barracks in
which his men lived were really extremely comfortable. Chinamen — at any rate the inhabitants of North China — seldom live in squalor, and these barracks were well constructed, roomy, and comfortable. The officers’ houses were really very neat. The only things that were badly looked after were the arms. The Chinese never can look after their guns and rifles properly; and although there were many good breech-loading rifles in the hands of these men, they would probably be perfectly useless on account of the rust. I think what chiefly struck me about the arrangements of these barracks was the family-party air which pervaded the whole. Here was the comfortable old general, only bent on taking things as easily as possible, and the officers and men appeared to be merely there to attend to his wants. They had to look after him a little, and hang about him generally; but they might be quite sure that he would not trouble them with any excess of military zeal, and they might go on leading a quiet, peaceful existence till their turn for command came round. The men worked hard at their vegetable gardens outside the barracks, and we had opportunities of testing the excellent quality of the vegetables which they turned out; but drill and rifle-practice were very seldom carried on. As far as our personal comfort was concerned, this was lucky, for one day when rifle-practice was going on, I had just turned the corner of a wall when a bullet came whizzing close by my head; the troops were at rifle-practice, and firing right across a public way, without taking any precaution to warn people.

But my intercourse at Kashgar was not only with the Chinese; I also saw there men from nearly every part of Asia. It is a curious meeting-ground of many nationalities from north and south, and from east and west of Asia; from Russian territory and from India, from China, and from Afghanistan and Bokhara, even men from Constantinople. With all of these I had from time to time opportunities of speaking. Ethnologically they differed greatly, but they were all Asiatics, and nearly all traders, and their general characteristics, in consequence, varied but little. The effect of Central Asian listlessness had made itself felt on all. The wild fanatical Pathan from the Indian frontier allowed his ardour to cool down here till he became almost as mild as the comfortable merchant from Bokhara. All were intelligent men who, in their wanderings, had picked up much useful knowledge; and as a rule the constant rubbing up against their neighbours had produced good manners in them. They were seldom anything else but courteous, if they knew that courtesy would be shown to them, and a visit from any of them was always a pleasure. They discussed politics constantly, as their trade depended so much upon the political situation; and the man in all Asia whom they watched with the keenest interest was Abdul Rahman, the Amir of Kabul. On him and on his life so much of their little fortunes depended. He was credited with boundless ambitions. At one time he was to attack the Chinese in Kashgar, and turn them out; at another he was to invade Bokhara; and four times during our stay in Kashgar he was dead altogether. These Central Asian traders speculate freely on what is to happen when he dies. If a son of his is to rule in his stead, then Afghanistan will remain as much closed for them as it is now, and the trade of Central Asia will be strangled as before by the prohibitive tariffs, and other obstacles to it which are imposed by the ruler of Kabul. But if Afghanistan is swept away as an independent state, and the Russian and Indian frontiers coincide either on the Hindu Kush Mountains or the river Oxus, then trade will increase, railways and good roads will be constructed, and oppression by petty officials be unknown. The Central Asian question is therefore one of great interest to them; every move in the game is watched with keenness, and the relative strength and probable intentions of the two great powers, whom they regard as struggling for the supremacy of Asia, are freely discussed by them.
It is naturally difficult for an Englishman to get at their real opinions as to the respective merits of British and Russian rule; but, as merchants, I think they highly appreciate the benefits which are conferred by an administration which makes such efforts to improve the communications of the country, by the construction of railways, roads, and telegraphs; which adds so greatly to the production of the country by the cutting of irrigation canals; and which encourages trade by removing all duties that are not absolutely necessary, as the British do. They hate the system of law in India, though they believe in the justice of the individual officer, and I am not altogether sure that they do not prefer administrations where the decision of law may be less just, but will probably be less costly, and will certainly be more rapid. But they consider that, on the whole, their trade interests are furthered more under British than under any other rule.

In regard, however, to the comparative strength of the two rival powers of Asia, there is not a doubt that they consider the Russian more powerful than the British. Even if they have not really got the greater strength, the Russians succeed better in producing an impression of it than do the British. Their numbers in Central Asia are really very small, but they are much more numerous in proportion to the number of natives than are the British in India. Then, again, the Russians, when they strike, strike very heavily; and when they advance they do not go back, as the British generally find some plausible reason for doing. Moreover, they have subjugated people who were easy to conquer, and the general result of all this, and of the rumours of untold legions of soldiers stationed in Russia proper, is to impress the Oriental mind with the idea that the Russians have a greater strength in comparison with the British than they perhaps actually have. Some English writers argue that the retirement from Afghanistan, in 1881, has had no effect upon British prestige. That retirement may have been wise on financial grounds, but that it did effect our prestige in Central Asia there can, I think, be little doubt. If we had gone to Kabul and Kandahar, and remained there, our prestige, for whatever it is worth, would certainly have stood higher than it does now, when it is perfectly well known throughout Asia that the Amir of Kabul practically closes Afghanistan to every Englishman. To keep up this prestige may not have been worth the money which it would have been necessary to expend in order to do so, but it is false to argue that the prestige is just as high after retirement as it was before. We cannot save up our money and expect the same results as if we had expended it. The shrewd native observers of our policy in Central Asia see perfectly well that we did not hold Afghanistan, because we had not sufficient men to do so. The Russians, chiefly because they have only had very unwarlike people to conquer, have never yet in Central Asia been put in the position of having to withdraw after a conquest.

Among other interesting features of my stay in Kashgar were my conversations with M. Petrovsky. He was a man with a large knowledge of the world, who had lived many years in St. Petersburg, as well as in Russian Turkestan and Kashgar. He had read largely on subjects connected with India and Central Asia; he had a number of our best books and Parliamentary Reports, and, like all Russians, he talked very freely, and, on subjects not connected with local politics, in which of course we were both concerned, very openly. Hence I had an opportunity of seeing ourselves as others see us.

M. Petrovsky had read the report of the Sweating Committee, our Factory Legislation Reports, accounts in our newspapers of the strikes which continually occur. All this had produced on his mind the impression that we were in a bad way. Forty thousand men hold all the riches, and the rest of the thirty-six millions were just ground down to the last penny. This was his idea of the state of things in England; and he compared it with the condition of Russia. In Russia there was no great gulf between rich
and poor. Strikes, which he looked upon as mild revolutions, were unknown, and all lived together in peace and contentment under the Czar.

When I found an intelligent Russian taking this distorted view of the condition of England, and holding such optimistic opinions of the state of Russia, it often struck me that perhaps our own views of Russia were not always so true as they might be.

But it was in his criticisms of Indian and Central Asian affairs that I found M. Petrovsky most interesting, and, perhaps, more sound. One of the points upon which he was very insistent was our treatment of the natives. He thought that we held ourselves too much aloof from them, and that we were too cold and haughty. Here, I think, we must plead guilty; though if we had the faculty of getting on closer terms with those whom we rule, in addition to our other good qualities, we should be well-nigh perfect. When Englishmen are working hard together with natives, as on active service in the field, for instance, or surveying or exploring, the two nationalities become very firmly attached to each other. But ordinarily an Englishman finds great difficulty in “letting himself out” to strangers of any description. Very few, indeed, have that genial manner which draws people together. But as soon as the Englishman in India gets out of his wretched office, and away from all the stiffness of cantonment regularity, and is really thrown with the natives, so that he can see them and they him, the coldness thaws, and the natives see that in reality there is much warmth of heart inside the cold exterior. Offices and regulations are evils which apparently are necessary for effective administration of our civilized type, but if we shut ourselves up too closely behind these barriers, and lose touch with the people, then the Russian consul’s fears as to the eventual result of our coldness will undoubtedly be realized.

Of the Chinese, M. Petrovsky held a very poor opinion. He looked upon them with contempt, and had hardly a good word to say for them. Their administration was corrupt, the army badly officered and badly armed, and the empire generally honeycombed with secret societies. M. Petrovsky’s practical acquaintance with the Chinese Empire was, however, entirely confined to Kashgar, and he had not been a hundred miles into the country, even into this outlying dependency, much less into China itself. I was surprised, too, to find that neither he nor any of his staff spoke Chinese, though they had been many years in Chinese Turkestan, and they were dependent for their interpretation upon a Mussulman. Every English consul in China can speak Chinese, he is compelled to pass an examination in it, and even for a temporary stay in Turkestan I had been furnished with a competent English interpreter and a Cantonese clerk. In this important particular of acquiring a knowledge of the language of the people with whom we had to deal, it appeared, therefore, that we took far greater pains than the Russians did.

This is not the only case in which the Russians show themselves careless in learning the language of a country. In Turkestan it is the exception, and not the rule, for a Russian officer to speak the language of the people, and of six Russian officers whom I afterwards met on the Pamirs, only two could speak Turki, though they were permanently quartered in Turkestan. Those Russians who speak a foreign language, speak it very well indeed; but, contrary to the general belief in England, the majority of even Russian officers speak Russian only.

Enlivened by these conversations with Central Asian merchants and with the Russian consul and his staff, the winter at Kashgar passed more quickly than it might be expected to do in so remote a corner of the world. We were fortunate, too, in having several visitors from Europe. The first of these was M. E. Blanc, a French traveller, who, having spent a few months in Turkestan, was perfectly willing to
put both the Russian consul and myself right upon any point connected with Central Asia. The next visit was from the young Swedish traveller, Doctor Sven Hedin, who impressed me as being of the true stamp for exploration — physically robust, genial, even-tempered, cool and persevering. He only paid a hurried visit to Kashgar from Russian Turkestan, but he had already made a remarkable journey in Persia, and has since travelled much on the Pamirs, in Tibet, and Chinese Turkestan. I envied him his linguistic abilities, his knowledge of scientific subjects, obtained under the best instructors in Europe, and his artistic accomplishments; he seemed to possess every qualification of a scientific traveller, added to the quiet, self-reliant character of his Northern ancestors.

Later on, again, we had a visit from M. Dutreuil de Rhins and his companion M. Grenard, who did me the honour of staying with me during their fortnight's halt in Kashgar, preparatory to their three years' wandering in Tibet, which ended so disastrously in the murder of De Rhins by the Tibetans. M. de Rhins was a man of about forty-five, who had served the principal part of his life in the French navy and mercantile marine. He had already devoted his time for some years to the study of Tibet, and was most thorough and methodical in all his arrangements, and especially in his astronomical observations. We had many long conversations together, and I remember being particularly struck with a remark of his regarding the feeling between the French and the Germans. He said that neither he nor the majority of Frenchmen desired to bring on a war with Germany, but that if the Germans ever brought a war on he would at once enlist as a private soldier.

In the Franco-German war he had served as an officer. Having secured the necessary transport, M. de Rhins, with his companion, set out for Tibet. Macartney and I rode out of the town with them, and we parted with many assurances of goodwill, and after making arrangements to meet one day in Paris. I afterwards received a couple of letters from M. de Rhins, from Tibet; but he never returned from there. He was attacked by Tibetans, his arms were bound to his body with ropes, and he was thrown into a river and drowned; and so died one of the most hardy, plucky, and persevering of explorers whom France has sent out. Three years after leaving Kashgar his companion, M. Grenard, returned to Paris, and is now engaged in publishing the results of the journey.

These were our visitors, but we had also the company of a permanent European resident in Kashgar, Père Hendriks, the Dutch missionary, whom I had met here in 1887, and who still remains there. Regularly every day he used to come round for a chat and walk with us, and even now he writes to me every few months. His is lonely and uphill work, and he often appeared pressed down by the weight of obstacles which beset his way. But his enthusiasm and hopefulness were unbounded, and no kinder-hearted man exists. Many of his methods of conversion used to surprise me, and he certainly was not viewed with favour by the Russian authorities; but he was a man who had travelled much and studied much, and he was ready to talk in any language, from Mongol to English, and upon any subject, from the geological structures of the Himalayas, to his various conflicts with the Russian authorities. It would astonish people at home to see in what poverty this highly educated man lived, and to what straits he put himself in the exercise of his calling. Soon after we arrived he was dining with us, and the next morning when he came to see us he said he had slept much better that night. I asked him how it was he had done so, and he replied he thought it must be from having had some meat to eat at dinner with us. Then it was we found out that he lived on bread and vegetables only, for he had not more than ten or twelve rupees a month to spend, and lived in the merest hovel, which the Chinese had lent him. Of
course, after that he always had one, and generally two meals a day with us, and we were delighted at
the opportunity of having his company.

Beech and Lennard returned from a trip to Maralbashi before Christmas, so we were able, with them
and with the Russian consul, his secretary, his son, the Cossack officer of the escort, and Père Hendriks,
to have a good-sized dinner-party on Christmas Day. Beech had a wonderful tinned plum-pudding,
which went off with an explosion when it was opened on the table, and I had another, which a kind
friend in India had sent up, and which arrived on Christmas Eve, so we were able to show our Russian
friends what “le plum-pudding anglais,” which they had heard so much about but never seen, was
really like.

Beech soon set off to Russian Turkestan, and was most hospitably entertained there by the
governor-general and every other official whom he met, and came back in April much impressed with
his reception. Then he and Lennard departed for the Pamirs to shoot Ovis poli, seventeen head of which
magnificent animals they managed to bag.

At this time my life was saddened by two of the hardest blows which can befall a man. Both of them
were sudden and unexpected, and in that far-away land letters from my friends took many months to
reach me, and only came at intervals of weeks together. I longed to be home again once more, and those
at home were needing me only a little less than I did them. But three more months I had still to remain
stationary in Kashgar, the long days slowly dragging by with never-varying monotony.

At last, at the beginning of July, a man appeared one evening at our house, laden with a huge bag.
This was a post from India. None had arrived for nearly two months, and in this one the permission to
return to India, which I had been so longing for, arrived at last. Another pleasure, too, awaited me. An
official letter for me bore the letters C.I.E. after my name. I did not at first pay any attention, thinking it
was a mistake on the part of the clerk. But in a newspaper I found the announcement that I had been
made a Companion of the Order of the Indian Empire, and this recognition of my services could not
possibly have come at a more welcome time.

Permission was given me to return to India by either Leh or Gilgit, whichever I preferred; but poor
Macartney was to stay on in Kashgar, and he is still there. I chose to return by the Pamirs and Gilgit, as I
had already twice traversed the desolate route across the Karakoram. So I proceeded to hire ponies for
the journey, and to make other necessary arrangements.

In the meanwhile, news arrived from Yarkand that an English traveller had reached Shahidula from
Leh, in an almost destitute condition, and had told the Chinese authorities that he wanted to come on to
Kashgar to see me. I asked the Chinese to give him any assistance they could. This they did; and shortly
after a roughly pencilled note arrived for me, saying that he was Lieutenant Davison, of the Leinster
Regiment; that he had come from Leh with the intention of crossing the Mustagh Pass, explored by me in
1887, but he had been stopped by the rivers on the way, all his men but one had run away, and he had
lost nearly all his ponies, kit, and money. He had, therefore, no means of returning to Leh, and was
compelled to come on to me for assistance. He travelled up to Kashgar with astonishing rapidity, and
wanted, after getting information and assistance from me, to start off back again the next day to tackle
the Mustagh Pass once more. He was exactly like a bulldog — you could not get him off this pass. He
had come out to get over, and it was hours before I could convince him that it was impossible to do so
before September. But he had already had experience of the depth and rapidity of the rivers on the way
to it, and he gradually saw that it was out of the question. I then asked him for an account of his adventures on the way to Kashgar. It appeared that he had been given two months’ leave from his regiment. He had no time to get a proper map of the route he would have to follow; but he pushed on as hard as he could through Kashmir and Ladak towards the Karakoram Pass, from which point he imagined that he would merely have to “turn to the left” and he would see a long distinct range of snow-mountains, with a gap in them, which would be the Mustagh Pass. He had little idea of the pathless labyrinth of mountain that actually shut in this remote pass! Crossing his first pass between Kashmir and Ladak, he became snow-blind, and had to be carried across on a bed. At his second — beyond Leh — the Ladakis whom he had engaged struck work, and said the pass would not be open for ponies for weeks yet. But Davison, by measures more severe than diplomatic, managed to get both them and his ponies over. Then came the Karakoram Pass; and the only way to traverse this in the month of May, when the snow on it was all soft and yielding, was by tediously laying down felts and blankets in front of the ponies for them to walk over, picking them up as the ponies had passed over them, and again laying them down in front — and so on for mile upon mile. Those who have themselves had experience of trudging through soft snow at an elevation of eighteen thousand feet, can best realize what this must have been to a man who had come straight up from the plains of India, and who had never been on a snow-mountain in his life before. Now came the crisis of the journey. Davison had no map to show him the way to the Mustagh Pass, and, still worse, he had no guide. He had not been able to find a single man who had been a yard off the beaten track to Yarkand; but he had a rough map which gave him the relative position of the Mustagh and Karakoram Passes; so he plotted those two points on a piece of paper, and then started a prismatic compass survey, which in future he plotted out regularly on the same piece of paper, and by these means he hoped to be able to make out his way to the goal he had before him. With this intention, he followed down the stream which flows from the Karakoram Pass past Aktagh. But the further he advanced the more rugged and impracticable became the mountains which bounded in the valley in the direction of the Mustagh Pass. He could see nothing of that great snowy range which he had expected to find standing up conspicuous and distinct from all the rest, and with the Mustagh Pass forming a landmark which he could make out from any distance, and steer for without difficulty. Instead of this, he found himself shut in by rocky precipitous mountains, which forbade him following any other route but that which led down the valley he was in. He had lost three ponies on the Karakoram Pass. Two of his men now deserted with most of his supplies. But Davison still pushed on, in spite of the danger of doing so with his scanty stock of food, till — very fortunately for him — he was pulled up on account of the stream having increased so much in depth that it had become unfordable. This was at Khoja Mohammed gorge, about two marches below Chiragh Saldi. Davison tried to swim the river with a rope tied round his waist, but the stream was too strong for him. Finding it impossible to get down the valley at the time of year when the snows were melting and the rivers in flood, he reluctantly retraced his steps for a short distance and then turned north, crossed a pass (the Kokaolang, if I remember rightly) which had not previously been explored, and then, finding ahead of him nothing but snowfields and impracticable-looking mountains in the direction of Yarkand, he made his way back again to the valley of the Yarkand (Raskam) River, with the intention of making for Shahidula, the nearest point at which he could hope to get supplies. He was now at the last extremity; he had but one man, one pony, and supplies for a day or two. He then fell sick, and could not move, and in this plight he had to send away his sole remaining servant to find Shahidula, and bring some supplies and help
from that place. As it turned out, he was nearer Shahidula than he thought. His servant reached there the same day, and on the following returned with food and a pony. Davison’s difficulties were then over, and, after resting a few days at Shahidula to regain his strength, he made his way rapidly to Kashgar. The ground that Davison covered had been previously explored by both Russians and English, but Davison had not the benefit of their experience; and the remarkable thing about his journey was that he accomplished it without any previous experience either of mountaineering or of ordinary travelling. A young subaltern, of only two years’ service, he set out from the plains of Punjab, and by sheer pluck found his way, in the worst season of the year for travelling, to the plains of Turkestan, and this is a feat of which any one might feel proud.

I persuaded Davison to come back with me to India by the Pamirs, and our preparations for the journey were rapidly made. I called on all the Chinese officials, and received farewell dinners from them, and especially from old General Wang much hospitality. But it was a disappointment to me that I had to leave Kashgar without having the pleasure of saying good-bye to M. Petrovsky, the Russian consul. His dignity had been hurt because I took Davison to call upon him in the afternoon. He had refused to receive us, and afterwards informed Macartney that first calls ought always to be made in the middle of the day. I did my best to appease him by explaining by letter that we had only intended to do him a civility; that it was our custom to call in the afternoon; and that at Peking I had myself called upon his own official superior, the Russian minister, in the afternoon, and been called on in return by him. But M. Petrovsky replied that he was only concerned with Kashgar, and that at Kashgar the custom was to call in the middle of the day.

I regretted this misunderstanding with M. Petrovsky all the more because I felt myself indebted to him for many civilities during my stay in Kashgar. He had been most obliging in forwarding our letters through his couriers to Russian Turkestan; he had lent us numbers of books to read; and in many other ways had done us kindesses for which I should have wished to show my gratitude. I had, however, the satisfaction of parting on very friendly terms with M. Lutsch, the secretary, and receiving from him a handsome present as a token of his regard.
NEWS BRIEF

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ARCHAEOLOGY

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OUR AUTHORS

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Born in Yardimli, Republic of Azerbaijan in 1985. Received a BA degree in International Relations from Qafqaz University (Baku, Azerbaijan) in 2008. Currently he is studying for a MA-Double Degree in the field of Global Studies. He already completed the first year in 2009 at the University of Lepizig. At present he is completing the second year at the University of Vienna. Mr. Abilov’s main research areas are: Azerbaijan-Conflict Studies, Caucasus, European Union, International Relations Theories & Globalization; in these fields he authored several articles. He is native speaker of Azeri and Turkish, fluent in English and has a reasonable working knowledge of German.

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Mr. Aliyev holds a master’s degree in International Politics from Kyung Hee University, South Korea and has a degree in Humanitarian Action from Ruhr-Universität, Bochum, Germany. His current research interests are civil society in the North Caucasus and Russia, conflicts and democratization in the Caucasus.

BAYAR, Dovdoy (1946-2010)

Mongolian archaeologist. Mr. Bayar graduated in 1974 at the Ulaanbaatar Teachers’ Training College. From 1975 he was with the Mongolian Academy of Sciences, Institute of History, Department of Archaeology. Between 2002 and 2008 he was the director of the Middle Ages section, where he was engaged in investigating ancient Turkic and Mongolian periods. He became the chief expert of stone idols. He got his doctoral degree in 1991; his dissertation paid attention to the Eastern-Mongolian idols. Dr. Bayar was the first scholar who made a distinction between the Turkic and Mongolian idols. He received his Doctor of Sciences degree in 2001 with the dissertation on the topic of Mongolian stone idols. He took part as chief expert in numerous great international expeditions in Mongolia. Until 1990 he cooperated with Russian experts. After the collapse of Soviet Union, he took part in the joint Japanese-Mongolian expedition “Gurvan gol”; the group explored the archaeological places of Eastern-Mongolia, identifying Chinggis Khan’s early palace. Between 1999 and 2008 he was the chief expert of the joint German-Mongolian excavation of the great Mongolian Empire, Karakorum.

BÉRCZI, Szaniszló

Physicist-astronomer who made a new synthesis of evolution of matter according to the material hierarchy versus great structure building periods. This model is a part of his Lecture Note Series Book on the Eötvös University. He also organized a research group on evolution of matter in the Geonomy Scientific Committee of the Hungarian Academy of Scince (with Béla
Lukács). He wrote the first book in Hungary about planetary science From Crystals to Planetary Bodies (also he was the first candidate of earth sciences in topics planetology). He built with colleagues on the Eötvös University the Hungarian University Surveyor (Hunveyor) experimental space probe model for teachers for training purposes and development of new constructions in measuring technologies.

CSORNAI, Katalin

Completed her studies at the “Gate of Dharma” Buddhist University, Budapest, Hungary in 1999. She learnt from her masters — Éva Kalmár and Ildikó Ecsedy — compulsive commitment, thorough soundness and diligence, too. Ms. Csornai’s main research areas are the history and culture of the Han Empire and Manichean texts. Her main translation works include: ‘Barbarian Star Is Shining on Four Corners of the World’ (2007) and ‘The Manichean Manuscripts of the Rock Temple of Duanhuang’ (2009).

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Mr. Ab. Majid Dar has got his Bachelors Degree from the Government Degree College Khanabal, Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir, India. He did his Post-Graduation in Geography from the University of Kashmir. In addition to it, he has received a Bachelors of Education (B. Ed.) degree from the same university. He has completed his Doctor of Philosophy Programme in the discipline of Geography in 2009 at the Centre of Central Asian Studies, University of Kashmir.

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Was born in 1973 and graduated from the Middle East Technical University, Computer Engineering Department. In 1998 he started his MA studies at the Cinema-TV Department at Yeditepe University; he did further research in cinema in 2001 in Italy. In 2003 he successfully completed his master degree education with the thesis "Change of Cultural Society of Turkey in post-1980 and Cultural Construction of Yavuz Turgul Cinema". Since then he has been working in various TV series, short films, radio programs, documentary films as script writer and consultant. Starting from 2005, he attended a master class called "Playwriting Workshop" for a
period of one year at Mehmet Ergen management. After that class, he finished his first play entitled "Amber-eyed woman". Since 2006, he is giving lectures called "Dramatic Writing and Script Writing Workshop" at Sinematek Association. Since 1998 he has been working in different roles in the IT sector and currently is working as IT consultant.

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Mr. Farkas was born in 1967 in Kolozsvár/Cluj/Klausenburg, Romania. He holds a M.Sc. degree from Technical University of Budapest, Hungary and Ecole Normale Superieure de Cachan; France, and an MBA degree from Henley Management College, UK. Since 1992 he is living in the Netherlands. He cofounded the Foundation Mikes International in 2001 in The Hague, the Netherlands.

MARÁCZ, László

Born in 1960 in Utrecht, the Netherlands. Received his degree from the University of Groningen. Between 1984 and 1990 he was with the University of Groningen as assistant professor. Between 1990 and 1992 as a Niels Stensen scholar he was with MTI, MTA and CNRS as a guest researcher. Since 1992 Mr. Marácz is lecturer of the East-European Institute of the University of Amsterdam. His areas of research cover general syntax, Hungarian grammar, the relationship of Hungarians and the West. Author of numerous scientific publications and books.

MOLNÁR, Zsolt

Received a doctor univ. degree in Management and Organization from the Budapest University of Technology, Faculty of Social and Natural Sciences in the field of "Cognitive Modeling of Organizations". Currently he is working in the field of cognitive sciences focusing on the research of creation of meaning. His special interest is the investigation of the Hungarian language based on the meaning principle. In line with his research he is also working on new language teaching methods based on theoretical findings.

MOLNÁRNÉ CZEGLÉDI, Cecília

Ms. Molnárné Czeglédi is working as teacher and teaching methodology developer. Currently she is working in an elementary school, does applied research, practical adaptation and effective introductions in the field of teaching methodology development. At present her main area of interest is the development of a new Hungarian language teaching method, based on the theoretical findings of the meaning principle.
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Born in 1971, Budapest, Hungary. Received her diploma (M.Sc.) in Agricultural Sciences and her Doctorate (Ph.D.) in Plant Physiology, in 1995 and 2001, respectively, both from the Szent István University of Gödöllő, Hungary. In 2003 she graduated as an engineer in Plant Protection at the University of Veszprém, Hungary and worked for the Hungarian Plant and Soil Protection Service. Between 2004 and 2005 she worked as a postdoctoral student at the Technopôle Brest-Iroise in Brest, France. She is specialized in the physiology and molecular biology of halophyte plants. Since 2007 she studies fine arts at the Academy of Fine Arts of The Hague, The Netherlands. Her special field of interest is the artistic depiction of organic growth processes.

OBRUSÁNSZKY, Borbála

Historian, orientalist. She completed her studies at the University Eötvös Loránd in Budapest between 1992 and 1997 in history and Mongol civilization. This is followed by a postgradual study at the Mongol State University, where she is awarded a Ph.D. degree in 1999. Between 2000 and 2002 she worked as external consultant of the Asia Center at the University of Pécs, and organized the Mongol programs of the Shambala Tibet Center. During this period she participated in several expeditions in Mongolia and China. Ms. Obrusánszky is member and/or founder of several Hungarian scientific associations and she is author of numerous books and articles, and regularly provides analyses on Central-Asia in the scientific press.
SYED, Damsaz Ali

Received a M.A. degree in History at the University of Kashmir in 2006. At present he is pursuing a Ph.D. program in history through the faculty of School of Social Sciences at Indira Gandhi National Open University, New Delhi. His main area of research is Kashmiri history; he published several papers in this field. Mr. Syed has a command of the Urdu, Kashmiri, English, and German languages.

TAPON, Francis

Author of The Hidden Europe: What Eastern Europeans Can Teach Us, which comes in 2011.

Author of Hike Your Own Hike: 7 Life Lessons from Backpacking Across America.

Has visited all 25 Eastern European countries at least twice and has traveled there nonstop for 3 years.

Has traveled to over 80 countries, walked across America 4 times, backpacked over 12,500 miles in the mountains, and was a finalist in the California Outdoors Hall of Fame.


Amazon.com & Lincoln Mercury selected him as the best example of someone who is fulfilling the dream of traveling the world, and produced a video profile on him.

His dad is French, his mom is Chilean, and he was born in San Francisco. Speaks several languages. He has never owned a TV, chair, table, couch, bed, or rocket ship.

Has a BA in Religion from Amherst College and an MBA from Harvard Business School.

ZOMBORI, Andor

Born in Budapest, Hungary. Acquired a B.A. degree in Japanese language and international relations in 2003 at the California State University, Long Beach in the United States. Also studied Japanese language, culture, and international affairs for one year at the Osaka Gakuin University in Japan and Korean language and culture for another year at the Kyungbuk National University in Korea. Mr. Zombori has been living in Japan since 2004 and working at a Japanese automotive industry consulting company as the department head of English-language publications. His primary area of specialization is the Asian automotive industry and market.
YOUNGHUSBAND, Francis Edward (1863-1942)

Lieutenant Colonel Sir Francis Edward Younghusband was a British Army officer, explorer, and spiritual writer. He is remembered chiefly for his travels in the Far East and Central Asia; especially the 1904 British expedition to Tibet, which he led, and for his writings on Asia and foreign policy. Younghusband held positions including British commissioner to Tibet and President of the Royal Geographical Society.